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Developing Asia and the world
Developing Asia and the Pacific:  
Performance and prospects
Economic growth in developing Asia and the Pacific surprised on the upside in 2005. In September last 
year, the Asian Development Outlook (ADO) 2005 Update forecast aggregate regional growth of 6.6%. The 
ADO 2006’s estimate of growth is now 7.4%, well above the average rate of growth in the region since 
2000. If purchasing power parity weights, rather than weights based on market exchange rates, are used 
to aggregate over countries, regional growth in 2005 is estimated to have been even faster, at 8.0%. With 
the release of revised gross domestic product estimates for 2004 in a number of countries, growth in 
2004 has now been raised to 7.8%, from 7.4% in the ADO 2005 Update.
On the basis of a broadly favorable outlook for the international economy, the continuing trend 
toward improved economic management and performance, and apparent resilience to high oil prices, 
the ADO 2006 revises up its aggregate growth projection for 2006, and, to a lesser extent, for 2007 
(Figure 1.1.1). Aggregate regional growth of 7.2% is now expected in 2006, easing to 7.0% in 2007. But 
risks remain, and could yet unsettle a generally positive outlook. These risks include the possibility of a 
disorderly unraveling of global payments imbalances (which are still widening), heightened protectionist 
trade pressures, yet higher oil prices, and the possibility of an antigen shift of the avian flu virus into the 
human population.
Performance in 2005
Headline growth in developing Asia is heavily influenced by the 
performance of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (which carries a 
weight of about 37%), and by India and the Republic of Korea (Korea) 
(which have a combined weight of 30% of regional income) (Figure 1.1.2). 
In the PRC, following back-to-back years of double-digit expansion, 
growth dipped below 10% in 2005, but only fractionally. Booming exports 
and investment continued to propel demand, and growth of industrial 
output accelerated. In India, growth surged to 8.1%, underpinned 
by strong performances in industry and services, and a rebound in 
agriculture from a weak performance in 2004. Although Korean growth 
slipped in 2005, consumption demand recovered in the latter part of the 
year to lift the annual average to 4%.
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Other countries, too, saw positive developments. In 2005, Pakistan 
grew faster than at any time in the past two decades (its fiscal year 
ended on 30 June 2005). Its performance was helped by an exceptional 
agricultural harvest, but the industry and services sectors also showed 
some vigor. In 2005, growth once again climbed in Cambodia, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Viet Nam, and was faster than at 
any point since 1999 in all three countries. In Central Asia—a net oil and 
gas exporter—high oil prices supported double-digit economic expansion. 
Although growth in the Pacific remains seriously constrained, 2005 was 
better than most recent years. Solomon Islands consolidated its recovery 
process, and Samoa enjoyed its fastest growth in 4 years. The benefits of 
high oil prices enjoyed by Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste, both net 
exporters of oil, buttressed the Pacific average.
Resilience was another theme in 2005. The impact of high oil prices 
on growth appears to have been muted. Developing Asia is not only a 
large net oil importer, it is also a comparatively energy inefficient region 
(ADO 2005 Update). In 2005, oil prices were on average about 42% higher 
than in 2004, yet regional growth slowed by just 0.4 of a percentage 
point. And despite the horrific loss of life caused by the December 2004 
tsunami, economic growth in Indonesia and Sri Lanka in 2005 improved 
on 2004’s performance. Pakistan’s tragic earthquake is unlikely to have 
much impact on its economic performance in FY2006. Across the region, 
the number of human deaths from avian flu has now risen to 103 (as of 
17 March), but the main economic impact of the virus has so far been 
confined to the poultry sector. Although this sector is small in most 
countries, poor farmers are the people bearing the brunt of income losses.
Various factors help explain why oil prices did not make a large 
dent on regional growth in 2005. To the extent that fuel prices are 
either directly or indirectly subsidized, as they still are in many Asian 
developing countries, producers and consumers have been shielded from 
the need to make adjustments. In both the PRC and India, and in a 
majority of other countries, the pass-through of higher border prices to 
retail fuel prices was far from complete (Box 1.1.1). Unrelated factors that 
supported growth in 2005, such as better agricultural harvests in some 
countries, also helped mask the impact of higher oil prices. In countries 
that allowed faster and fuller pass-through, such as Indonesia and 
Thailand, there is clearer evidence that rising oil prices did in fact pinch 
growth. But the resources released by reduced subsidies are now available 
for programs that can sustain growth over the longer run, including 
investments in health, education, and physical infrastructure. 
For some countries, 2005 proved a difficult year. The Maldives 
economy contracted. This small island’s tourist industry was laid low by 
the destruction caused by the tsunami, and has yet to recover fully. The 
economy of the Kyrgyz Republic also contracted. Political dislocation 
and production difficulties at a large gold mine took their toll on 
aggregate income. In other countries, growth slowed. In Thailand, the 
conjunction of the tsunami, an unusually poor agricultural harvest, and 
political uncertainty linked to disruption in the south slowed growth. In 
the Philippines, too, bad weather hit agricultural growth and political 
uncertainty crimped investment. Toward the end of 2005, growth slowed 
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Since 2002, international fuel prices have been on an 
uptrend, cumulatively rising by close to 150%. The average 
price of Brent crude has climbed from $25 per barrel in 
2002 to $62 per barrel in 2006 (as of 15 March). Average 
prices of diesel and kerosene in the New York market 
have soared higher than that of Brent crude, increasing 
from about $0.18 per liter to $0.48 per liter over that 
period. Meanwhile, the hike in prices of unleaded 
gasoline, both regular and premium, has been much less 
than that of Brent crude. Average unleaded gasoline prices 
are now $0.42–0.46 per liter, compared with $0.18–0.21 
per liter in 2002.
While fuel prices in the international market are 
continuing to move up, governments in many parts 
of developing Asia have limited the rises in domestic 
retail fuel prices, shielding domestic consumers from 
higher costs. As a result, many Asian governments are 
facing increasing fiscal stresses brought about by direct 
or indirect subsidy provision. Bangladesh, India, Nepal, 
and Sri Lanka all adjusted retail prices upward in 2005. 
Diesel Super gasoline
Retail fuel prices of Luxembourg = approximate minimum entrance level for 10 European Union accession countries. 
Retail fuel prices in the United States = average cost-covering retail prices including industry margin, VAT, and  approximately 10 US cents for 
the two road funds (federal and state). This fuel price, as it has no other speciﬁc fuel taxes, may be considered the international minimum 
benchmark for a nonsubsidized road transport policy.
Crude oil prices on the world market (Brent at Rotterdam).
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Sources: National press reports; surveys by ADB resident missions; Fuel Price Report, February 2006, available:
http://www.theaa.com/onlinenews/allaboutcars/fuel/2006/February2006.doc; Energy Information Administration, available:
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1.1.1 Retail fuel prices in Asia
Box figure  Comparison of retail fuel prices in Asia (as of February 2006, US cents per liter)6    Asian Development Outlook 2006
Nevertheless, these countries continue to have relatively 
large direct or indirect subsidies (in relation to gross 
domestic product), mainly due to large subsidization of 
household-use products such as kerosene and liquefied 
petroleum gas. Governments have indicated that subsidies 
will be reduced in 2006 and 2007. The PRC raised gasoline 
and diesel ex-refinery prices in March 2006.
The box figure, which provides an indication of the 
extent of government subsidies, shows retail prices of 
transportation fuels—super gasoline and diesel—during 
the first 2 weeks of February 2006 for selected developing 
Asian economies. Following the methodology adopted 
by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the box 
figure shows three sets of colored vertical lines defining 
benchmark prices (see Box 3.4 of the Asian Development 
Outlook 2005 Update). The red lines (40 US cents per 
liter) indicate the cost per liter of crude oil, which was 
$63 per barrel at that time. The green lines are the US 
retail prices plus 10 US cents per liter of taxation for 
road infrastructure (77 US cents per liter for gasoline and 
76 US cents per liter for diesel). The yellow lines represent 
Luxembourg product prices (125 US cents for gasoline and 
107 US cents for diesel). Only Hong Kong, China and the 
Republic of Korea priced their gasoline and diesel close to 
the yellow benchmark lines of Luxembourg.
For gasoline, a large number of economies (14) in 
developing Asia charged the US retail price benchmark 
or more, while a smaller number (5) charged the US 
retail price benchmark net of the 10 US cents allowance 
for taxation. This does not necessarily indicate that full 
cost recovery was practiced in these countries’ pricing 
mechanisms, as cost recovery depends on refining 
and distribution efficiency as well as on infrastructure 
maintenance costs. Economies pricing up to the green 
benchmark line likely recovered at least their crude and 
refining costs. 
Indonesia used to cover only crude costs, but even 
as gasoline prices were put up by 149% since February 
2005, retail prices remained below the green benchmark 
line. In Turkmenistan, which is one of the net oil and 
gas exporters of Central Asia, retail prices covered a very 
small fraction of crude costs. Azerbaijan priced almost 
up to the red benchmark line. Malaysia and Uzbekistan 
covered crude oil costs, but retail prices remained heavily 
subsidized. In late February 2006, gasoline prices were 
raised by 19% in Malaysia, but the Government estimates 
that the new prices would be 28% higher still if subsidies 
were removed. Retail prices in Myanmar fell short of crude 
oil costs, even as gasoline prices were raised more than 
eightfold in October 2005 to curb a thriving trade in the 
black market.
For diesel, several countries—Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—
charged less than the indicative crude costs. As with 
gasoline, most of the countries that did not charge up 
to the red benchmark line are oil producers and net oil 
exporters. Myanmar, despite having lifted diesel prices 
more than ninefold in the last quarter of 2005, still has 
heavily subsidized retail prices. Malaysia estimates that 
domestic retail prices of diesel would be 25% higher 
if government subsidies were removed. Still, another 
19 countries did not price up to the US retail price 
benchmark. 
More economies provided greater subsidies for diesel 
than for gasoline. This is because diesel is commonly used 
by public utility vehicles, and the poor stand to benefit 
from the subsidy by way of lower transport fares. However, 
an unintended effect is that private car owners who use 
diesel-run vehicles also benefit from the government 
subsidy.
Since 15 February 2006, crude oil prices have risen 
further, but these increases have not been fully reflected 
in domestic retail prices of most developing Asian 
economies. Instead, subsidy bills continue to grow, fuel 
tax revenues are generally on the slide, and losses of state 
owned and controlled petroleum distribution companies 
continue to rise.
Sources: Surveys by ADB resident missions; Fuel Price Report, 
February 2006, available: http://www.theaa.com/onlinenews/
allaboutcars/fuel/2006/February2006.doc; Datastream; Energy 
Information Administration, available: http://www.eia.doe.gov; 
national press reports.
sharply in Indonesia as the impact of reductions in fuel subsidies caused 
inflation to jump and rising interest rates sapped domestic demand. 
Inflation in developing Asia moderated a little in 2005, but the picture 
varied across subregions and countries (Figure 1.1.3). Inflation eased in 
both East Asia and South Asia, largely as a result of favorable agricultural 
developments that subdued rises in food prices. But it accelerated in 
Southeast Asia and in Central Asia on account of higher oil prices, 
though for different reasons. In Southeast Asia, higher oil prices added 
to costs that percolated through to prices, while in Central Asia inflation 
was spurred by the impact of a booming oil sector on demand, as Asian Development Outlook 2006    
government spending expanded and oil wealth filtered through to other 
parts of the economy. 
Across the region, the monetary authorities took steps to respond to 
the threat of heightened inflationary expectations. Policy interest rates 
were raised in quite a few economies, including Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; 
India; Indonesia; Kazakhstan; Korea; Malaysia; Pakistan; Philippines; 
Sri Lanka; Taipei,China; and Thailand. Nevertheless, real interest rates 
remained quite low.
In most countries, fiscal positions in 2005 remained little changed 
relative to 2004. However, measures to limit growth of expenditure helped 
reduce the deficit in the Philippines, and in India fast growth helped buoy 
fiscal revenues. In Indonesia and Malaysia, public expenditure targets 
were missed because of slow disbursements on planned investments. 
In Pakistan, a larger deficit reflected a sharp increase in development 
expenditures aimed at sustaining growth. In some countries, the fiscal 
cost of fuel subsidies have triggered cuts in their levels, with subsidies 
on gasoline reduced the most and those on diesel and kerosene less so. 
Thailand moved to eliminate gasoline and diesel subsidies altogether. In 
October, the Indonesian Government slashed subsidies. Other countries 
have moved more slowly. In Bangladesh, PRC, and India, liabilities 
accumulated on the balance sheets of state-owned oil distribution 
companies that purchase fuel at world prices but that are compelled to 
sell in domestic markets cheaply. These losses must eventually be met by 
taxpayers.
Developing Asia’s trade surplus with the rest of the world widened by 
$52 billion in 2005 to $192 billion; the PRC’s trade surplus alone widened 
by about $74 billion. Had oil prices not risen, Asia’s trade surplus would 
have been much larger. Although the growth of merchandise exports 
from the PRC tailed off a little in 2005, imports grew at only half of 
their 2004 pace. Slower import growth in 2005 reflected an expansion 
of domestic capacity that replaced imports of some commodities and, 
possibly, a drawdown of inventories of imported commodities that had 
been accumulated in earlier years. Korea’s trade surplus in 2005 almost 
matched 2004’s as large-scale enterprises continued to perform strongly 
in overseas markets. In Southeast Asia, an overall rise in the current 
account surplus disguised a widening trade deficit in both the Philippines 
and Thailand. Central Asia posted a 75% increase in its trade surplus as 
a result of higher oil prices. In South Asia, trade deficits widened in all 
countries but Bangladesh and Nepal (Figure 1.1.4).
Generally, current account movements in 2005 tracked closely those 
of the trade balance. But strong remittance inflows in Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, and Philippines in 2005 either offset or reversed trade deficits. 
To some degree, remittances were buoyed by strong oil revenues in the 
Middle East, which is host to many immigrant workers from Asia. As a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), the current account surplus 
widened in East Asia, and narrowed in Southeast Asia (Figure 1.1.5). 
In Central Asia, the deficit switched to a surplus. South Asia’s current 
account deficit widened substantially. Largely as a consequence of current 
account surpluses, developing Asia’s foreign exchange reserves increased 
in 2005 to around $1.86 trillion (Box 1.1.2). Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows in 2005 remained brisk but were a little less than in 2004, 
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Developing Asia’s foreign exchange reserves rose by about $252.4 billion 
during 2005 to $1.86 trillion at year-end, according to preliminary data 
(Box table). Despite its size, the advance was much lower than the 
$369.4 billion seen in 2004, and represented a break in the increasingly 
outsized gains made by the region since 2001 (Box figure 1). Only a 
handful of countries recorded declines in reserves in either year and 
they were marginal. The lower accumulation in 2005 was due mainly 
to smaller reserve increases 
among large holders such 
as India; Republic of Korea; 
Malaysia; Singapore; and 
Taipei,China. Early balance-
of-payments data suggest that 
these smaller gains reflect 
developments in the capital 
and financial accounts rather 
than in the current account. 
The absolute increase 
in the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) in 2005 
was about the same as in 
2004, despite a marked 
improvement in its current 
account surplus for the year. At $819 million, the PRC accounted for 
about 44% of developing Asia’s stock of foreign exchange reserves at 
end-2005, up from about 27% at end-2001, accumulating about 56% of 
the region’s increase in reserves over this period.
Box figure 2 indicates that the region’s share in the United States 
(US) merchandise trade deficit remained essentially stable in 2005—as 
it has since 2000. Within this trend, the PRC has gained share. This 
is in contrast to Southeast 
Asia, reflecting both the 
country’s development as 
the lowest-cost producer 
of many goods and the 
growth of intraregional trade 
(which features exports of 
components and supplies to 
the PRC for assembly into 
goods for export). 
In 2005, developing Asia’s 
trade deficit with the US 
amounted to $289.6 billion, 
or 37.8% of the total 
US trade deficit, up by 
0.6 percentage points from 
2004. In East Asia, the PRC accounted for $201.6 billion, or 26.3% of 
the total deficit, up by 1.4 percentage points, while the share of Korea 
and Taipei,China fell by a combined 1.2 percentage points, to produce 
a net 0.2 percentage point increase for the subregion. A deeper US 
trade deficit with Southeast Asia accounted for nearly all the balance 
(0.4 percentage points) of 2005’s increase. 
1.1.2 Developing Asia’s foreign exchange reserves and the United States trade deficit
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Foreign exchange reserves ($ billion)
Stock 
end-2005
Change over the year
   2005          2004
Central Asia 8.7 -2.0 4.9
Armenia 0.7 0.2 0.1
Azerbaijan 1.2 0.1 0.4
Kazakhstan 6.1 -2.4 4.2
Kyrgyz Republic 0.6 0.1 0.2
Tajikistan 0.2 0.0 0.0
East Asia 1,406.8 233.2 290.6
China, People's Rep. of 818.9 208.9 206.7
Hong Kong, China 124.2 0.7 5.2
Korea, Rep. of 210.0 11.8 43.7
Mongolia 0.4 0.2 0.0
Taipei,China 253.3 11.6 35.1
South Asia 148.1 6.3 27.1
Bangladesh 2.8 -0.4 0.6
Bhutan 0.4 0.1 -0.1
India 131.0 5.9 27.5
Maldives 0.2 -0.0 0.0
Nepal 1.5 0.0 0.2
Pakistan 9.8 0.3 -1.1
Sri Lanka 2.5 0.4 -0.1
Southeast Asia 297.0 15.0 46.5
Cambodia 1.0 0.0 0.1
Indonesia 32.8 -1.9 -0.0
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.2 0.0 0.0
Malaysia 72.0 6.6 21.9
Myanmar 0.8 0.1 0.1
Philippines 15.8 2.8 -0.5
Singapore 115.3 3.8 16.5
Thailand 50.5 2.0 7.5
Viet Nam 8.6 1.6 0.8
The Pacific 1.4 -0.0 0.2
Fiji Islands 0.3 -0.1 0.1
Micronesia, Fed. States of 0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Papua New Guinea 0.7 0.1 0.1
Samoa 0.1 -0.0 0.0
Solomon Islands 0.1 0.0 0.0
Tonga 0.0 -0.0 0.0
Vanuatu 0.1 0.0 0.0
Developing Asia 1,862.0 252.4 369.4
Note: Foreign exchange reserves exclude gold, special drawing 
rights, and the reserve position in the International Monetary 
Fund. 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, and Asian Development Bank staff estimates.Asian Development Outlook 2006    
while portfolio inflows climbed sharply. However, 2005 saw net credit 
outflows, prompted perhaps by revised expectations of the likelihood of 
regional currency appreciation. 
Developing Asia’s aggregate current account surplus mirrors an excess 
of Asia’s saving over investment. This has been referred to as a “savings 
glut,” but as the ADO 2005 Update noted, outside the PRC, widening 
surpluses are more closely associated with stunted levels of investment. 
In 2004, evidence of a broad pickup in business investment was observed, 
particularly in South Asia and Southeast Asia. The PRC’s investment 
rate, which has trended up for over two decades, also increased in 2004. 
But in 2005, investment performance was somewhat mixed. Yet again, 
the aggregate investment rate rose in the PRC, despite the presence of 
substantial excess capacity in some sectors. In South Asia, investment 
rates remained largely unchanged on 2004. In Southeast Asia, investment 
spurted in Thailand and its ratio to GDP increased by 4.5 percentage 
points. In Indonesia, the investment rate held steady. Investment rates fell 
in Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore. With the exception of Cambodia, 
PRC, and Viet Nam, investment rates in East Asia and Southeast Asia are 
still well below their average precrisis levels (Figure 1.1.6).
On the eve of the abolition of quotas on textiles and clothing on 
31 December 2004, concerns had been expressed that some countries in 
developing Asia could lose significantly (for example, Mlachila and Yang 
2004).
 The textile and clothing industry is an important source of foreign 
exchange revenue, income, and employment in many of Asia’s developing 
countries. A detailed examination of the impact of the end of the quota 
regime is provided in Textiles and clothing in the post-quota era: The 
outlook for Asian suppliers, later in Part 1, drawing on recent European 
Union (EU) and United States (US) customs data on the quantity and 
value of imports from exporting countries. This analysis suggests that 
for competitive, well-positioned Asian suppliers, such as Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, the end of quotas has, overall, 
resulted in expansion and increased market shares, despite reversals in 
some market segments. But for smaller, marginal producers, such as 
Fiji Islands, Mongolia, and Nepal, the end of quotas has meant that it is 
no longer profitable to produce readymade clothes for distant markets 
in Europe and America, and has led to factory closures and downsizing. 
For those countries where unit labor costs are comparatively high, such 
as Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand, some reductions in market share 
have occurred but prospects have been helped by the reintroduction of 
“safeguard” quotas on the PRC’s textile and clothing exports in the latter 
part of 2005. Viet Nam’s market share also held up in the EU and US. 
That country’s prospects will depend on its World Trade Organization 
(WTO) accession and the development of its intermediate textiles 
industry. 
Outlook for 2006 and 2007
The outlook for developing Asia in 2006 and 2007 will clearly depend 
on global economic prospects (Table 1.1.1). As explained in Prospects for 
the World Economy in 2006–2007, below, these are seen as remaining 
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the major industrial economies are forecast to grow close 
to their potential, and global trade is expected to expand 
at about its recent historical average. The upswing in the 
global electronics cycle, which began in 2005, should 
continue through most of 2006, supporting growth in a 
number of regional economies, in East Asia and Southeast 
Asia especially. Fast growth is again expected in the PRC 
and India. Risks to the regional outlook would, however, be 
mitigated if domestic demand were to play a more supportive 
role going forward. 
The baseline assumptions on which the country 
projections rest are set out in each of the country chapters 
(see Part 2). Although it is difficult to generalize across 
such an expansive and diverse region, it seems reasonable 
to expect that macroeconomic policy settings will remain 
broadly neutral in terms of their impact on demand. In a 
number of countries, interest rates are likely to continue 
to climb in a context where global interest rates are also 
likely to rise. The room for fiscal maneuver is limited in 
many countries of developing Asia. Indeed, in a number of 
countries, it is expected that governments will take measures 
to rein in deficits. In those countries where fuel subsidies are 
directly or indirectly adding to fiscal burdens, subsidies are 
likely to be gradually rolled back and retail prices brought more closely 
into line with border prices. Hidden subsidies to other energy prices, such 
as electricity, may also be gradually removed as the cost of fuel inputs 
rises.
Against a backdrop of favorable global conditions, of marginally 
less accommodative macroeconomic policy settings, and of continued 
adjustments to high oil prices, aggregate growth in 2006 is expected to 
soften a little to 7.2%, and by some more in 2007 to 7.0%. By historical 
standards, these growth rates in developing Asia are robust (Figure 1.1.7). 
In the PRC, growth is set to ease in 2006. In its recently announced 
11th Five-Year Program (2006–2010), the Government has set its sights on 
a lower growth trajectory for the economy. The Government now intends 
to pay more attention to some of the social and environmental stresses 
that have emerged as a consequence of the prolonged rapid growth that 
has largely been concentrated in urban and coastal areas. However, given 
the existence of gaps in market institutions and signaling processes, and 
the difficulties in changing incentives and reining in spending at the local 
level, it is unlikely that the momentum of growth can be slowed quickly. 
Growth of about 9.5% is forecast for 2006, softening to about 8.8% in 2007. 
In Korea, growth in 2006 is expected to accelerate to 5.1%, supported by 
a continued recovery in consumption demand, and strong investment 
demand by large-scale enterprises. A combination of slower growth in the 
PRC and an acceleration of growth in Korea should just about cancel each 
other out, leaving the average for East Asia at about 7.7%, matching 2005’s 
performance. 
India has ambitions to lift its growth rate to over 9% in the medium 
term. This is likely to require that it increase the ratio of its investment 
to GDP and that it raise capital productivity. Both will need determined 
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1.1.1 Selected economic indicators, developing Asia, 
2004–2007
2004 2005 2006 2007
Gross domestic product (annual % change)
Developing Asia 7.8 7.4 7.2 7.0
  Central Asia 10.6 10.9 10.3 9.8
  East Asia 8.3 7.7 7.7 7.1
  South Asia 7.2 7.8 7.3 7.5
  Southeast Asia 6.3 5.5 5.5 5.7
  The Pacific 3.1 2.7 2.9 3.0
Consumer price index (annual % change)
Developing Asia 4.1 3.4 4.0 3.7
  Central Asia 5.8 7.4 7.9 6.3
  East Asia 3.3 2.0 2.4 2.7
  South Asia a 6.2 5.3 6.1 5.4
  Southeast Asia 4.3 6.3 7.3 4.9
  The Pacific 3.4 2.6 2.9 2.8
Current account balance (% of GDP)
Developing Asia 3.6 4.3 3.9 3.4
  Central Asia -1.8 1.7 2.9 4.8
  East Asia 4.3 5.8 5.5 4.8
  South Asia -0.5 -2.3 -3.0 -3.1
  Southeast Asia 6.3 6.1 5.6 5.2
  The Pacific -0.8 -0.6 - -
a India reports on a wholesale price index basis.
Sources: Asian Development Outlook database; staff estimates.Asian Development Outlook 2006    11
reform efforts. However, it is unlikely that growth in 2006 can match 
2005’s strong performance. The base effect that lifted agricultural growth 
in 2005 will be removed, the Reserve Bank of India is likely to continue 
to nudge interest rates up over the next 12 months, and the program of 
fiscal consolidation that is now under way is set to continue. As part 
of this program, the economy will likely have to adjust to the effects of 
higher global oil prices so that subsidies can be reduced. In Pakistan too, 
growth is expected to soften as agricultural conditions revert to normal. 
Outside agriculture, particularly in the large-scale industrial sector and in 
services, Pakistan’s economy should continue to perform strongly. Softer 
growth in India and Pakistan will clip the average for South Asia, which 
is put at about 7.3% in 2006, but with some upside potential in 2007 as 
investment expands to relieve infrastructure bottlenecks. 
The performance of Southeast Asia in 2006 and 2007 is likely to change 
little from recent economic performance, with growth projected at 5.5% in 
2006 and rising marginally to 5.7% in 2007. Until there are clear signals 
that inflationary threats have abated, domestic demand in Indonesia 
will probably be contained by high interest rates. Thereafter, possibly in 
the second half of 2006, growth should begin to pick up. Medium-term 
prospects will hinge on an improvement in the business investment 
climate, and on an easing of infrastructure bottlenecks. In Malaysia 
and Thailand, it is expected that public sector investment programs will 
address critical bottlenecks and support growth. Both economies may also 
benefit from the current upswing in the electronics cycle. Over the near 
term, growth in the Philippines is expected to stay largely unchanged. The 
Philippines faces a difficult reform agenda, which has upfront costs but 
which should deliver durable benefits over the longer term. 
As a net oil exporter, Central Asia will continue to benefit from high 
oil prices. Robust growth in Kazakhstan should continue. Azerbaijan in 
2005 became one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, with 
momentum set to build further as new investments in oil and gas fields 
and export pipelines come into full operation. An important challenge 
in Azerbaijan and in other oil-exporting countries is to manage windfall 
gains in a way that provides a basis for balanced and sustainable growth 
over the long term. Uzbekistan has enjoyed strong growth in the past 2 
years and this momentum will likely be carried forward, aided by greater 
FDI. Growth in the Kyrgyz Republic, which is a net oil importer, should 
bounce back after 2005’s difficulties. In both 2006 and 2007, growth in 
Central Asia is expected to remain close to 10%. 
In the Pacific, high oil prices will help sustain subregional growth in 
2006 as both Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste are comparatively large 
economies and net oil exporters. Timor-Leste will see growth boosted by 
higher public investment financed by petroleum revenues. In contrast, 
Papua New Guinea’s growth prospects remain hobbled by a difficult law-
and-order situation. The small economies, which are entirely dependent 
on fuel imports, will continue to face pressures, but Solomon Islands is 
expected to consolidate its recovery. In the Fiji Islands, growth of tourism 
and opportunities in some niche sectors will help offset difficulties 
created through the loss of clothing quotas and reductions in sugar 
subsidies by the EU. Growth in the Pacific is predicted to remain at about 
3.0% in 2006 and 2007. 
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The inflation outlook for developing Asia in 2006 and 2007 
is generally favorable (Figure 1.1.8). In most countries, authorities 
are expected to respond adroitly to inflationary threats. Slowing 
price inflation—or even declining prices—for commodities, a mild 
appreciation of regional currencies, and stiff competition in the market 
for manufactured goods are all likely to help keep price rises in check. 
However, a gradual pass-through of earlier oil price rises seems set to 
continue in 2006 and will seep into inflation numbers. Food prices may 
also rise if agricultural conditions turn out to be less favorable than in the 
recent past. For these reasons, inflation is expected to edge up in some 
countries, but should pose little threat to overall prospects. As the impact 
of earlier oil price rises should have largely faded by 2007, and higher 
interest rates will have had more time to work on demand, it is envisaged 
that inflationary pressures will subsequently recede. Further sharp rises 
in oil prices would, of course, pose a risk to the outlook for inflation.
Developing Asia is expected to continue to run a substantial current 
account surplus over the next 2 years (Figure 1.1.9). As a proportion of 
GDP, though, it is likely that the current account surplus will begin to 
edge down (Figure 1.1.10). In the PRC, measures to support domestic 
demand and greater exchange rate flexibility should start to narrow its 
trade and current account surpluses. Korea’s current account surplus 
may also close as domestic demand plays a stronger role in supporting 
growth. In South Asia, deficits are likely to persist or may even widen as 
large infrastructure projects get under way. Thailand, which ran a current 
account deficit in 2005 for the first time since 1997, is expected to maintain 
deficits in 2006 and 2007 as domestic investment picks up further. 
A narrowing current account surplus suggests that, on average, 
domestic demand will play a more important role in supporting growth 
in developing Asia in 2006 and 2007. In some countries, the growth of 
consumption spending is set to pick up and, in others, there is greater 
optimism about investment. Public investment programs will be ramped 
up in some countries to address deficits in areas such as roads, ports, 
power, and the environment. Ongoing efforts to improve the business 
climate for private investment, and improved corporate balance sheets, 
should also contribute to capital spending. 
The moves toward greater currency flexibility against the US dollar 
taken by the PRC and Malaysia in 2005 have so far resulted in only small 
appreciations of the dollar value of their currencies. In recent months, 
the Korean won and the Singapore dollar have appreciated by more. The 
likelihood of continued current account surpluses, robust FDI inflows, 
and—possibly—sustained portfolio interest in developing Asia is likely to 
keep exerting pressures for an appreciation of many regional currencies 
through 2006. Additional exchange rate flexibility of key currencies would 
help adjustments and could give a fillip to domestic demand. 
Medium-term prospects and challenges
The medium-term outlook (2006–2010) for developing Asia is broadly 
favorable. The region benefits from its geography and demographics, and 
from the conviction among leading policy makers that integration with 
the global economy will be beneficial. Nevertheless, further progress 
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cannot be taken for granted and, in many countries, sustaining growth 
will require a concerted effort on reforms. Not only will reforms expand 
opportunities, but they should also help economies better cope with any 
future turbulence and shocks that they may have to face. 
Part 2 of ADO 2006 notes that a key challenge (outside the PRC) is 
to raise investment rates to sustain or accelerate growth. More public 
sector resources will be needed to help close gaps in physical and social 
infrastructure provision. This is likely to require taxation and other 
revenue reforms, as well as closer scrutiny of what governments spend 
public money on. Closer partnerships will also be needed between 
the private and public sectors to meet burgeoning infrastructure 
needs, though the private sector will not find partnerships attractive 
if they entail unreasonable risks. At one level, risks can emanate from 
macroeconomic instability. At another, inadequate legal and regulatory 
provision, and unreliable enforcement, represent a deterrent to private 
investment. The absence of markets in long-term debt and in instruments 
for hedging and managing risk also impede private investments in 
projects where revenue streams extend far into the future. And there is 
still much that can be done to improve the climate for small domestic 
private entrepreneurs, including simplifying business registration 
processes (Table 1.1.2). 
A later section in Part 1, The Doha Development Agenda, asks: What is 
at stake for developing Asia in the Doha Round trade talks? It makes the 
point that the region has a strong interest in a positive conclusion to the 
Doha Round, and that developing countries in Asia can contribute to this. 
This is likely to require them to trade off concessions on liberalization in 
“sensitive” sectors for expanded market access in other sectors, special 
assistance to support structural adjustment, and measures to ensure that 
poor countries can actually get their exports to market. The benefits of 
trade liberalization will be maximized where complementary domestic 
reforms ensure positive supply responses to changes in relative prices. The 
idea that there can be a “round for free” for least-developed countries is 
misplaced. These countries will only benefit from the Doha Round if they 
take an active part in the talks. Although meaningful trade liberalization, 
particularly in agriculture, can do much to help expand opportunities 
for the poor, in some cases safety nets may be needed to provide social 
protection and mitigate adjustment costs. 
Part 3 of ADO 2006 looks beyond the Doha Round and examines 
the opportunities offered by possible multilateral, regional, and bilateral 
routes to trade liberalization in Asia (see also Box 1.1.3 in this section). 
There has been a close association between burgeoning trade, FDI, and 
deepening regional trade integration, particularly in East Asia and 
Southeast Asia. The evidence, however, suggests that these processes are 
being driven more by technology, markets, and the private sector than 
by formal preferential trading agreements such as the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA). Looking 
to the future, opportunities for trade creation in Asia as well as in the 
rest of the world would be maximized by a multilateral approach to 
liberalization, especially one that includes low-income Asian countries 
that are currently outside the WTO framework. 
Developing countries in Asia are now, though, being swept along on 
1.1.2 Ease of doing business
Rank Economy
2 Singapore
7 Hong Kong, China
20 Thailand
21 Malaysia








48 Marshall Islands, Rep. of
49 Vanuatu
50 Palau, Rep. of
53 Solomon Islands
55 Nepal
56 Micronesia, Fed. States of
60 Pakistan
61 Mongolia















142 Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of
147 Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Note: The ease of doing business index ranks 
economies from 1 to 155 and is calculated as 
the ranking on the simple average of country 
percentile rankings in each of the following 
indicators (covered in Doing Business in 2006): 
(i) starting a business, (ii) dealing with licenses, 
(iii) hiring and firing workers, (iv) registering 
property, (v) getting credit, (vi) protecting 
investors, (vii) paying taxes, (viii) trading across 
borders), (ix) enforcing contracts, and (x) closing a 
business.
Source: Doing business web site, available: http://
www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings/, 
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Developing Asia’s trade in goods and services has grown 
at an unrivalled rate. Between 1984 and 2004, the region’s 
exports expanded almost 10-fold. Over the same period, 
it enjoyed rapid growth of income, and made significant 
gains in terms of poverty reduction and other social 
objectives. Of course, aggregate regional trends mask 
considerable geographic diversity. East Asia led the way 
and began experimenting with trade liberalization in the 
1960s. Gradually, these experiments were broadened, 
and East Asia was followed by Southeast Asia and 
more recently by the People’s Republic of China. These 
experiences have had a powerful demonstration effect and 
South Asia is now embarking on its own liberalization 
agenda. In Central Asia, trade has grown from a low base, 
after a virtual dissolving of economic structures at the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. In the small Pacific states, 
location and size have been an impediment to deeper 
integration. 
It would be naïve to suggest that trade liberalization 
can of itself ignite and sustain growth, but the balance of 
evidence (Winters 2004) provides a strong “presumption” 
that trade liberalization has been an important element 
in a broader package of factors that has helped lift 
productivity and incomes in developing Asia. One 
reason for this is, perhaps, that trade openness stimulates 
investment by expanding markets abroad and by reducing 
the cost of imported machinery. Another is that trade 
liberalization may help trigger or “lock in” other beneficial 
institutional and policy changes. In contrast, significant 
trade protection has never been associated with fast 
economic growth for extended periods of time. 
Part 3 develops the point that growing trade integration 
within Asia, and between Asia and the rest of the world, 
reflects a confluence of factors. Trade integration has been 
driven both by multilateral and unilateral liberalization 
initiatives, on the one hand, and by technological changes 
and market opportunities that have created new avenues 
for trade, on the other. Developing Asia benefited from 
expanded market access for manufactured goods that 
resulted from multilateral trade liberalization under the 
sponsorship of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and then the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
But in East and Southeast Asia, unilateral efforts to 
liberalize trade were critical and helped pave the way for 
foreign direct investment looking for low-cost, export-
production platforms. These trends were apparent before 
the establishment of preferential trade agreements, such 
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade 
Area. Other evidence (ADB 2002) suggests that, unlike 
in North America and Europe, preferential agreements in 
developing Asia have had little impact on trade integration. 
Yet the landscape of preferential trade agreements is 
changing globally and in Asia. Perhaps disillusioned by 
the slow pace of progress on multilateral liberalization 
trade talks, policy makers in recent years have generated 
an avalanche of bilateral trade agreements that have 
been notified to WTO. Increasingly, these bilateral 
agreements will influence the volume and pattern of 
trade and investment flows, globally and within Asia. 
Such agreements liberalize trade on a reciprocal basis 
between two countries and their scope can go beyond 
WTO mandates to include investment, trade in services, 
and other issues, including trade facilitation. Essentially, 
like-minded partners can agree on anything they would 
like to, provided that this does not abrogate their WTO 
obligations. The potential that bilateral agreements have 
to expand into areas not yet covered in multilateral 
agreements holds promise for gains. But bilateral 
agreements are also inherently discriminatory, leaving 
countries that do not receive preferences at a disadvantage 
to those signing up to them. 
Asia is well represented in the array of bilateral 
agreements that are now in force or are currently 
in negotiation. Many of these actual and potential 
agreements are between Asian countries and countries 
from other regions. Asia’s “noodle bowl” is not only filling 
up quickly, it is spilling across regional boundaries. It 
seems unlikely that bilateralism is a route that will lead to 
a larger Asian free trade area (with or without extending 
benefits to third parties on a most-favored-nation basis). 
A more likely scenario is one in which large Asian trading 
“hubs” negotiate bilateral deals with smaller, isolated 
trading “spokes,” but in which the spokes are not linked 
through reciprocal deals with each other. 
In Part 3, a general equilibrium model of the global 
economy that focuses on Asia’s trade (GEMAT) is used 
to compare and contrast the potential offered to Asia by 
multilateral, regional, and bilateral approaches to trade 
liberalization. The results are striking and illustrate the 
possibility of significant trade diversion under bilateralism, 
and a polarization of benefits favoring large trading hubs 
to the detriment of small Asian countries. Add to this the 
compliance costs entailed by the expanding noodle bowl 
of overlapping and inconsistent rules of origin, as well as 
the fact that bilateralism can deflect interest and energy 
from multilateral processes, then the potential for harm is 
clearly present.
However, the risk entailed by bilateral agreements 
depends on their intentions, their coverage, and their 
details. It also depends on the underlying political 
dynamics. It is conceivable that bilateral liberalization 
initiatives may move these dynamics in some countries 
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toward more expansive, multilateral liberalization 
efforts, but this is not guaranteed. A more purposeful 
approach may therefore be needed to limit damage and 
maximize opportunities. In Part 3, ways of mitigating the 
potentially damaging impacts of bilateral agreements and 
of leveraging their potential benefits are set out. These 
include assuring wide coverage in terms of goods and 
services, adopting harmonized rules, and leaving open the 
possibility of extending preferences to others. Calculations 
presented there suggest (i) that measures reducing 
trade costs and helping ensure that poorer countries 
can get their goods to market more cheaply—through 
simplification of customs procedures, for example—offer 
considerable benefits, and (ii) that these measures are 
inherently nondiscriminatory. As many poor countries 
do not have the capacity to negotiate and design “full-
blown” bilateral trade agreements, technical assistance 
and cooperation are likely to be needed as part of broader 
“aid-for-trade” approaches.
In the final analysis, significant progress on the 
multilateral liberalization of trade under the aegis of 
WTO could do much to reduce bilateralism’s downside, 
through lowering potential margins of preference on a 
most-favored-nation basis. 
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1.1.3 Routes for Asia’s trade—continued
a rising tide of bilateralism in which countries extend preferences on a 
reciprocal basis, but do not extend liberalization on a most-favored-nation 
basis to others. Despite significant bilateral agreements between countries 
within the Asian region, such as the 2002 Economic Partnership 
Agreement between Japan and Singapore, agreements appear to be driven 
by a wide variety of interests and are not limited by geography. At this 
point, it would be difficult to conclude that bilateralism is a stepping 
stone to deeper integration within Asia or its subregions. Asia’s “noodle 
bowl” is getting full, but it is also spilling across regional boundaries. 
Given the compelling political, strategic, and commercial interests 
that appear to be driving bilateralism, the challenge ahead is to ensure 
that crisscrossing bilateral agreements adhere as closely as possible to 
principles that avoid discrimination and that these agreements reduce 
trade frictions and (nontariff) costs, rather than increase them. Faster 
progress on multilateral liberalization, by narrowing potential margins of 
preference, would also help stem possible harm caused by discrimination 
and complex rules of origin. 
Risks
This generally positive outlook for developing Asia could muddy for 
several reasons. Avian flu continues to spread in bird populations, and 
although it is difficult to quantify what the ultimate economic costs 
would be of a global pandemic among humans, the short-term costs are 
likely to be substantial (Box 1.1.4). Poor countries in Asia would face 
immense challenges in coping with the stresses that would be placed on 
health and social infrastructure and on public services. 
Global payments imbalances are, if anything, likely to widen in 2006, 
and maybe beyond. But encouraging signs of a more balanced profile of 
growth are emerging among the major industrial economies and some 
narrowing of the savings and investment gap in Asia may be in prospect. 
Nevertheless, underlying structural imbalances are unlikely to correct 16    Asian Development Outlook 2006
The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a major 
uncertainty facing the region’s economy. Since early 2004, the 
H5N1 influenza virus, commonly known as “avian flu,” has 
been spreading quickly in poultry populations throughout 
the region. Avian flu has been detected in birds in more than 
30 countries, from East Asia (where it originated) to Africa, 
Europe, and the Middle East. It has already severely curtailed 
the export of poultry products from a number of countries 
and has led to the deaths of millions of birds. In economic 
terms, estimated costs are in the range of $10 billion–
$15 billion. Since backyard farming is a major source of 
income for many rural households in the region, avian flu 
has contributed to the already high level of rural poverty. 
Public health experts fear that the H5N1 virus could 
mutate and become a human influenza. Around 200 people 
have caught avian flu directly from infected birds and more 
than half of them have died. Each animal-to-human infection 
raises the possibility that the virus will mutate. As humans 
have no natural immunity against this particular virus, it 
would spread quickly across the globe. What would the 
consequences of a human influenza pandemic be? 
The world has little experience with flu pandemics. In 
the 20th century, there were only three. The first, in 1918, 
killed an estimated 2.5–5.0% of the world’s population in a 
short period. It killed more people than the First World War. 
Two other pandemics were milder, although they did kill 
substantially more people than the normal seasonal flu. 
One thing that all of these flu pandemics had in common 
was that they originated with a form of avian influenza that 
subsequently mutated. If the virus mutates, it will take a 
heavy human toll. The World Health Organization’s most 
optimistic estimates are that it will lead to between 2 million 
and 7 million deaths. Other estimates are significantly higher. 
While the human cost would be substantial, it would also 
have important economic ramifications. 
The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak 
in 2003 caused a major, albeit short-term, economic shock 
localized in the affected economies. This highlighted the 
importance of psychology on the demand side. 
The Asian Development Bank made projections of 
the impact of a SARS-like demand shock coupled with 
the epidemiological estimates of the World Health 
Organization (available at http://adb.org/Documents/
EDRC/Policy_Briefs/PB042.pdf). These estimates suggest 
that avian flu would lead to a severe economic shock in the 
Asia and Pacific region, with economic consequences in the 
range of $100 billion–$300 billion. At its worse, this would 
essentially halt economic growth for 1 year and throw the 
world into an economic recession, the first global recession 
since 1982. 
While the economic impact of avian flu would be severe, 
in all likelihood it would not be long lasting. Economic 
activity would likely return to “normal” within 1 year 
and reach pre-pandemic levels in 2–3 years. Although the 
aggregate impact of avian flu is likely to be brief, its impact 
would not be felt uniformly. 
Services sectors would be severely affected, as people 
reduce their “face-to-face” contact. Internationally traded 
services, such as tourism, management consulting, and 
international banking, would be especially hard hit. 
Investment decisions would be delayed and trade would slow. 
Economies that have a significant share of services 
in their economies would be the most affected—and the 
impact greater and longer lasting. This includes advanced 
economies, such as Hong Kong, China and Singapore, and 
countries that receive significant international tourism, 
such as Cambodia and Thailand. Larger economies, such as 
People’s Republic of China, India, and Indonesia, are less 
dependent on international trade and so would feel a smaller 
economic impact. 
1.1.4 The economic risk of avian flu
themselves quickly and the possibility remains that a shift in investor 
preferences—which are, after all, volatile—will precipitate a sharp fall in 
the real value of the US dollar. Views about the extent of the required 
depreciation, its timing, and whether adjustments are likely to be smooth 
or sharp, vary widely. The most troubling scenario would be one in 
which the US dollar showed an abrupt and sharp depreciation. This 
would almost inevitably be accompanied by an increase in long-term US 
interest rates. Asia could then get caught in a double bind: not only would 
its exports to US markets become more expensive in US dollar terms, 
but domestic demand in the US could sag under the weight of higher 
market interest rates. As developing Asia is still highly dependent on the 
US as a market for its final goods, as seen in Part 3, this could stall an 
important engine of Asia’s growth. In these circumstances, inflationary 
pressures in Asia would be tempered and monetary policy could be eased, 
but opportunities to support demand through fiscal expansion would Asian Development Outlook 2006    1
be constrained. Better coordination of macroeconomic policies at an 
international level could help mitigate this risk. 
Looking further out, the quality of Asia’s growth poses risks. 
Economic growth has taken a high toll on the environment, to the point 
where threats to water and other resources could increasingly constrain 
growth. The incidence of environmental disasters appears to be increasing 
and this has now captured the attention of policy makers in the PRC and 
in other countries. As Asia continues to modernize and industrialize, it 
must find ways to promote cleaner production and technologies as well as 
greater energy efficiency. Markets and incentives, together with controls 
and regulations, have an important role to play.
Finally, the prospects for developing Asia will be imperiled if 
inequality continues to widen and growth does not provide jobs for its 
massive population. At least 500 million people in the region were either 
unemployed or underemployed in 2005, out of a total labor force of 
1.75 billion. Between 2005 and 2015, another 245 million people will be 
added to the labor force. Developing Asia therefore needs to find almost 
three quarters of a billion new jobs in the next decade. If it fails to do 
this, its growth is unlikely to prove durable over the long run as social 
and other stresses—including badly overcrowded cities—increasingly 
consume resources and constrain opportunities. Ultimately, these jobs 
will not be provided if countries retreat into protectionism and turn their 
backs on trade liberalization, or fail to undertake other complementary 
reforms that will elicit the necessary supply responses. 
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The world economy demonstrated great resilience in 2005, despite rising oil prices, multiple natural 
disasters, and tight commodity markets. Growth in the United States (US), Japan, and euro zone averaged 
2.7%, slowing from 3.2% in 2004. These figures mask important divergences in growth performance—
a rapid recovery in Japan, strong growth in the US, and a faltering recovery in the euro zone. This 
divergence in economic performance among industrial economies is likely to narrow somewhat in 2006 
and 2007. Asia continued to grow rapidly. 
Overall, the outlook for the world economy in 2006 and 2007 is positive, with annual growth in the US, 
euro zone, and Japan forecast to average 2.7%. Inflation in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries is projected to average approximately 2% over the same period, 
reflecting recent and ongoing monetary tightening in the largest industrial economies. The volume of 
trade is anticipated to grow by around 7% a year in 2006 and 2007. Demand for Asian output is therefore 
expected to remain healthy.
Despite the positive outlook, there are downside risks. These include higher energy prices, growing 
protectionist sentiment in the industrial world, avian flu crossing to humans, and the possibility of sharp 
adjustments in exchange and interest rates induced by widening international payments imbalances. 
The Asian Development Outlook 2006 baseline scenario outlined below assumes that these risks do not 
eventuate over the forecast period.
Outlook for major economies
United States
The US economy grew by 3.5% in real terms in 2005, down from 4.2% in 
2004. Headline consumer price inflation was 3.4%, while prices exclusive 
of food and energy rose by 2.2%. Unemployment fell to 5.1% from 5.5% 
in 2004. Average real hourly earnings fell by 0.4%. Industrial capacity 
utilization rose by 1.5 percentage points year on year to December, to 
81.2%, roughly its long-standing historical average rate from 1972 until 
now. Despite its robust performance, the US economy did not display 
signs of significant overheating. Policy interest rate increases (of which 
there were eight in 2005 and two in the first 3 months of 2006) mark a 
return to a more “neutral” monetary policy, and reflect the need to guard 
against energy price increases and strong demand being built into price 
expectations and wages. Inflationary pressures remain restrained.
Figure 1.2.1 shows the importance of consumer spending in driving 
US growth. US consumption growth has, at least until recently, 
been supported by the wealth effects of rapidly rising house prices. 
Consumption braked in the fourth quarter of 2005, slowing growth 
to 1.6% at a seasonally adjusted annualized rate. Rosier recent retail 
and production figures and tentative improvements in employment 
growth suggest that the fourth quarter results were a temporary dip, 
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related to Hurricane Katrina. However, on the downside, tightening 
monetary policy and long-anticipated effects of higher energy prices are 
probably playing a role as well. The former appears to be contributing 
to a softening of the housing market, while the latter has crowded out 
nonenergy consumer spending from 57.5% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the second quarter of 2003 to 55.9% in the fourth quarter of 
2005.
The US twin (fiscal and trade) deficits continue to cause concern. The 
fiscal deficit, exclusive of income on the social security trust fund, fell 
to 4.0% of GDP, as tax revenues outpaced spending growth, but the US 
Congressional Budget Office expects the deficit to widen slightly in 2006. 
The US trade deficit widened to 5.8% of GDP in 2005 from 5.3% in 2004, 
and continues to expand, reflecting faster growth of domestic spending 
over domestic output, and low savings. The US savings rate was 14.2% 
of GDP in nominal terms in 2005, roughly its average level of the past 
3 years.
The baseline projection is for US real GDP growth of 3.3% in 2006 
and 3.1% in 2007. This reflects gradually softening consumer demand 
as the effects of recent increases in oil prices and interest rates make 
themselves felt, and an assumption that government spending growth 
slows. This projection also assumes that policy interest rates will be 
raised once again in the first half of 2006. Significant downside risks 
remain if house prices weaken suddenly, oil prices rise much higher, 
or investor demands for dollar assets change in light of accumulating 
international imbalances.
Japan
Japan’s long-anticipated economic recovery took hold in 2005, 
strengthening rapidly in recent months. Real GDP grew by 2.7%, up 
from 2.3% in 2004 (Figure 1.2.2). Investment rebounded in 2005, growing 
by 4.3%. Providing further comfort, the unemployment rate fell to 4.4% 
in 2005 from 4.7%, and average real wages rose slightly. Consumer 
prices fell by 0.3% in 2005, but deflation seems to be coming to an end. 
In December, prices fell by an annualized rate of 0.1%, and in January 
2006 inflation crossed the threshold into positive figures, rising to an 
annualized 0.5%.
The primary fiscal deficit (excluding surpluses on social security 
funds) is estimated by the Economist Intelligence Unit to have fallen from 
4.8% of GDP in 2004 to 4.5% in 2005. The fiscal year 2006/07 budget has 
been passed, and envisages reduced spending and higher revenues as a 
result of renewed economic growth. Both these improvements are good 
news, as Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio was a striking 160% in the fourth 
quarter of 2005. Meanwhile, monetary policy, which has been extremely 
supportive of the recovery, is likely to tighten. The Bank of Japan ended 
its policy of “quantitative easing” in March 2006. The central bank is 
expected to raise nominal interest rates soon, in order to prevent real 
interest rates from turning negative as prices rise.
Given the strength of the recovery, a recent pickup in both domestic 
and external demand, and considerable pent-up consumer spending 
from the years of deflation, the Japanese economy is expected to grow 
by 2.9% in 2006. In 2007, as the momentum of the recovery begins to 
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subside, the growth rate is projected to fall to 2.4%, closer to its long run 
potential growth rate of around 2.0%. The underlying trend rate reflects 
the maturity of both the economy and its workforce. The baseline forecast 
includes an end to deflation in Japan.
Euro zone
Euro zone GDP grew by only 1.3% in 2005. That said, the euro zone 
economy continues to produce signals that, while frequently mixed 
and interrupted, trend slowly positive. However, the contributions to 
growth of different countries and expenditure components remain in 
flux, as reflected in Figures 1.2.3 and 1.2.4. The external sector of the euro 
zone has performed erratically, and growth of consumption remains 
tentative. Though Spain has been a strong performer, France, Germany, 
and Italy have seen significant fluctuations, with France and Germany 
experiencing a slowdown in the last quarter of 2005. The fourth quarter 
of 2005 saw growth fall to 1% in the euro zone, as consumer and external 
demand contracted. Continued growth in investment supports cautious 
optimism.
All the major euro zone economies face significant fiscal problems. 
French, German, and Italian fiscal deficits have persistently exceeded the 
3% of GDP targeted by the EU’s stability and growth pact. Even with most 
of the smaller European economies within the target range, the scope for 
fiscal stimulus to support the recovery is sharply limited.
Monetary policy in the EU has tightened a little recently, with the 
European Central Bank (ECB) raising rates by a quarter percentage point 
to 2.25% in December. Despite firm handling by the ECB, inflation has 
slightly exceeded its target of 2% for 6 years in a row. In combination 
with the persistence of high unemployment in most of the euro zone 
(Figure 1.2.5), the tendency of the economy to register high inflation while 
showing disappointing growth reflects serious underlying structural 
problems. Until these are resolved, a convincing upswing in performance 
may be delayed.
Growth in the euro zone is forecast at 2.1% in 2006, reflecting 
expectations of somewhat stronger performance in the larger economies, 
and the related modest growth in investment. Little change is expected 
in 2007.
World trade and commodity prices
The volume of world trade grew at a healthy 6.2% in 2005. The data 
reflect further shifts in geographic patterns of trade during 2005 as 
industrial-country exports posted small gains, while the share of the 
People’s Republic of China in world trade continued to grow steadily, to 
an estimated 7% of world exports in 2005, compared with 4.3% in 2001. 
In keeping with the expected rate of global output growth in 2006, and 
a recovery in electronics demand, world trade is expected to grow at 
around 7% in 2006 and 2007.
In 2002, the Brent crude oil price averaged $25 per barrel. Prices 
began to increase in 2003, and have trended ever upward, if at times 
spasmodically, reaching $62 per barrel as of 15 March 2006. Higher 
prices and slower worldwide growth appear to have damped oil demand 
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growth, which fell from a high 3.8% in 2004 to 1.3% in 2005. Price 
increases are widely regarded to reflect increasingly tight capacity 
constraints and expected escalation in oil-field development and 
extraction costs. 
There is significant uncertainty regarding future oil prices, as evident 
from the extent to which futures prices, for delivery up to 7 years from 
now, move in tandem with spot prices (Figure 1.2.6). If futures prices were 
based on long-run fundamentals, they would be more stable than spot 
prices, which reflect short-run shifts in demand and supply. Futures and 
spot prices moving in tandem strongly suggests that expectations of long-
term fundamentals are not well anchored.
Despite this uncertainty, cheap oil may be a thing of the past. Even 
the most optimistic forecasts have prices falling at most to around 
$40 per barrel by 2010. The baseline assumes that average oil prices will 
change little from their current levels (Table 1.2.1). However, because 
production constraints will bind tighter and more frequently, continued 
oil price volatility is expected.
Semiconductor sales grew by 6.8% in 2005, according to data from 
the World Semiconductor Trade Statistics organization. Semiconductor 
and wider electronics demand are volatile, as they are influenced by the 
development of new end-user products, and by the business cycle in 
consuming countries. Demand in 2005 was supported by strong sales of 
 1.2.1 Baseline assumptions for external conditions
2004 2005 2006 2007 2006–2010







Industrial countriesa 3.2 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.7
United States 4.2 3.5  3.3  3.1 3.3
Euro zone 2.1 1.3 2.1 2.0 2.0
Japan 2.3 2.7 2.9 2.4 2.4
Memorandum items
US Federal Funds rate (average, %) 1.35 3.22 4.75 4.75 4.50
Brent crude oil spot prices 
($ per barrel) (annual average)
38.3 54.4 62.0 60.0 57.0
Nonfuel commodity prices 
(% increase)
17.4 13.5 -5.9 -6.3 0.3
CPI inflation (OECD) (annual 
average)b
1.9 2.7 2.1 2.0 2.0
World trade volume (% change) 10.3 6.2 7.0 6.8 6.3
a Growth rates for industrial countries are a GDP weighted average for the US, EU, and Japan.
b All consumer price index inflation data and forecasts for the OECD are from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit.
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, available: http://www.bea.
gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N#S1; Economic and Social Research Institute of 
Japan, available: http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/qe054-2/gdemenueb.html; Eurostat, available: 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
&screen=welcomeref&open=/economy/nation/quart/qags_gdp&language=en&product=EU_MAIN_
TREE&root=EU_MAIN_TREE&scrollto=294; Federal Reserve Board, available: http://www.federalreserve.
gov/releases/h15/data/Annual/H15_FF_O.txt; Datastream; Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet), The 
World Bank, available: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/
0,,contentMDK:20268484~menuPK:556802~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,
00.html; Prospects for the World Economy, World Bank, available: http://web.
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/EXTGBLPROSPECTS/
0,,contentMDK:20675180~menuPK:612509~pagePK:64218950~piPK:64218883~theSitePK:612501,00.html; 
OECD, available: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/36/18628078.pdf; staff estimates. 
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MP3 music players and mobile phones. Demand is expected to be robust 
in 2006 and 2007, with industry estimates of billing growth ranging 
from 8% to about 20%. This wide range reflects differing expectations of 
the likely success of new products, especially those not yet widely used 
in emerging markets. Diversity of forecasts also stems from uncertainty 
regarding the future replacement schedules for notebook computers and 
mobile phones in more mature markets. These schedules are susceptible 
to cyclical effects. The expected buoyancy in several electronics markets 
therefore contributes to the bright outlook for electronics exports in 
2006.
On the supply side, industry analyses forecast semiconductor 
production capacity constraints. Because manufacturers place 
semiconductor orders with reasonably long lags (up to 1 year), such 
forecasts are taken seriously. Given tight supply and demand conditions, 
electronics prices are expected to strengthen in 2006, and significant 
investments are anticipated in component-manufacturing countries. 
As Figure 1.2.7 shows, semiconductor export revenues do not rise every 
year, so despite the wide range of forecasts, 2006 is clearly expected to 
be a strong year. The figure also illustrates the emergence of demand for 
semiconductors in Asia (excluding Japan). This is due to outsourcing of 
electronics manufacturing from industrial countries, and to rapid growth 
in demand for consumer electronics in emerging Asia.
Agricultural price rises in 2005 slowed somewhat on strength of 
supply improvements (Figure 1.2.8). Natural rubber prices were propelled 
by rising demand as oil prices drove up the price of synthetic rubber. 
Cotton prices also picked up over the course of the year, though they still 
posted a lower average than in 2004. Prices of raw materials (especially 
minerals and wood) rose on the strength of demand in Asia and the US, 
production bottlenecks, and increases in energy costs. They are expected 
to plateau in 2006 as the bottlenecks ease.
Capital flows and markets
Net private foreign equity flows to emerging Asia continue to grow 
steadily (Figure 1.2.9). While foreign direct investment in Asia has 
remained fairly constant in dollar terms since the Asian financial crisis, 
portfolio investments have increased significantly, rising from 8% of net 
equity flows at the end of the crisis in 1998, to 39% in 2005. Meanwhile, 
flows of credit to the region, particularly those routed through banks, 
are recovering from negative levels in 1998, but have been fitful of late. 
Consequently, when compared to precrisis financing, a shift from credit 
to equity financing can be seen. Figure 1.2.10 shows that the risk spreads 
on both Asian and all emerging market debt fell in 2005. Each of these 
trends is consistent with a resurgence of foreign confidence in Asian 
markets, and in emerging markets generally. 
Credit flows in recent years have moved in sync with world interest 
rate differentials. In 2004, net foreign credit flows to Asia surged in 
response to low interest rates in the US, and perhaps as a result of 
speculation that some Asian currencies would appreciate. In 2005, as US 
interest rates rose and relevant Asian central banks’ currency positions 
were clarified, these credit flows reversed somewhat. However, the 
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reduction in net foreign credit to Asia was outweighed by strong foreign 
investment in Asian equities, and aggregate capital flows to Asia were 
positive in 2005.
Figure 1.2.11 shows that most Asian currencies have appreciated 
relative to the dollar. The demand for Asian currency is being supported 
by capital and current account trends, with both contributing to 
increases in foreign exchange holdings. If the payments imbalances 
that underpin these movements unravel rapidly, the real adjustment 
costs could be high. The likely outcome would be a depreciation of 
the US dollar relative to Asian currencies, a movement out of dollar-
denominated assets, and an increase in long-term US interest rates. 
Such a rate rise would crimp US demand growth, and could also have 
secondary impacts by bringing down housing prices sharply, reducing 
household wealth and spending. Currency appreciation would have 
adverse effects on Asia’s exports, with potentially serious consequences 
for growth and employment. Policy coordination to ensure an orderly 
transition to a steadier international regime would be desirable. This 
baseline assumes that resolution of the imbalances will not be quick, and 
sudden changes are not anticipated.Subregional summaries 
Central Asia
Economic performance
Growth in the Central Asian republics (CARs) for 2005 is estimated 
at 10.9% (Figure 1.3.1), higher than the 8.7% projection made in ADO 
2005, with net exports acting as the main driver of growth. Within the 
subregion, however, growth performance varied markedly. The oil-
exporting countries, led by Azerbaijan, saw greater production and 
continued high prices for oil and gas, and consequently expanded rapidly. 
Armenia, a non-oil exporting country, also saw robust growth in 2005, 
owing to rapid expansion of the construction sector for both housing and 
manufacturing facilities. At the other end of the spectrum, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, which underwent a political upheaval in 2005 and suffered 
a drop in gold production (a major export), saw a contraction. High 
growth in some of the countries translated into rapidly rising private 
consumption, for example Kazakhstan, while in other countries that also 
experienced accelerated growth private consumption remained flat, for 
example Uzbekistan. 
Both fiscal and external balances strengthened in 2005. Fiscal 
balances improved mainly because the oil price windfall boosted 
revenues, though streamlining of tax administration also helped in some 
countries. At a structural level, Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan 
carried out economic programs supported by IMF arrangements under 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, and all met their fiscal targets 
and other program objectives for the year. 
The external current account position for the subregion swung into 
positive territory, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan posting significant 
surpluses. Hydrocarbon exports continued to dominate in Kazakhstan, 
and cotton, gas, gold, and heavy machinery in Uzbekistan, though the 
latter economy is making progress toward export diversification in light 
industry. In Azerbaijan, the heavy current account deficit in 2004, which 
had been caused by large oil and gas sector investment, improved sharply 
to rough balance in 2005, reflecting the startup of production and exports 
from some new fields. 
Stronger workers’ remittances made substantial contributions to 
strengthening external positions of Armenia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 
Interestingly, recent studies have noted a rising trend in trade flows 
among some of the CARs, which together have been referred to as a 
“Russia-centric trading bloc.” FDI inflows moderated during the year, 
reflecting completion of some hydrocarbon projects in Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan. At the same time, the People’s Republic of China 
and the Russian Federation have been pursuing investment deals in 
several countries in the subregion. Notably, foreign direct investment in 
Uzbekistan’s hydrocarbon sector could pick up as a result of these two 
countries’ quest to secure sources of energy supply. 
1.3.1 GDP growth, Central Asia











Sources: Asian Development Outlook database; staff 
estimates.Asian Development Outlook 2006    2
Inflation in the CARs rose from 5.8% in 2004 to 7.4% in 2005, 
but Armenia bucked the trend by bringing inflation down sharply. 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan experienced a buildup in 
inflationary pressures with rapid monetary and credit growth and 
substantial wage increases in the public sector. 
Some countries continued to make structural progress. The 
Transition Indicator scores of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development for 2005 show upgrades for Armenia (in large-scale 
privatization, competition policy, and banking reform), Azerbaijan 
(in trade and the foreign exchange system), and Tajikistan (in small-
scale privatization). Yet most of the countries in the subregion need to 
strengthen their “at-the-border” trade liberalization measures (Armenia 
and the Kyrgyz Republic are already WTO members) at the same time 
as reducing “behind-the-border” barriers to trade. These barriers present 
a diverse array among the CARs, ranging from import monopolies to 
large differences between the excise taxes levied on certain imports 
and the same domestically sourced products. Recent progress made in 
policy and institutional reform to reduce behind-the-border barriers 
includes simplification of the tax system (Armenia), acceptance of IMF 
Article VIII convertibility obligations (Azerbaijan), draft legislation to 
boost competition and investment and to lower costs in infrastructure 
(Kazakhstan), labor market reform (Kyrgyz Republic), allowing more 
competition in the banking sector including entry of foreign banks 
(Tajikistan), and commitment to remove cash restrictions (Uzbekistan). 
Still, the remaining agenda in domestic policy reform, particularly in the 
area of market competition, remains long.
While strong growth has generally translated into lower poverty 
incidence in Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan, 
this pattern is less evident in Uzbekistan. A possible explanation may be 
found in trends in inequality: in countries that have achieved a reduction 
in poverty incidence, income inequality as measured by their gini 
coefficients have also experienced a decline. 
Prospects for 2006 and 2007
The near-term outlook remains favorable, albeit with some downside 
risks. Growth in the subregion is expected to slow marginally to about 
10% in 2006 and 2007, reflecting easing in growth in a few countries. The 
exceptions are Azerbaijan, which is expected to see another growth spurt 
in 2006 with a ramping up of its oil and gas production, and the Kyrgyz 
Republic, where the economy should recover from the 2005 downturn. 
Inflation is likely to continue at over 7% in the subregion in 2006 with 
relatively minor variations in country performance from 2005. However, 
inflation in Azerbaijan is expected to jump due to a very large increase 
in government expenditure. The subregional current account surplus is 
forecast to increase moderately. 
Medium-term outlook
Over the medium to long term, the outlook for the oil- and gas-producing 
countries will depend on how well they manage their windfall and 
diversify their economies to a broader base. For the other countries, 
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in reducing barriers to trade, transport, transit, and investment. A 
recent study has attempted to quantify the costs of noncooperation 
and the benefits from cooperation, and suggests that potential benefits 
could raise per capita incomes by 50–100%, but over the next few 
years, at least, subregional cooperation is likely to remain limited with 
greater cooperation achieved in certain country groupings (among, for 
example, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan). Over the longer 
term, the demonstration effects of such cooperation may foment closer 
collaboration among the less cooperative countries.
East Asia 
Economic performance
Economic growth for East Asia as a group was 7.7% in 2005, 
0.6 percentage points below that of 2004. All five economies in the 
subregion posted lower expansion rates than in 2004. The deceleration 
was slight in the PRC, the biggest economy, and sharp in Mongolia, the 
smallest (Figure 1.3.2). 
Growth in the PRC, at 9.9%, was slightly below that in 2004 and, 
once again, was driven by investment and export-oriented industrial 
production. Gross fixed capital formation increased by 16%, supported 
by expanding liquidity and credit. Merchandise exports grew by about 
30% thanks to robust global demand and increasing market penetration 
of PRC-manufactured goods in foreign markets, while import growth 
decelerated to 17.6%, as a result of the use of inventories accumulated in 
earlier years and increasing domestic substitution for imports. 
Mongolia grew by 6.2%, still a robust rate but slowing sharply 
from an exceptionally strong 10.7% in 2004, when GDP surged on the 
rebuilding of livestock herds and the expansion of mining. The services 
sector made the biggest contribution. Agriculture also contributed, but 
industrial production was hit by cutbacks in the clothing industry after 
the end of global quotas in major export markets. In Korea, growth of 
4.0% was led by a recovery in private consumption, following a 2-year 
slump, and a strong performance by exports (though they grew far more 
slowly than in 2004). Growth of fixed capital formation remained weak. 
Taipei,China’s expansion decelerated to 4.1% as export growth slowed. 
Merchandise import growth also fell (more than exports), reflecting weak 
domestic investment demand. Although public investment strengthened 
significantly, private investment fell, so the overall contribution of 
capital formation to GDP growth was negligible. Hong Kong, China 
registered growth of 7.3% in 2005. This rapid pace was mainly the result 
of an acceleration in net exports, reflecting the linkages between the 
economy and that of the PRC. Private consumption contributed the 
rest; government consumption detracted from growth as a result of a 
conservative fiscal stance, and investment made a minor contribution.
The impact of soaring global oil prices on inflation was muted, in 
part because fuel subsidies in the PRC shielded its consumers from the 
full effect. Inflation in the PRC eased from 3.9% in 2004 to 1.8%, and in 
the subregion as a whole from 3.3% to 2.0%. In Mongolia, consumer price 
inflation accelerated to 12.7% as the money supply grew at a significantly 
1.3.2 GDP growth, East Asia






China, People's Rep. of
East Asia
%
Sources: Asian Development Outlook database; staff 
estimates.Asian Development Outlook 2006    2
faster pace than nominal GDP. Korea’s inflation eased to 2.7%, damped 
a little by interest-rate rises. In Taipei,China, inflation was held to 2.3% 
by currency appreciation and imports of low-priced manufactured goods 
from the PRC. After years of deflation, prices rose by 1.1% in Hong Kong, 
China, largely in response to the broad-based economic pickup.
Prospects for 2006 and 2007
East Asia’s growth in 2006 in aggregate is expected to remain at 7.7%, 
and in 2007 it is seen decelerating by about a half percentage point to 
7.1%. Growth in the PRC will abate slowly, to 9.5% in 2006 and to 8.8% in 
2007. Under the recently approved 11th Five-Year Program for 2006–2010, 
the authorities there have provided an indicative average target of 7.5% 
for 2006–2010. It seems unlikely, however, that growth will slow to that 
rate in the near term, since for this to occur, investment would have 
to decelerate significantly, which is difficult as the country is facing 
rising unemployment, and local governments and state enterprises face 
incentives that are biased toward investment. 
Mongolia’s economy is expected to expand by about 6% in 2006 and 
by about 5% in 2007, after the livestock sector returns to its trend growth 
rate. In the case of Korea, growth is expected to increase significantly in 
2006 to 5.1%, supported by the upswing in global electronics demand, 
and remain close to 5% in 2007. Expansion in Taipei,China is expected to 
pick up to 4.4% in 2006, also as a result of a stronger global electronics 
industry, before decelerating in 2007. Hong Kong, China’s growth is 
expected to slow in 2006 and 2007 to about 5.5% and 5%, respectively, 
mainly as a result of the increase in domestic interest rates, but also due 
to the slight deceleration in growth in the PRC. 
The subregional current account surplus is expected to decline to 5.5% 
of GDP this year, from 5.8% in 2005. The PRC’s current account surplus 
will fall a little as export growth moderates and the trade surplus is partly 
offset by a services deficit. Korea’s trade and current account surpluses 
will decline as stronger domestic demand and recent appreciation of the 
won push up imports.
Inflation is seen edging up in the PRC in the next 2 years to about 
2–3%, as administered prices of electricity, gas, water, and petroleum 
products increase. In contrast, the prices of some manufactured products 
may decline. Price rises in Mongolia are expected to ease to about 5–5.5%, 
reflecting likely lower upward pressure from oil prices and steps taken by 
the Mongolian central bank. Inflation in Korea is expected to remain at 
about 2.8–3%, and in Taipei,China to moderate to 1.6% and to 1.3% over 
the next 2 years. Finally, prices are expected to continue creeping up in 
Hong Kong, China on the back of tightening labor and land markets and 
of rising energy prices. 
Medium-term outlook
The major challenge for the PRC in the medium term is how to guide its 
economy to a more sustainable growth path where private consumption 
plays a more prominent role. After many years of phenomenal expansion, 
several structural weaknesses have surfaced, including—especially—
overcapacity (in various industries) and income inequalities (primarily 
between rural and urban areas). Unemployment and underemployment 2    Asian Development Outlook 2006
are also on the rise. Finally, the environment has suffered from heavy 
industrialization. To address these problems, the Five-Year Program aims 
to achieve more balanced, equitable, and sustainable growth through 
strategies designed to boost private consumption and rebalance the 
composition of aggregate demand, and to promote rural development, 
protect the environment, and reduce income inequality. 
Over 2006–2010, the average growth rate for the PRC is likely to be 
about 9%. Growth in Mongolia over this period is forecast to average 
about 5%, with the primary sector a more significant contributor to 
growth. For Korea, the estimated growth rate in the medium term 
is 4.5–5.0%, substantially higher than most other economies in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, but lower 
than rates achieved by Korea in its earlier stages of development. 
Taipei,China is expected to grow in the range 4.0–4.5%, on the 
assumption of stable cross-strait relations and continued efforts to 
address structural reforms, while Hong Kong, China is seen expanding by 
an average of 5% in the medium term. 
South Asia
Economic performance
South Asia’s GDP growth is estimated to have reached 7.8% in 2005, 
which is higher than the projected growth of 6.7% in ADO 2005 and the 
subregion’s actual growth rate of 7.2% in 2004. The higher growth was 
driven by the strong performance of the Indian and Pakistan economies. 
In fact, the majority of countries performed better than in 2004 (the 
exceptions were Bangladesh, Maldives, and Nepal) (Figure 1.3.3).
India has been able to maintain its high growth momentum with 
an 8.1% expansion of GDP in 2005, significantly above trend and 
0.6 percentage points higher than in 2004. The broadly favorable 
monsoon and robust growth in the industry and services sectors 
consolidated high growth. Aggregate demand was strong, private sector 
investment picked up, and consumer spending remained buoyant.
The Pakistan economy registered impressive economic growth of 8.4% 
in 2005, the highest in the last two decades and 2 percentage points above 
the previous year. Private consumption increased by 16.8% in real terms, 
and led GDP growth for the second consecutive year. However, for the 
first time in 4 years, the balance of payments was in deficit. 
Bangladesh experienced a decelerating GDP growth rate of 5.6% 
in 2005. Still, it was above trend, despite devastating floods, escalating 
international oil prices, and the end of textile and clothing quotas. Steady 
expansion in industry and services continued to support growth. The 
strong increase in workers’ remittances virtually matched the increase in 
the cost of petroleum imports, but a larger trade deficit moved the current 
account balance to a deficit. 
Growth of the formal economy in Afghanistan again reached 
double-digit levels (estimated at 13.8% in 2005) as higher rainfall pushed 
agricultural output higher. The reconstruction effort kept rapid growth 
rolling in the construction, trade, transport, and telecommunications 
sectors. It was also the first time since 2001 that opium production 
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declined, though only slightly. The country is undertaking slow, but 
measured, sound macroeconomic policy and structural reforms. 
Sri Lanka’s GDP growth at 5.7% in 2005 was higher than trend and 
better than the previous year, despite the devastating Asian tsunami of 
December 2004. The engine of growth was nontourist-related services 
industry (import-related trade, telecoms, and financial services). The end 
of the quota system did not generate a large number of bankruptcies 
and closures in the textile industry (as earlier feared), but export growth 
still slowed sharply, to 3.1%. The trade gap widened with oil payments 
accounting for 50% of the overall growth in imports in 2005.
Nepal’s economic performance declined largely as the result of 
domestic insurgency and strikes. Light monsoon rains brought down 
paddy production, adding to price pressures that brought up annual 
average inflation to 4.5%. The tourism industry also saw a downturn 
because of the conflict. GDP grew by only 2.3%. The economy of the 
Maldives contracted by an estimated 5.5% in 2005, primarily due to a 
reduction in tourism as a result of tsunami-related damage. Increased 
expenditure associated with the restructuring of the Government raised 
the budget deficit. The external current account deficit is projected to 
have increased to about 40% of GDP. Bhutan’s economic growth remained 
strong and was estimated at 8.8% for 2005, with construction of a major 
hydropower project the major economic driver. 
Prospects for 2006 and 2007
South Asia’s growth is projected to moderate to 7.3% in 2006 as a result of 
some slowing in India and Pakistan. Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Maldives 
are projected to achieve higher economic growth than the previous year. 
In 2007, the subregion’s growth rate is forecast to rise to 7.5%, when India 
and Pakistan are seen resuming their recent growth trajectory.
India’s economy is likely to continue its high-growth trend, though 
expansion is expected to slow to 7.6% in 2006 before picking up to 
7.8% the following year. Both the industry and services sectors should 
maintain strong growth. Import growth is likely to slow but still outpace 
export expansion, thereby increasing the current account deficit to about 
3% of GDP in 2006. Inflation is set to pick up to 5.5% in 2006, reflecting 
the need to raise domestic prices of petroleum products to eliminate large 
subsidy costs.
In Pakistan, economic growth of 6.5% is in prospect for 2006, about 
2 percentage points weaker than 2005, but still robust. After an unusually 
strong gain in 2005, agriculture is expected to grow by only 3.0% in 2006, 
reflecting smaller cotton and sugarcane crops. High domestic oil prices 
will also limit economic growth, as will (to some extent) the effects of the 
8 October earthquake.
Economic prospects in Afghanistan are favorable, with GDP growth 
estimated at 11.7% and 10.6% in 2006 and 2007, respectively. This good 
performance is projected on the basis that another drought does not hit 
agricultural production. The current account deficit (excluding grants) is 
projected to improve as grant aid tapers down while the deficit (including 
grants) increases slightly, reflecting somewhat greater foreign direct 
investment and public loan inflows. In Bangladesh, GDP growth is 
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external demand. Healthy private consumption and buoyant workers’ 
remittances will continue to underpin growth. However, growth is seen 
moderating to 6.0% in 2007 amid the political uncertainty of the January 
2007 election.
Economic growth in Sri Lanka will likely decline somewhat to 5.3% 
in 2006 and 5.2% in 2007, which is in line with the country’s long-term 
economic growth trend. The private sector will continue to buttress 
growth, especially in textile and clothing manufacturing and in services. 
Nepal’s economic outlook includes a modest pickup in economic 
performance. GDP growth is projected to be 2.0% in 2006 and 3.4% 
in 2007. The low growth rates reflect the continuing domestic conflict; 
political instability; a slowdown in reform momentum; and growing 
polarization between the Government on the one hand, and the political 
parties and the insurgents on the other. In the Maldives, prospects are for 
an economic recovery to 9.0% growth in 2006 (but deceleration to 6.0% 
the following year). Persistence of the fiscal crisis that began in 2005 and 
a drop in foreign exchange reserves constitute significant risks over the 
next few years. 
Bhutan’s GDP growth is expected to accelerate to 10.0% and 12.0% 
in 2006 and 2007, respectively. The completion of the Tala hydroelectric 
project, which is being brought online in March through June this year, 
will substantially boost exports and the country’s budget revenues. 
South Asia’s export growth decelerated in 2005 to 14.9% from 21.4% 
in 2004. With the exception of Afghanistan and Pakistan, all countries in 
the subregion registered lower export growth. Subregional import growth 
also decelerated, to 28.2% from 40.5% in 2004. The current account deficit 
on the balance of payments widened sharply to 2.3% of GDP. India’s 
current account deficit increased to 2.5% of GDP. It is expected that in 
2006, the subregion’s balance-of-payments deficit will increase to 3.0% of 
GDP. 
Average inflation for South Asia in 2005 moderated to 5.3%, from 
the high of 6.2% in 2004. However, Pakistan and Sri Lanka experienced 
substantial increases in inflation in 2005. Adjustments in domestic prices 
of petroleum products (to dilute or remove subsidies) will likely be the 
main factor lifting the subregion’s inflation rate to 6.1% in 2006, even in 
a context of tightening monetary policy. Countries with high inflation 
in 2005 (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) should be able to reduce 
inflation somewhat, but inflation in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal will 
likely rise. 
Medium-term outlook 
The medium-term outlook for growth in India is for GDP to expand 
by 8–8.5% over 2006–2010. This will require a sizable pickup in gross 
fixed capital formation from about 26% to 30% of GDP and making 
substantial improvements in the physical infrastructure. In addition, 
various structural changes are required to improve the investment 
environment. The main imperatives are to direct greater investment 
into agriculture to raise productivity and living conditions for the rural 
poor, and to rapidly expand manufacturing industry to generate much-
needed employment opportunities and underpin strengthening in the 
balance of payments. Asian Development Outlook 2006    31
Pakistan faces similar challenges. However, planned substantial public 
sector investment in agriculture and private investment in mechanization 
should continue to boost incomes, productivity and growth in the sector. 
Capacity expansion, balancing, and modernization in key industries 
(such as textiles and clothing) will also need to be sustained. Greater 
investment, particularly in the infrastructure sector, is a key challenge.
Substantial progress has been made in recent years in structural 
reform that have been supported by international financial institutions. 
Despite this, medium-term economic prospects in Afghanistan, Nepal, 
and Sri Lanka rest heavily on achieving solutions to political conflicts that 
threaten to retard development. Bhutan’s economy will remain dependent 
on the performance of hydropower.
Southeast Asia
Economic performance
The economies of Southeast Asia expanded by 5.5% in aggregate last 
year, above the average of the previous 5 years, but easing from a rapid 
6.3% in 2004. In a notable performance, Indonesia ramped up its growth 
rate, despite some major hurdles. Growth in the smaller economies—
Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), and Viet Nam—
accelerated and topped the subregional list (Figure 1.3.4). However, the 
pace slowed in four of the five biggest economies, namely Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Indonesia had to deal with the impact of the December 2004 tsunami, 
and later in 2005, a slump in the rupiah, a sharp rise in fuel prices, and 
a resulting surge in inflation and interest rates. Even then, growth in 
Southeast Asia’s biggest economy picked up by 0.7 percentage points 
to 5.6% in 2005, having accelerated over 4 years from 3.8%. Private 
consumption and fixed investment contributed most to last year’s 
expansion. 
Viet Nam’s economic performance continued to be robust, with 
growth accelerating above 8%, fueled by surging private investment 
and strong domestic demand. (As a net oil exporter, the economy has 
benefited from higher world oil prices.) However, inflation has also 
accelerated. Cambodia’s economy, too, expanded by more than 8%, 
bolstered by stronger agricultural production that partly reflected a 
recovery from drought and an increase in clothing exports. The Lao PDR 
grew by an estimated 7.2%, with its industry sector the main source of 
expansion, driven by gold and copper mining. 
Thailand’s growth slowed to 4.5% in 2005. This economy was hurt by 
a drought in the first half that reduced agricultural production, the effects 
of the tsunami on tourism, and high global oil prices. Consumption 
remained the major contributor to GDP growth. Higher oil prices and 
buoyant demand for capital goods pushed up imports, and the surplus on 
the trade and current accounts swung into deficit. In Malaysia, growth 
decelerated to 5.3%, mainly because of weaker external demand for the 
country’s electronics products. Private consumption was the main driver 
of growth, supported by low interest rates, easy access to credit, and firm 
commodity prices that lifted rural incomes. The Philippines was also 
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affected by drought in the first half of the year, and, to a lesser extent, by 
slower growth in services. GDP grew by 5.1%. Buoyed by a strong flow of 
remittances from overseas workers, personal consumption spending was 
the largest contributor to growth. Government consumption was weak as 
the Government reined in its fiscal deficit.
Singapore benefited late in the year from the upswing in global 
demand for electronics products and from a recovery in domestic 
demand, which was buttressed by strengthening employment and a 
pickup in the property market. GDP grew by 6.4%, although this was well 
below the high rate recorded in 2004. 
Prospects for 2006 and 2007
Growth in 2006 is forecast to remain at around 5.5% for Southeast Asia 
as a group, with a slight increase to 5.7% penciled in for 2007. Cambodia 
and Viet Nam, the economies that grew the fastest last year, are likely to 
moderate their expansion rates. Growth is expected to be slightly stronger 
in Lao PDR, Malaysia, and Thailand, and a little lower in the other 
subregional economies. Consumption in several of the bigger economies 
will be damped by continuing high oil costs and firming interest rates. 
Investment, though, is forecast to pick up. 
Indonesia will be constrained for much of 2006 by high inflation and 
interest rates. Increased fiscal spending allowed by a reduction in fuel 
subsidies last year will start to counteract this weakness, leaving full-
year growth at about 5.4%. The authorities are pushing to improve the 
investment climate, which will help pave the way for a pickup to 6.0% in 
2007, when inflation and interest rates should be lower than now.
Thailand is projected to grow by 4.7% in 2006, with a moderate 
increase in public investment, better performance in agriculture, and 
robust exports. The trade and current account deficits are expected to 
widen. Growth is seen accelerating to 5.5% in 2007 when the Government 
is scheduled to increase spending on a megaprojects program. In 
Malaysia, growth is forecast to rise to 5.5% this year and 5.8% in 2007, 
driven by robust consumer spending, a lift in private investment, and 
higher public spending related to the start of the Ninth Malaysia Plan. 
Growth in the Philippines could soften to 5.0% this year, partly because 
crop production may be reduced by forecast heavy rains. Also, investment 
and exports are expected to weaken. In 2007, growth is seen recovering to 
5.3%, when agriculture should have a better year (because of more normal 
weather) and investment is likely to rise. 
Singapore, the most export-dependent economy in Asia, is benefiting 
from stronger exports of electronics and from a continued recovery of 
domestic demand. The full-year 2006 expansion rate is forecast at 6.1%. 
Growth is expected to soften later in 2006, and further into 2007, when it 
is seen at 4.6%.
Viet Nam’s growth is projected to consolidate at around 8% in the 
next 2 years. Exports will probably grow at slightly below recent rates 
as world prices retreat for some of its commodities. The momentum for 
domestic demand is likely to be maintained through sustained expansion 
of FDI, private remittances, and tourism receipts. The country is expected 
to join WTO in the forecast period, which should assist its export efforts 
and maintain its momentum toward domestic market-oriented reforms. Asian Development Outlook 2006    33
Cambodia is expected to post an average growth of around 6.3% in 
2006–2007. Agriculture will return to slightly lower growth rates after 
the rebound from drought, while clothing exports will face intensified 
competition. In the Lao PDR, growth is underpinned by investment 
in a major hydroelectric project and in mining. This economy is seen 
expanding by 7.3% this year, and by 6.5% in 2007.
Medium-term outlook
In the 2006–2010 period, Indonesia is expected to grow by about 6% on 
average, so long as the investment environment continues to improve. For 
Thailand, the outlook is for growth in the 5–6% range, with assistance 
from major public investment projects. Malaysia is seen growing at 
around 5.5%. In the Philippines, average growth is projected at 5%, but 
this could be boosted if momentum builds behind reforms and the capital 
stock expands much faster than in recent years. Viet Nam will continue 
to grow at the fastest rate in Southeast Asia, averaging 7.5–8.0%, provided 
that it pushes ahead with market-oriented reforms. The Lao PDR is 
expected to grow by 6–7.0% and Cambodia by perhaps 6.0% over the 




Economic growth picked up in about half the Pacific developing member 
countries in 2005, though the aggregate growth rate slipped to an 
estimated 2.7% from 3.1% in 2004. This was the result of a slowdown 
in the Fiji Islands (the second-biggest subregional economy accounting 
for a quarter of output). Hurt by the end of clothing quotas in the US 
and slower growth in some other industries, growth in the Fiji Islands 
decelerated to 1.7% in 2005 from 4.1%. 
Papua New Guinea, the biggest subregional economy, recorded 
marginally improved growth of 3.0%, consolidating its better performance 
of the previous 2 years. Agriculture performed particularly well, assisted 
by stronger global prices for commodities such as coffee and rubber. 
Growth would have been stronger still but for a landslide at the large 
Porgera gold mine, which reduced mineral production. Political stability 
and supportive fiscal, monetary, and trade policies have helped to 
revive this economy, reflected in a buildup of foreign reserves, fiscal 
consolidation, a stable exchange rate, and lower interest rates and 
inflation. The surge in global oil prices is a factor, too, given that Papua 
New Guinea is an oil exporter. So is Timor-Leste, the number three 
economy in the Pacific. Its growth rate stepped up to 2.5% from 1.8% a 
year earlier as the country recovered from an earlier steep contraction in 
the economy. Growth is supported by rising government income from the 
country’s share of oil and gas production in the Timor Sea.
Many of the smaller Pacific economies rely on fishing (including 
license fees from fishing fleets) and on income from remittances, tourism, 
aid flows, and trust funds. The continuing strength of international 
capital markets boosted the market value of trust funds in Kiribati, 
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Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Tuvalu. Income 
from remittances remained at high levels in Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu. 
For the Fiji Islands, remittances have become the second biggest source 
of foreign exchange. International aid continued to be a key factor in 
underpinning economic activity. The Marshall Islands and the Federated 
States of Micronesia benefited from funds provided by a renewed 
Compact Agreement with the US. Compact funds also underwrote 
development in Palau, while aid projects provided important support for 
infrastructure in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, and 
Tuvalu. 
Fish products and fishing license fees are sources of income for many 
Pacific countries. However, fish harvests were generally low in 2005, 
raising concerns about falling stocks, particularly of some species of tuna. 
Prices for some subregional export commodities, such as coconut oil and 
copra, weakened later in the year, but are still considerably higher than 
the low points of several years ago. One industry doing well across much 
of the Pacific is tourism, helped in part by the entry of budget airlines 
into the subregion. Tourism stimulates the construction industry and a 
range of services including hotels, restaurants, and transport. In the Fiji 
Islands, tourist arrivals have increased for 4 years and this industry is 
a pillar of the economy. Tourism also is important to the Cook Islands, 
Palau, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu, but provides limited income for 
Kiribati and Solomon Islands. Australia and New Zealand are the two 
major source countries, but Japan, United Kingdom, and US are also 
important, while organized tours from the PRC are beginning to generate 
revenues for some island economies. Tourism has strong potential for 
further growth, provided that it does not ruin the natural environment, 
which is a major pull for many tourists.
High world oil prices continue to have an adverse impact (other 
than on the two oil exporters). Most of the subregion relies on imported 
petroleum products for air and sea connections and for generating 
electricity. The increased oil prices led to a pickup in inflation in some 
countries, though for the subregion as a whole inflation moderated to 
2.6% in 2005, down nearly 1 percentage point from 2004. (Inflation was 
much higher in Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Tonga than elsewhere.)
Budgetary positions were relatively stable in 2005, though several 
countries need considerable fiscal consolidation. Tonga faces the largest 
adjustment, following a decision to increase civil servants’ salaries by 
some 60–80%. The fiscal position of Timor-Leste has been bolstered 
by income from petroleum production; it has more of a problem with 
disbursing funds. Several countries made strides in implementing 
structural reforms last year: Papua New Guinea continues to implement a 
tax and tariff reduction policy; Solomon Islands established an economic 
reform unit in the Ministry of Finance; and Vanuatu is developing an 
economic regulatory framework to improve efficiency and lower costs of 
utilities. 
Prospects for 2006 and 2007
In 2006–2007, subregional growth is forecast to pick up to 2.9–3.0% 
(Figure 1.3.5). Growth is expected to edge higher in most countries, for 
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it faces major adjustments in its clothing and sugar industries because 
of declining preferential trade concessions in major markets. Papua New 
Guinea has a building growth momentum, and government spending 
could rise ahead of 2007 elections. Timor-Leste’s government spending, 
financed by oil revenues, will support growth. Cook Islands and Vanuatu 
are forecast to lift earnings from tourism. Palau, Marshall Islands, and 
Tuvalu will see more public investment, and Solomon Islands is still 
pulling out of its deep decline. Weaker growth is seen in Tonga, because 
of fiscal adjustments, and in Samoa, partly because of weakness in 
manufacturing. Kiribati is likely to record marginal GDP growth, but 
GNP should continue to receive support from buoyant capital markets 
in Australia where trust fund assets are invested. The Federated States of 
Micronesia is forecast to grow at a similar rate to 2005. Nauru is expected 
to remain in a vulnerable condition because of its very limited sources of 
income and lack of arable land for food production.
Inflation over the next couple of years should remain in the 2–3% 
range for most countries, if oil prices are fairly steady. However, Solomon 
Islands and Tonga are expected to record inflation of about 7–8%, 
mirroring recent trends and ongoing fiscal and current account pressures. 
Inflation should abate in Samoa to about 4% in the next 2 years. 
Medium-term outlook 
External conditions are projected to remain favorable, and transport 
and telecoms costs have fallen over a long period. This setting should 
offer the subregion an opportunity to accelerate economic development 
and improve social indicators. Despite this, the environment for 
rapid private sector development is unfavorable in most of the Pacific, 
and governments dominate many of the economies. Key constraints 
to the private sector include traditional communal land-ownership 
arrangements; governance problems, including in some cases those of law 
and order; government aversion to privatization; and policy uncertainty 
and investment restrictions, especially for foreign investors. The recently 
formulated Pacific Plan for strengthening cooperation and integration 
may facilitate better policies. However, it will take some time to raise 
economic growth so that per capita incomes improve significantly, 
particularly as population growth of around 2.4% is likely to continue in 
the medium term. Textiles and clothing in the post-quota era:  
The outlook for Asian suppliers
The end to quota restrictions at the end of 2004 on textile and clothing exports of developing countries 
was expected to provide substantial market access benefits to competitive Asian suppliers led by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India. Indeed, over the course of 2005 shipments from the PRC to 
the United States and the European Union surged in volume and value terms. This led authorities in these 
two large markets to invoke the special safeguards clause in the PRC’s World Trade Organization accession 
agreement and to restore quantitative limits on fast-growing categories of PRC shipments in the latter part 
of 2005 through 2008. 
While marginal Asian and Pacific developing country suppliers, along with former large quota holders, 
have seen market shares in these two markets evaporate in 2005, a number of competitive Asian suppliers 
have done relatively well. In fact, they have outperformed non-Asian preferential suppliers in both markets 
with Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam all competing effectively. 
Going forward, it is likely that the PRC will lose some of the rapid gains it made in market share in 2005 
and preferential non-Asian suppliers will continue to see contraction while other Asian suppliers increase 
their market shares. This suggests that the fears of the collapse of the industry with the end of quotas 
were exaggerated.
Introduction: An end to quotas?
The liberalization of the global system of trade restraints on exports of 
textiles and clothing from developing countries, which had operated 
for more than four decades, was accomplished on 31 December 2004 
with the full implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC). The freeing-up of trade in textiles and clothing from nontariff 
barriers was heralded as one of the most significant outcomes of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations that led to the founding of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). This crucial agreement affects nearly 4% of world 
trade in manufactures, worth $453 billion in 2004 (WTO 2005). Benefits 
from the ATC were expected to be divided between competitive Asian 
suppliers and consumers in the markets of Europe and North America. 
Expected losers were the protected suppliers in the domestic markets of 
those two regions, and marginal exporters that had emerged in many 
locales in the developing world purely as a result of “quota-hopping” 
investments in footloose clothing factories.
“Temporary” quantitative limits on exports of textile and clothing 
products from developing countries were first imposed in the late-1950s 
on Asian economies.1 Quantitative restrictions on textile and clothing 
exports from developing countries generally were formalized in 1962 
under the Long-Term Agreement on Cotton Textiles. These restrictions 
on cotton textiles were extended to products from man-made fiber, wool, 
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became effective in 1974, through 1994. The quotas negotiated between 
industrial and developing countries were administered by exporting 
countries, and the rents generated led rapidly to the emergence of interest 
groups, in both sets of countries, which had a strong motive in seeing the 
system remain intact. Hence the breakthrough in the Uruguay Round, 
which led to the ATC as of 1 January 1995, can be viewed as one of the 
triumphs of free trade advocates across the globe. 
The ATC was gradually implemented in four phases over a 10-year 
period beginning on 1 January 1995 and ending on 31 December 2004. 
The liberalization had two dimensions: first, the phased integration of 
harmonized system tariff codes or lines into the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (16% in 1995, 17% in 1998, 18% in 2002, 
and 49% in 2005); and second, higher growth rates in remaining quota-
constrained categories (6.96% in 1995–1997, 8.7% in 1998–2001, and 11.05% 
in 2002–2004) (James et al. 2003).2 In this way, the ATC gradually but 
progressively liberalized world trade in textiles and clothing in these two 
dimensions of integration and growth in the remaining quotas. 
During those 10 years, however, several unforeseen developments 
occurred that have important consequences for the outcome of the 
liberalization. The first of these is the post-Uruguay Round proliferation 
of preferential trade agreements around the major trading hub countries 
of the European Union (EU)—Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and 
United Kingdom—and North America. These agreements include 
programs aimed at providing new life to the textile complexes in the 
older industrial economies through “outsourcing” and “production 
sharing” arrangements with neighboring developing countries and 
countries in transition from central planning to market economies. The 
preferential agreements include so-called “free trade agreements” as well 
as unilateral preference treaties such as the General Preferential Tariff 
program of Canada, the Everything But Arms initiative of the EU, and 
the African Growth and Opportunities Act of the United States (US). All 
of these discriminatory agreements are enforced by rules of origin that 
usually encourage exclusive use of textile intermediate products (yarn 
and fabric) from the hub countries. That these agreements have had a 
substantial impact on the direction and composition of trade is not in 
doubt. What is in doubt is whether they will continue to allow high-cost 
textile producers in the hub countries to survive. 
The second unforeseen development during the negotiation of the 
ATC was the dramatic emergence of the PRC as an industrial power 
and its accession to WTO in late 2001, near the end of the second phase 
of the implementation of the ATC. The fact that the PRC would benefit 
from the relaxation of quotas meant that the benefits expected from the 
agreement by other large Asian suppliers of textiles and clothing would, 
at a minimum, have to be shared with it. The extent to which the PRC 
would gain, however, remains uncertain. This is because the accession 
agreement includes a special textile safeguard arrangement that is valid 
through 2008.3 
The imposition of safeguard quotas on the PRC in mid-2005 by the 
EU and US (followed by other WTO members including Argentina, 
Brazil, Peru, and Turkey) is significant in that the PRC is the world’s 
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exporter of intermediate and made-up textile products. As the PRC’s 
shares of the EU (30%) and US (25%) imports of all textile and clothing 
products in 2005 were large, imposition of quota restraints may erode 
gains to consumers through prices higher than would otherwise have 
been charged. This also means that the world is not completely quota 
free (except for a brief interlude in early 2005). Hence, one may refer to 
the “almost” post-quota era between the present and the end of 2008. 
Even then the outcome is not determinate because the PRC’s accession 
agreement allows WTO members to treat the PRC as a nonmarket 
economy for another extended period (up to 2016). This allows any WTO 
member to enact antidumping measures by comparing import prices 
of PRC goods with prices of similar goods in a representative market 
economy rather than domestic prices of these goods in the PRC.4 In any 
case, normal WTO safeguards and other contingent forms of protection 
remain available.5 
In this section of the Asian Development Outlook, the historical 
significance of production and trade in textiles and clothing in the 
economic development of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) developing 
member countries is discussed and past performance is briefly reviewed. 
Then new statistical data that are collected on a “real time” basis in 
the EU and US for the entire year of 2005 are examined in order to 
understand the trends under the (almost) quota-free trading environment 
and, in particular, to compare the situations of preferential and 
nonpreferential suppliers. Finally, an agenda for future reform of trade 
policy in this important area of world trade is considered, an agenda that 
may be influential both in the current Doha negotiations and in crafting 
other trade agreements.
Historical perspective on textiles and clothing  
in Asian development 
The reintegration of textile and clothing trade into the system of 
world trade at the completion of the ATC on 31 December 2004 was of 
particular significance to Asian developing economies and had prompted 
much speculation of what the possible effects could be. These economies 
had seen large increases in exports of textiles and clothing—especially 
clothing—as they moved up the ladder of industrialization from largely 
agricultural economies to modern manufacturing and services-based 
economies over a 30–40-year period. In the last two decades, textiles and 
clothing have been the second-fastest growing segment of world trade 
(after electronics), despite the presence of the quota system (Hayashi 
2005). Of course, in the decade after the ATC was agreed upon, market 
access improved, foreign investment flows rose, and buyers and suppliers 
began to reposition themselves in light of the PRC’s WTO accession, the 
end of quotas, and the proliferation of preferential trade agreements. 
The success that economies like Japan; Hong Kong, China; Republic of 
Korea; Taipei,China; and Singapore had with textiles and clothing in the 
early stages of their industrialization, particularly before the quota system 
became embedded in the GATT in 1974, was outstanding, with export-
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of younger female workers), and technological and management skills. 
These economies tended to develop large textile complexes and labor-
intensive clothing industries, the latter dominated by small and medium 
enterprises. 
Following Japan’s earlier experience, the East Asian newly 
industrialized economies that held large quotas in recognition of their 
large capacity and competitiveness in textiles and clothing in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, gradually became uncompetitive in the most labor-
intensive segments of the industry. The rising labor and energy costs of 
the 1970s and early 1980s helped prompt the migration of these industries 
to Southeast Asia, a process that was accelerated by currency appreciation 
after the Plaza Accord of 1985 (Thee 1991 and 2003). 
Once reforms took hold in the PRC, textile and clothing factories 
from higher-cost locations in East Asia and Southeast Asia began to 
relocate production either there or to other locations where preferences 
were large enough and costs competitive enough to justify the 
investments. Hong Kong, China; Korea; and Taipei,China still retain 
niches in high-end fashion wear requiring very skilled sewing and 
design operations and in high-quality and capital-intensive segments of 
the textile industry, such as expensive man-made fabrics and industrial 
textiles. Korea and Taipei,China retain some of the largest textile capacity 
in Asia, with only the PRC, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia (ranked by 
size) having larger mill capacities (USITC 2004, Table 3.1). Thailand 
also has large textile capacity, exceeding that of Mexico in 2003 (USITC 
2004). Pakistan has the third-largest cotton textile industry, after the PRC 
and India. Viet Nam is now developing a modern textile industry but 
it is in the early stages of development. USITC (2004) shows that large 
Asian countries have the lion’s share of textile mill capacity in knitting, 
spinning, and weaving among all regions of the developing world. 
Outside Asia, Turkey, Mexico, and Egypt (ranked by size) have the most 
significant capacities among developing countries. 
The data for 2003 indicate that Asian-based textile mills accounted 
for 60% of world fiber consumption. Estimates of spinning and weaving 
capacities indicate that Asian mills accounted for 66% and 68%, 
respectively, of all machinery in these textile segments globally (USITC 
2004).6 Member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) imported about 31% of textile imports from 
non-OECD sources in 2001, of which 79% came from Asia. For the larger 
category in imports, namely clothing, two thirds of OECD imports were 
from non-OECD countries. Asian suppliers accounted for 44% of total 
OECD clothing imports or two thirds of all imports of clothing from 
non-OECD countries in 2001 (OECD 2004). 
The migration of textile production has been to large developing 
Asian countries; smaller countries almost exclusively assemble clothing 
but rely on imported intermediate textile fabrics. This process is still 
taking place as the largest textile company in Taipei,China—Formosa 
Plastics—has recently chosen to invest in a large-scale textile complex 
in Viet Nam.7 Later, it will be seen that the presence or absence of large-
scale production capacity in intermediate textile products is a critical 
factor in the emerging trading environment. One consequence is that 
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Asian players. However, because of fragmentation, small countries 
that are competitive with low labor costs or highly skilled sewers, and 
have low trade costs because of smooth customs operations and good 
infrastructure, are likely to survive and may even thrive in the (almost) 
quota-free trading environment.
For some Asian countries, the textile and clothing industry has 
become the leading source of manufactured exports and, indeed, total 
merchandise exports. Over 80% of the merchandise exports of Cambodia 
(85%) and Bangladesh (83%) are clothing. For Sri Lanka (55%), Nepal 
(51%), and Lao People’s Democratic Republic (42%), clothing exports are 
also by far the largest item in merchandise exports. For Pakistan, 70% of 
merchandise exports are in textiles or clothing.8
It is hard to overstate the significance of the employment and incomes 
that accrue to female workers, often new entrants to the labor force. 
Without these jobs, there would be little alternative formal employment 
of young female workers in manufacturing. The opening of the formerly 
closed economies of South Asia and the transitional economies of 
Southeast Asia would not have been as rapid, had it not been for the 
growth of a strong export-oriented industrial lobby based in the clothing 
sector. 
As pointed out in Part 3 of the Asian Development Outlook 2006, the 
development of export-oriented manufacturing industries under open 
trade regimes has had important social benefits for Asian countries 
related to employment, participation rates, household formation, and 
female status in society. It has also had some beneficial impacts on labor 
standards and human rights, as experience in Cambodia demonstrates. 
Cambodia, for example, has adopted International Labour Organization 
codes and conventions and has taken their enforcement quite seriously as 
a result of the critical position of the export-oriented clothing industry 
and its reliance on markets in the EU and North America.9 Some fear 
that these benefits may be lost if the industry collapsed. This anxiety 
has been repeatedly expressed for the small clothing exporters in the 
region, but is the concern—expressed in such articles as the Far Eastern 
Economic Review (2003)—valid? An attempt is made to address this issue 
in the following section. 
Before turning to recent trade performance, it is important to note 
briefly the industrial structure of textiles and clothing and to understand 
the various factors thought to be important in determining where 
production takes place. Viewed as an integrated whole, the value chain 
in textiles and clothing consists of the following five production stages 
(Figure 1.4.1): (i) spinning of fibers into yarn; (ii) knitting or weaving 
of yarn into gray fabric; (iii) dyeing, printing, and finishing of fabrics 
for clothing production; (iv) cutting of fabric into clothing parts; and 
(v) assembly or sewing operations (combined with accessories like buttons 
and zippers) to create finished clothing. 
The presence of large domestic supplies of cotton or wool as in 
PRC, India, Pakistan, and Egypt provides a basis for cotton and wool 
textile production, but cotton or wool may also be imported from other 
suppliers of raw material (e.g., Australia and New Zealand). Man-made 
fabric (MMF) is produced from polyester filaments. Finishing operations 
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large supplies of freshwater and power in addition to chemicals, dyes, and 
paints. Cutting and assembly operations for clothing are often subdivided 
as well, with simple sewing being the most labor intensive of all the 
production stages. 
A developing country typically begins with importing cut clothing 
pieces for sewing into clothing items. As the industry develops, cutting of 
fabrics and sewing the pieces into clothing represents a second phase of 
development. As the producers become more sophisticated, standard trim 
and accessories are added to production (e.g., white buttons on men’s 
dress shirts). Finally, a full-package clothing producer does the sourcing 
of the fabric and contracts for the cutting, sewing, and trim operations 
along a global supply chain or production network. 
The ability to fragment production allows the full-package producer 
to place each operation in the most cost-effective location. The big 
differences in factor prices are what enable low-income developing 
countries to enter these global production networks. For example, 
clothing workers in Indonesia (earning $0.27/hour), India ($0.38/hour), 
Bangladesh ($0.39/hour), Pakistan ($0.41/hour), and Sri Lanka 
($0.48/hour) can compete with those in the PRC ($0.78/hour) in labor-
intensive sewing operations, provided that productivity is adequate, while 
workers in Mexico ($2.45/hour) may have difficulty doing so for markets 
as distant as Japan or Europe (USITC 2004). However, it takes only 2 days 
to ship clothing from Mexico to US retail outlets, but 21 days for clothing 
from the PRC to reach retail markets in Los Angeles, and time is literally 
money (Hummels 2001).10 Hence, in certain clothing categories, the labor 
cost advantage of the PRC may be offset by geographic proximity, if trade 
costs are low in the competitor country.
The following factors must also be taken into account in addition 
to time, distance, and labor cost adjusted for productivity (unit labor 
costs): business climate in the supplying country (including policies and 
conditions for trade, investment, and the financial and labor markets); 
infrastructure (including use of electricity, informatics, ports, roads, 
telecommunications, water, and human resource-related infrastructure 
in, for example, health and education); and, most important, market 
access (whether a supplier is entitled to preferential tariff treatment or is 
subject to discriminatory tariff and nontariff barriers). All of these factors 
must be taken into consideration to understand the outcome of the 
liberalization that was completed under the ATC.11 While space prevents 
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this brief review from conducting an evaluation of these factors in the 
developing Asian countries, it can be assumed that those that perform 
well in the post-quota trading environment are likely to have satisfied the 
requirements in most dimensions of these factors.
Recent performance under the ATC and in the 
(almost) post-quota era 
In 2003 and again in 2004, growth in world textile and clothing trade was 
in double digits (WTO 2005), averaging 12–13% in value. Asian exports of 
textile and clothing products to Europe and North America increased at 
an annual rate of 18% during these 2 years in dollars and euros (Anson 
and Brocklehurst 2005). 
In 2005, growth was anticipated to expand in volume terms (as all 
quotas are on the volume of exports and not on the value, which is 
determined by prices and quantities) but the outcome in value terms was 
indeterminate because it was not known if increases in volumes would 
outpace decreases in prices. Then again, it was only at the midnight hour 
of the fourth and final phase of the ATC that binding quotas on nearly 
half of all textile and clothing tariff lines in the harmonized system were 
finally ended for all WTO contracting member states by Canada, EU, 
and US. 
The elimination of quotas is a double-edged sword for developing 
countries because of the existence of discriminatory preferential trade 
agreements with industrial countries. These agreements provided a large 
“margin of preference” to beneficiaries prior to 2005 because the tariff 
equivalent of the quotas imposed on large Asian nonpreferential suppliers 
was substantial. The elimination of quotas therefore implied a significant 
erosion of the margin of preference enjoyed by preferential suppliers as 
the tariff equivalents fell to zero as of 31 December 2004. This meant that 
shifts in market shares away from preferential suppliers and downward 
pressure on prices were likely to be seen as 2005 progressed.
The United States Office of Textiles and Apparel was empowered 
to rapidly collect import data on textile and clothing imports by quota 
categories, even after quotas were eliminated, through electronic data 
processing. It increased its efforts beginning in 2005 to monitor imports 
from the PRC in view of the special safeguard agreement that was part 
of the WTO accession agreement with that country. Data therefore 
became available by product and source country of imports with only a 
2-month lag. Similarly, Eurostat put in place a system to monitor textile 
and clothing imports on a “real time” basis for the same purpose.12 In 
the US case, detailed data on imports under special import programs are 
available so that preferential imports may be distinguished from imports 
facing most-favored nation tariffs. These data allow for the separation 
of what is happening in terms of volume and value (and, consequently, 
unit prices) in various categories of textile and clothing imports from 
preferential and nonpreferential suppliers, as well as for more aggregate 
measures of imports such as market share.
The following sections offer an overview of Asian exporters’ recent 
performance to the US and EU markets.Asian Development Outlook 2006    3
United States market
Clothing
The annual volume changes of US imports from all major suppliers for 
clothing in million square meter equivalents for 2002–2005 are shown 
in Table 1.4.1, which indicates a 10.3% increase in 2005 over 2004 and 
represents a sharp acceleration of growth compared with the previous 
year. The value of US imports of clothing in millions of current US dollars 
rose by about 6%—indicative of falling unit prices in 2005 compared with 
2004 (Table 1.4.2). Clothing imports from the PRC increased by nearly 
100% in volume and by about 70% in value—revealing a steep cut in unit 
values of the PRC’s products. The full-year increase in the PRC’s share of 
the US import market of about 12% in volume and 8% in value cements the 
PRC’s position as the lead supplier of US imports of clothing, despite the 
imposition of safeguard quotas in the second half of the year. 
In contrast, former major quota holders like Hong Kong, China; 
Taipei,China; and Korea (ranked by size of quota holdings) saw a 
cumulative drop in market share from 9.7% in 2004 to 6.1% in 2005 in 
volume and a drop from 11.1% to 8.4% in value over the same period. 
Preferential suppliers overall saw a decline in market shares in clothing 
shipments in volume of about 5% and in value by a little more than 4% in 
2005 compared with 2004 (Tables 1.4.1 and 1.4.2). A group of competitive 
Asian suppliers more than held their own in the US market in 2005 led 
by Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Viet 
Nam, cumulatively increasing volume share by about 1 percentage point 
to about 24% in 2005 versus 23% in 2004, and increasing value share to 
22.7% from 20.5% over the same time frame. This group managed this 
performance mainly because their unit values kept pace or grew faster 
than volumes. In fact, in Viet Nam and Sri Lanka, volumes rose more 
slowly than the world average but values increased more rapidly than the 
world average. 
Moreover, in the case of Indonesia growth of value (nearly 20%) 
clearly outpaced volume growth (17%), indicating that rather than 
competing directly with the PRC, producers moved into higher-quality 
clothing lines. In particular, high growth in shipments of cotton clothing 
figured prominently in the success of these Asian suppliers, offsetting a 
generally weaker performance in shipments of MMF clothing. The latter 
category has much higher tariffs than cotton clothing (typically over 20% 
as against 10% for cottons) that may have priced some of them out of 
the market for certain products, compared with the PRC. The PRC lifted 
the volume of MMF clothing shipments by 140% in 2005 but increased 
value by half that, indicating a sharp reduction in its prices of MMF 
clothing. Even though the PRC also faces high tariffs on these items, its 
price competitiveness was strong enough to overcome them. Preferential 
suppliers were also able to preserve their market share in MMF clothing 
(a decline of 3.5% in volume but only 1.7% in value) better than in cotton 
clothing (a decline of 7.8% in volume and 7.2% in value).
In some contrast to competitive Asian suppliers, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand continued to have fading performances in 
clothing shipments in both volume and value terms relative to the world 
average. This suggests that producers in these cases failed to adjust in the 
manner of the more competitive suppliers.44    Asian Development Outlook 2006
Small and marginal suppliers in the US market, such as the 
Fiji Islands and Nepal, which had already been losing ground before the 
ending of quotas, were hard hit in 2005. Most of the countries in Central 
Asia as well as Maldives and Mongolia saw their market shares evaporate 
in 2005. These were cases where distance and geography now count for 
more than other factors and, with the end of quotas, footloose producers 
have packed up and moved on.
In the main, however, many countries’ fears of being squeezed out 
of the US market—by a combination of the rising strength of the PRC 
on the one hand and the proliferation of US preferences with non-Asian 
suppliers on the other—were not realized. 
Textiles
Intermediate textile products include yarns and fabrics used in the 
manufacture of clothing. The trade in intermediate textile products is 
concentrated in fewer countries than trade in clothing, reflecting the 
large scale-economies in production of textiles compared with clothing. 
1.4.1 United States imports of clothing, by volume
Volume change over previous year (%) Market share (%)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Nonpreferential suppliers  12.64   14.40   10.40   21.87   52.19   54.87   57.41   59.93   66.20 
Asia-Pacific DMC suppliers  12.88   14.73   11.43   26.46   47.23   49.75   52.21   55.01   63.05 
People’s Republic of China  60.35   46.32   29.81   97.93   6.06   9.07   12.14   14.90   26.73 
Bangladesh  -3.96   -1.58   3.14   19.45   6.00   5.38   4.84   4.72   5.11 
Indonesia  0.15   3.92   13.83   17.07   3.69   3.45   3.28   3.53   3.74 
India  26.29   4.59   14.52   29.68   2.50   2.95   2.82   3.05   3.59 
Viet Nam  1,022.36   134.38   5.12   3.13   0.17   1.83   3.92   3.89   3.64 
Cambodia  22.67   19.97   20.28   11.87   2.23   2.55   2.80   3.18   3.23 
Thailand  8.32   1.20   7.45   0.69   2.81   2.84   2.63   2.67   2.44 
Hong Kong, China  -10.43   -4.36   -5.92   -19.27   5.69   4.76   4.16   3.70   2.71 
Pakistan  10.10   16.12   17.06   11.28   2.15   2.21   2.35   2.60   2.63 
Philippines  -0.49   -0.90   -5.87   1.00   3.44   3.19   2.89   2.57   2.36 
Sri Lanka  -2.31   0.28   5.08   9.32   2.50   2.28   2.09   2.08   2.06 
Republic of Korea  2.86   -11.43   8.48   -42.44   3.92   3.77   3.05   3.13   1.63 
Taipei,China  -6.25   2.61   -3.18   -31.56   3.81   3.34   3.13   2.87   1.78 
Malaysia  -0.14   -0.67   10.09   0.36   1.20   1.12   1.01   1.06   0.96 
Mongolia  23.12   3.34   12.35   -35.53   0.27   0.31   0.29   0.31   0.18 
Turkmenistan  2.39   43.95   -2.46   -6.51   0.09   0.09   0.12   0.11   0.09 
Nepal  -28.93   3.51   -11.26   -44.85   0.33   0.22   0.21   0.17   0.09 
Uzbekistan  90.23   39.59   -36.72   26.29   0.02   0.04   0.05   0.03   0.04 
Kyrgyz Republic  485.97   176.51   -11.26   -33.92   0.00   0.01   0.03   0.02   0.01 
Armenia  -18.46   -25.48   23.69   -68.54   0.03   0.02   0.01   0.02   0.00 
Kazakhstan  67.39   166.48   36.32   -91.59   0.01   0.02   0.06   0.07   0.01 
Fiji Islands  -14.21   -7.97   21.38   -80.46   0.14   0.11   0.09   0.11   0.02 
Maldives  49.28   11.92   -3.83   -93.74   0.15   0.20   0.21   0.19   0.01 
Tajikistan  -  10,544.65   -33.44   -99.75   -   0.00   0.02   0.01   0.00 
Excluding People’s Rep. of China  5.89   7.69   5.86   -0.09   41.17   40.68   40.07   40.11   36.32 
Other nonpreferential suppliers  10.36   11.15   0.05   -29.39   4.97   5.12   5.20   4.92   3.15 
Preferential suppliers  2.12   2.98   2.30   -4.50   43.12   41.09   38.71   37.44   32.41 
Central American Free Trade Agreement  4.90   5.46   2.87   -0.09   20.69   20.25   19.54   19.00   17.21 
Mexico  -5.81   -8.34   -4.10   -10.17   14.22   12.50   10.48   9.50   7.74 
Others  8.86   13.95   8.72   -7.82   8.21   8.34   8.69   8.94   7.47 
World  7.15   9.32   5.76   10.32   100.00   100.00   100.00   100.00   100.00 
DMC = developing member country of the Asian Development Bank.
Notes: Sum of nonpreferential and preferential suppliers does not add up to world total because some minor suppliers are not included; numbers may not sum 
precisely due to rounding.
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel, available: http://www.otexa.ita.doc.gov/, downloaded 10 March 2006. Asian Development Outlook 2006    45
1.4.2 United States imports of clothing, by value
Value change over previous year (%) Market share (%)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Nonpreferential suppliers  2.48   11.32   8.69   15.12   56.37   57.26   59.36   60.93   66.11 
Asia-Pacific DMC suppliers  2.48   12.06   9.60   19.90   48.25   49.00   51.15   52.93   59.83 
People’s Republic of China  21.54   29.75   23.01   69.61   8.15   9.82   11.87   13.78   22.04 
India  10.74   5.26   10.77   34.24   3.04   3.34   3.27   3.42   4.33 
Hong Kong, China  -7.93   -4.53   3.98   -8.79   7.46   6.81   6.05   5.94   5.11 
Indonesia  -7.81   5.69   11.36   19.67   3.92   3.58   3.53   3.71   4.18 
Viet Nam  1,768.80   165.29   7.91   6.33   0.08   1.57   3.88   3.96   3.97 
Bangladesh  -10.38   -1.86   7.01   19.93   3.72   3.31   3.02   3.05   3.45 
Cambodia  11.58   18.92   15.27   19.86   1.65   1.83   2.03   2.21   2.49 
Thailand  -5.44   -0.40   5.13   0.47   3.22   3.02   2.80   2.78   2.63 
Philippines  -4.02   2.11   -3.66   2.51   3.35   3.19   3.03   2.76   2.66 
Sri Lanka  -6.04   1.60   7.92   6.51   2.66   2.48   2.35   2.39   2.40 
Pakistan  -5.71   15.61   12.04   10.65   1.65   1.54   1.66   1.76   1.83 
Republic of Korea  -5.49   -12.39   0.15   -36.17   3.86   3.62   2.95   2.79   1.68 
Taipei,China  -12.98   2.21   -3.86   -26.76   3.21   2.77   2.63   2.39   1.65 
Malaysia  -5.42   -4.77   3.84   -4.79   1.35   1.26   1.12   1.10   0.99 
Mongolia  11.97   13.40   28.56   -40.78   0.25   0.27   0.29   0.35   0.20 
Nepal  -27.56   20.00   -24.31   -37.59   0.26   0.19   0.21   0.15   0.09 
Turkmenistan  10.46   42.28   -4.09   -20.38   0.05   0.06   0.08   0.07   0.05 
Uzbekistan  63.05   80.00   -53.16   62.54   0.01   0.02   0.03   0.02   0.02 
Fiji Islands  -18.54   9.48   7.90   -77.74   0.16   0.13   0.13   0.13   0.03 
Kyrgyz Republic  162.02   227.62   -28.79   -43.67   0.00   0.00   0.02   0.01   0.01 
Kazakhstan  -5.36   357.72   -15.66   -75.07   0.01   0.01   0.03   0.02   0.00 
Armenia  -13.95   -23.04   -1.38   -80.91   0.02   0.02   0.01   0.01   0.00 
Maldives  20.30   -9.52   -10.73   -94.18   0.15   0.18   0.15   0.13   0.01 
Tajikistan  -   10,247.18   -46.20   -99.45   -   0.00   0.01   0.00   0.00 
Excluding People’s Rep. of China  -1.40   7.63   5.54   2.40   40.09   39.18   39.28   39.15   37.79 
Other nonpreferential suppliers  2.47   6.92   3.03   -16.54   8.12   8.25   8.22   7.99   6.29 
Preferential suppliers  -0.06   1.96   4.01   -6.46   39.52   39.15   37.18   36.52   32.20 
Central American Free Trade Agreement  1.77   0.98   3.57   -4.26   15.82   15.96   15.01   14.68   13.25 
Mexico  -4.95   -7.01   -3.17   -9.07   13.83   13.03   11.29   10.32   8.85 
Others  3.87   15.03   12.08   -6.91   9.87   10.16   10.88   11.52   10.11 
World  0.89   7.37   5.90   6.09   100.00   100.00   100.00   100.00   100.00 
DMC = developing member country of the Asian Development Bank.
Notes: Sum of nonpreferential and preferential suppliers does not add up to world total because some minor suppliers are not included; numbers may not sum 
precisely due to rounding.
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel, available: http://www.otexa.ita.doc.gov/, downloaded 10 March 2006. 
Only seven Asian suppliers have a market share in US imports of textile 
intermediates of more than 1%, compared with double that number for 
clothing (Tables 1.4.3 and 1.4.4). Similarly, only three preferential suppliers 
(Canada, Mexico, and Israel—ranked by size) have a share exceeding 
1% of US imports of intermediate textile products compared with seven 
preferential suppliers of clothing. Imports of intermediate products are 
aggregated in Tables 1.4.3 (volume) and 1.4.4 (value). 
The volume of trade measured by US imports increased by only 3% in 
2005 from the previous year and the increase in value was even smaller, 
at only 2%. Only three big Asian suppliers had growth in shipments 
of intermediate textile products to the US after 2004 large enough to 
increase market share: the PRC (up 83% in volume and 56% in value); 
India (up 79% in volume and 22% in value); and Indonesia (up 7% in 
volume and 4% in value). Other significant Asian suppliers such as Korea 
and Taipei,China increased the volume of shipments but saw values fall, 46    Asian Development Outlook 2006
1.4.3 United States imports of textile intermediate products, by volume
Volume change over previous year (%) Market share (%)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Nonpreferential suppliers  29.98   -2.45   12.24   9.08   53.31   58.09   56.95   58.94   62.39 
Asia-Pacific DMC suppliers  38.40   -2.48   14.80   15.55   34.38   39.89   39.09   41.38   46.41 
People’s Republic of China  82.66   16.06   29.52   82.70   3.56   5.45   6.35   7.59   13.45 
Republic of Korea  58.26   15.42   20.88   5.85   6.41   8.51   9.87   11.00   11.30 
Pakistan  32.01   -12.59   17.99   -10.48   7.59   8.40   7.38   8.03   6.97 
Taipei,China  59.45   -14.71   4.27   1.20   4.04   5.39   4.62   4.45   4.37 
Indonesia  19.46   -17.46   16.38   6.74   2.94   2.95   2.44   2.62   2.72 
India  18.10   -3.35   14.35   79.30   1.65   1.63   1.59   1.67   2.91 
Thailand  8.38   -19.31   -3.21   -7.23   3.87   3.52   2.85   2.55   2.29 
Malaysia  41.04   11.30   2.16   -25.55   0.91   1.07   1.20   1.13   0.82 
Viet Nam  11,536.75   184.12   23.74   16.85   0.00   0.12   0.33   0.38   0.43 
Philippines  46.86   17.64   -18.49   -60.59   0.78   0.95   1.13   0.85   0.32 
Hong Kong, China  -30.04   -48.21   24.13   10.87   1.40   0.82   0.43   0.49   0.53 
Sri Lanka  -1.40   -10.00   -27.16   -39.93   0.43   0.36   0.32   0.22   0.13 
Bangladesh  -28.02   20.67   -1.89   -63.85   0.11   0.06   0.08   0.07   0.02 
Cambodia  309.43   -39.72   37.96   -53.23   0.02   0.06   0.04   0.05   0.02 
Uzbekistan  13.53   -26.98   -33.43   -57.87   0.56   0.54   0.39   0.24   0.10 
Nepal  233.99   67.40   100.90   626.41   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Mongolia  -34.03   -99.67   -41.85   6,343.94   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Turkmenistan  -41.56   23.99   -41.37   -45.77   0.10   0.05   0.06   0.03   0.02 
Kyrgyz Republic  -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   0.00 
Armenia  -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   0.00 
Kazakhstan  -   -100.00   -   -100.00   -   0.00   -   0.00   - 
Fiji Islands  808.88   -89.08   616.36   -88.08   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Maldives  -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   - 
Tajikistan  -92.63   64.55   2,825.57   -77.67   0.01   0.00   0.00   0.02   0.00 
Excluding People’s Rep. of China  33.29   -5.41   11.94   0.48   30.82   34.44   32.74   33.79   32.95 
Other nonpreferential suppliers  14.70   -2.38   6.64   -6.19   18.93   18.20   17.86   17.56   15.99 
Preferential suppliers  4.36   0.83   3.18   -5.87   43.75   38.27   38.78   36.90   33.71 
Mexico  8.58   -4.27   12.87   -5.93   10.55   9.61   9.24   9.62   8.78 
Central American Free Trade Agreement  -18.33   14.45   24.76   -32.95   0.58   0.40   0.46   0.53   0.34 
Others  577.29   2.38   -0.24   -5.32   32.61   28.27   29.08   26.75   24.59 
World  19.28   -0.49   8.45   3.03   100.00   100.00   100.00   100.00   100.00 
DMC = developing member country of the Asian Development Bank.
Notes: Sum of nonpreferential and preferential suppliers does not add up to world total because some minor suppliers are not included; numbers may not sum 
precisely due to rounding.
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel, available: http://www.otexa.ita.doc.gov/, downloaded 10 March 2006. 
losing market share in value terms. Only Canada, Mexico, and Israel, 
among all preferential suppliers, ship large amounts of intermediate 
textile products to the US and all of them saw decreases in the volume of 
shipments in 2005 of 5–6%. However, Mexico increased the value of its 
shipments enough to increase market share marginally. Indeed the market 
share of preferential suppliers as a group fell hardly at all in value (by 
only about two tenths of a percentage point), indicating that preferential 
rules of origin are likely at work, diverting trade in these products. This is 
in fact unsurprising, given the stringent “triple-transformation” (covering 
the second through fifth major steps in production shown in Figure 1.4.1 
above) rules of origin in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) as regards textiles and clothing. 
Asia might benefit by looking at EU and US experience with rules 
of origin in negotiating and designing rules for its own bilateral and 
regional trade agreements that will influence the future textile and Asian Development Outlook 2006    47
1.4.4 United States imports of textile intermediate products, by value
Value change over previous year (%) Market share (%)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Nonpreferential suppliers  9.32   -1.50  11.25   2.27   63.98   65.66   65.45   67.14   67.30 
Asia-Pacific DMC suppliers  14.02   -4.68  10.23   5.32   36.69   39.27   37.88   38.50   39.75 
People’s Republic of China  47.74   13.72   23.19   55.80   4.36   6.04   6.96   7.90   12.07 
Republic of Korea  8.31   -6.51  6.13   -0.13  9.71   9.88   9.35   9.15   8.95 
Pakistan  30.39   -2.69  22.29   -19.21  5.14   6.29   6.20   6.99   5.53 
Taipei,China  16.08   -10.41  1.65   -4.00  6.41   6.98   6.33   5.93   5.58 
Indonesia  -1.25  -8.52  17.90   3.61   1.97   1.83   1.69   1.84   1.87 
India  10.33   6.94   6.90   21.96   1.87   1.94   2.10   2.07   2.47 
Thailand  -0.87  -20.38  0.77   -4.64  2.54   2.37   1.91   1.77   1.66 
Malaysia  10.34   -1.85  -2.64  -22.61  0.67   0.70   0.69   0.62   0.47 
Viet Nam  32,745.72   202.55   23.59   -4.02  0.00   0.07   0.20   0.23   0.22 
Hong Kong, China  -31.09  -47.57  -12.66  -32.09  2.52   1.63   0.86   0.70   0.46 
Philippines  28.18   34.19   -11.96  -69.59  0.60   0.72   0.98   0.79   0.24 
Sri Lanka  -8.96  -24.36  -25.31  -40.99  0.40   0.34   0.26   0.18   0.10 
Cambodia  162.33   -50.54  29.04   -25.26  0.02   0.06   0.03   0.03   0.03 
Bangladesh  -24.81  13.70   20.48   -65.45  0.05   0.04   0.04   0.04   0.02 
Uzbekistan  4.52   -29.68  -21.46  -69.04  0.37   0.37   0.26   0.19   0.06 
Nepal  2.60   277.32   -9.14  114.31   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Maldives  -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   - 
Mongolia  -33.84  -96.99  158.90   134.41   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Turkmenistan  -13.86  -11.04  -6.31  -44.47  0.04   0.03   0.03   0.02   0.01 
Fiji Islands  249.26   -75.25  192.53   -83.09  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Kyrgyz Republic  -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   0.00 
Kazakhstan  -   -100.00  -   -100.00  -   0.00   -   0.00   - 
Armenia  -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   0.00 
Tajikistan  -92.15  76.28   2,346.08   -76.50  0.01   0.00   0.00   0.04   0.01 
Excluding People’s Rep. of China  9.47   -8.03  7.31   -7.71  32.33   33.23   30.93   30.60   27.68 
Other nonpreferential suppliers  2.99   3.25   12.65   -1.83  27.29   26.39   27.57   28.64   27.56 
Preferential suppliers  0.38   -0.91  3.35   1.34   32.76   30.88   30.96   29.51   29.31 
Mexico  6.82   -6.04  8.23   3.08   9.44   9.47   9.00   8.98   9.08 
Central American Free Trade Agreement  -18.24  -0.22  36.43   -19.31  0.27   0.21   0.21   0.26   0.21 
Others  -2.04  1.37   1.01   0.84   23.05   21.20   21.75   20.26   20.02 
World  6.52   -1.19  8.45   2.02   100.00   100.00   100.00   100.00   100.00 
DMC = developing member country of the Asian Development Bank.
Notes: Sum of nonpreferential and preferential suppliers does not add up to world total because some minor suppliers are not included; numbers may not sum 
precisely due to rounding.
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel, available: http://www.otexa.ita.doc.gov/, downloaded 10 March 2006. 
clothing trade of its developing countries. The US has demonstrated some 
flexibility in designing rules of origin in preferential agreements as far 
as intermediate textile products are concerned. For example, the US-
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) allows cumulation13 
in textiles and clothing between CAFTA and NAFTA so that textile yarns 
and fabrics from Mexico are counted as originating within the CAFTA 
countries. In its free trade agreement with Jordan, either US or Israeli 
fabrics or clothing parts may be used in Jordan’s clothing shipments to 
the US with duty-free treatment.14
European Union Market
Following the PRC’s entry into WTO in late 2001, the country’s access to 
the EU market improved: its shipments of textile and clothing products to 
the EU rose, and its share of the market in volume terms increased from 
17% in 2001 to 26% in 2004 and in value terms from 18% in 2001 to 23% in     Asian Development Outlook 2006
1.4.5 European Union imports of textiles and clothing, by volume
Volume change over previous year (%) Market share (%)
1996–
2000a
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1995–
2000b
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Asia 9.14 57.11 -23.88 14.32 5.76 13.94 56.19 65.27 59.92 62.34 62.59 66.78
People's Republic of China 14.04 44.39 3.88 28.37 10.86 36.39 13.73 16.89 21.16 24.71 26.01 33.37
India 5.92 5.94 -6.25 6.41 2.92 4.73 11.64 8.44 9.54 9.24 9.02 8.81
Bangladesh 9.02 401.16 -77.99 26.97 17.68 -1.18 5.26 19.38 5.14 5.94 6.64 6.13
Pakistan 6.38 8.24 11.72 12.98 6.82 -3.03 5.80 4.23 5.70 5.86 5.95 5.31
Hong Kong, China -2.03 40.65 -12.81 -8.92 -16.95 -20.06 2.95 2.37 2.49 2.06 1.63 1.19
Indonesia 7.51 18.65 -6.05 -7.80 -7.95 -7.26 5.04 4.12 4.67 3.92 3.43 3.00
Republic of Korea 25.69 -3.14 -1.81 2.00 -2.89 -19.17 2.83 2.56 3.03 2.81 2.59 1.97
Thailand 3.85 9.01 7.02 3.74 -4.67 4.92 2.85 2.03 2.62 2.48 2.24 2.20
Sri Lanka 7.06 -4.22 5.08 6.64 12.11 -9.00 1.12 0.71 0.90 0.87 0.93 0.79
Taipei,China 17.57 26.77 -19.83 -0.22 -12.05 8.47 2.61 2.48 2.39 2.17 1.81 1.86
Viet Nam 30.42 20.09 -1.71 7.19 6.95 -1.16 0.71 0.92 1.09 1.06 1.08 1.01
Cambodia 33.79 71.12 -9.09 19.70 24.70 -7.97 0.23 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.47 0.40
Philippines 0.31 2.02 -3.60 0.72 14.74 -33.49 0.63 0.36 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.26
Nepal -5.10 -21.68 -20.60 -0.29 9.45 -11.09 0.27 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08
Non-Asia 13.79 16.52 -3.10 5.57 5.23 -1.39 18.95 18.04 21.08 20.25 20.23 18.50
Turkey 15.81 17.90 -3.31 7.21 8.14 2.12 10.77 10.67 12.45 12.14 12.47 11.78
Romania 19.31 21.91 9.88 7.80 2.19 -8.96 2.17 2.48 3.29 3.22 3.13 2.66
Tunisia 7.51 8.77 -4.52 -5.11 -3.68 -8.06 2.49 1.96 2.26 1.95 1.78 1.52
Morocco 7.50 6.63 -8.70 3.20 -1.43 -8.27 2.58 1.90 2.09 1.96 1.84 1.56
Bulgaria 17.42 26.54 -19.30 6.86 10.27 3.16 0.94 1.03 1.00 0.97 1.02 0.97
World 8.78 35.55 -17.08 9.89 5.33 7.16 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
a Average growth rate from 1996 to 2000 relative to previous year. b Average market share in 1995–2000.
Note: Sum of Asia and non-Asia suppliers does not add up to world total because some minor suppliers are not included.
Source: Eurostat, available: http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=welcomeref&open=/
&product=EU_external_trade&depth=4, downloaded 1 March 2006.
2004 (Tables 1.4.5 and 1.4.6). Most Asian suppliers lost market share but 
the biggest losers were the large quota holders (Hong Kong, China; Korea; 
and Taipei,China). India, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand had small 
initial losses in 2002 but market shares were quite stable in 2003 and 
2004. Several Asian suppliers with preferential access to the EU under the 
Generalised System of Preferences and the Everything But Arms initiative 
actually improved market shares, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, and 
Pakistan during 2002–2004. Nepal and Viet Nam did not perform well 
despite available preferences. Non-Asian preferential suppliers had a 
similarly mixed performance. Turkey did well between 2002 and 2004 
and firmed up its place as the second-largest developing country supplier, 
after the PRC. However, preferential suppliers in the Mediterranean rim 
and North Africa, such as Tunisia and Morocco, lost market share in that 
period. Romania and Bulgaria, on the other hand, performed reasonably 
well. 
Unit values of EU imports have fallen since the end of 2002, as total 
import volume has increased more than import value. In 2005, growth 
in import volume exceeded that in import value by just 1.6 percentage 
points, so downward pressure on prices in the EU was muted.
The impact of the final phase of quota integration by the EU was 
expected to be less than in the US case, as the liberalization had gone 
further in Europe than in North America under the ATC, largely because 
the EU eliminated quotas for many small supplier countries earlier under 
various arrangements or because the lines it chose to liberalize were Asian Development Outlook 2006    
1.4.6 European Union imports of textiles and clothing, by value
Value change over previous year (%) Market share (%)
1996–
2000a
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1995–
2000b
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Asia 12.42 0.96 -0.35 0.53 8.05 13.37 51.41 51.67 51.64 52.16 53.77 57.91
People’s Republic of China 16.58 6.95 10.48 7.24 12.35 40.07 15.66 17.96 19.90 21.45 22.99 30.66
India 6.70 5.53 -4.74 -1.05 5.14 16.10 7.63 7.14 6.82 6.78 6.80 7.50
Bangladesh 21.48 8.95 -2.76 12.24 20.19 -6.43 3.36 4.41 4.30 4.86 5.57 4.95
Pakistan 7.53 6.80 4.49 3.65 9.64 -11.25 3.38 3.16 3.31 3.44 3.60 3.00
Hong Kong, China 4.70 -16.90 -9.89 -9.81 -6.37 -22.35 5.79 4.09 3.69 3.35 2.99 2.17
Indonesia 11.02 -1.99 -14.48 -11.82 -3.81 -12.66 3.93 3.68 3.16 2.80 2.57 2.16
Republic of Korea 19.08 -8.75 -9.83 -11.59 -7.69 -26.71 2.65 2.75 2.49 2.21 1.95 1.36
Thailand 9.41 -5.84 -1.23 -5.59 4.24 -8.63 2.27 2.02 2.01 1.90 1.89 1.64
Sri Lanka 13.87 -7.74 -3.69 -5.59 13.34 -3.12 1.34 1.27 1.22 1.16 1.26 1.14
Taipei,China 16.55 -10.63 -10.71 -11.77 -16.37 -19.80 1.96 1.70 1.52 1.35 1.08 0.82
Viet Nam 24.44 0.61 -8.62 -20.97 19.38 1.88 1.10 1.30 1.19 0.94 1.08 1.05
Cambodia 48.76 39.69 7.44 -0.72 22.49 -10.02 0.30 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.74 0.64
Philippines 6.04 -10.88 -0.12 -5.60 13.76 -35.85 0.69 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.53 0.33
Nepal 4.66 -27.43 -29.90 -12.28 10.80 -6.56 0.28 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10
Non-Asia 12.39 15.32 6.66 2.13 2.07 -1.17 25.47 28.83 30.84 31.65 30.82 28.71
Turkey 12.06 10.50 10.95 5.81 4.48 3.18 11.97 12.86 14.31 15.21 15.17 14.73
Romania 22.17 29.04 11.42 2.97 1.39 -5.72 3.60 5.47 6.11 6.32 6.11 5.46
Tunisia 8.51 13.41 0.69 -5.83 -4.49 -5.56 4.64 4.68 4.72 4.47 4.07 3.61
Morocco 7.51 11.87 -0.56 -5.70 -1.93 -7.74 4.20 4.16 4.15 3.93 3.68 3.20
Bulgaria 22.91 29.90 -7.20 10.11 9.53 1.19 1.06 1.66 1.55 1.71 1.79 1.71
World 10.93 4.32 -0.29 -0.48 4.81 5.52 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
a Average growth rate from 1996 to 2000 relative to previous year. b Average market share in 1995–2000. 
Note: Sum of Asia and non-Asia suppliers does not add up to world total because some minor suppliers are not included.
Source: Eurostat, available: http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=welcomeref&open=/
&product=EU_external_trade&depth=4, downloaded 1 March 2006.
of real commercial interest to developing country exporters. However, 
as the PRC was quota constrained in some important categories, some 
significant shifts in 2005 were seen, and its overall market share rose 
sharply from 23% to 31%, or by over one third. India is the only other 
Asian supplier that gained market share following the liberalization in the 
fourth and final phase of the ATC. Every preferential supplier lost market 
share, as did former large quota holders. 
In 2005, the EU introduced a system to monitor imports from the 
PRC and eight other Asian economies (Bangladesh; Cambodia; Hong 
Kong, China; India; Pakistan; Sri Lanka; Taipei,China; and Thailand) in 15 
categories of clothing (similar to the merged categories in the US case) and 
six categories of intermediate textile products deemed to be “sensitive.” 
Indeed, prior to the final implementation of the ATC, the European 
Commission had prepared and published “alert levels” of imports in textile 
and clothing categories that had been used to allocate quotas under the 
ATC, and so forewarned the PRC that it would take action if the alert 
levels (expressed in volume terms) were breached. In the first quarter of 
2005, shipments from the PRC rose at rates of over 100% relative to the 
same period in 2004 in volume terms in eight categories of clothing and 
textiles: knit shirts and t-shirts, sweaters, men’s trousers, blouses, hosiery, 
women’s overcoats, and dresses; and woven flax fabric.15 In two other 
categories, volumes were up by over 60%: brassieres and cotton fabrics. 
Thus, in the second quarter of the year, the European Commission 
started the process of introducing special safeguards on these 10 0    Asian Development Outlook 2006
categories and in June 2005 negotiated a comprehensive agreement 
to restrict these products. However, before the ink was dry on the 
agreement, import shipments that had already been in transit began 
arriving at European ports in amounts that breached the agreed limits. 
Ironically, a trade dispute resulted immediately with angry retailers 
demanding customs release shipments that were technically in violation 
of the negotiated agreement. This incident became known as the 
“bra war” as thousands of brassieres piled up in docks and customs 
warehouses. The comprehensive agreement appeared to be unraveling 
even before the EU negotiators could unpack their suitcases after 
returning from negotiations in Beijing. 
Fortunately, a full trade war was averted when the EU compromised and 
agreed to allow the items to be released but to be counted against the quota 
for 2006. It is too early to tell if the EU safeguard quotas will have the same 
effect of slowing the buildup in the PRC’s market share or even reversing it, 
allowing the other Asian suppliers or preferential suppliers to fill the gap.
Impact of new US restrictions on the PRC’s 
shipments of textiles and clothing
Looking forward, the situation in the US market appears to be favorable 
for continued penetration by Asian competitive suppliers, provided 
that they do not run up against more systematic protection through US 
antidumping measures or other forms of contingent protection.16 Some 
of the new US bilateral free trade agreements may move some trade from 
Asia in the coming years, yet this shift may be offset as several Asian 
suppliers seek bilateral trade agreements with the US to attain preferential 
access of their own (not least of which are Malaysia and Thailand—see 
Table 3.3 in section 3 of Part 3 of Asian Development Outlook 2006). 
Viet Nam may also see its terms of market access improve when it 
becomes a WTO member (possibly this year).
The most significant event influencing market access in the US 
for Asian suppliers in the next 2–3 years, however, is likely to be the 
negotiated new quantitative limits on 21 categories of imports of clothing 
and textile yarns, fabrics, and made-up products from the PRC as set out 
in the 5 November 2005 memorandum of understanding between the US 
and the PRC concerning trade in textile and apparel products. This sets 
out agreed levels of imports by volume for the next 3 years (2006–2008) 
and provides for progressive increases in quota growth but well below 
growth attained in 2005 before the safeguards were invoked (James 2005). 
Most of the restrictions apply to clothing categories that are quite broad 
in the sense that two or even three types of fiber (cotton, wool, MMF) are 
subject to restriction in the merged categories (Table 1.4.7). For example, 
in the categories of sweaters and hosiery, all such items made from cotton, 
wool, and MMF are restricted. For knit shirts, woven shirts, brassieres, 
underwear, and swimwear, restrictions are applied to cotton and MMF 
items. In the case of trousers, coverage includes all possible fabrics: cotton, 
wool, MMF, and silk and vegetable fibers. The coverage of total shipments 
of textiles and clothing to the US in terms of the value and volume of 
shipments in 2005 from the PRC (Table 1.4.7) is significant, but even Asian Development Outlook 2006    51
1.4.7 Restricted imports under the memorandum of understanding between the United States and the People’s Republic of China
Category Value ($ million) Change (%)
2004 2005 Jan 2004 Jan 2005 Jan 2006 2005 from 
2004
Jan 2005 from 
Jan 2004
Jan 2006 from 
Jan 2005
200/301 sewing thread/combed cotton yarn  16.40   28.31   0.98   0.94   2.78   72.67   -3.61  194.84 
222 knit fabric  46.34   73.55   5.40   2.98   9.50   58.72   -44.81  218.49 
229 special purpose fabric  122.26   174.22   6.79   13.25   12.98   42.50   95.17   -1.99
332/432/632 socks  237.51   223.57   11.29   24.25   12.46   -5.87  114.87   -48.62
338/339 cotton knit shirts  216.47   635.65   17.37   48.61   18.22   193.64   179.91   -62.53
340/640 men and boys woven shirts  160.63   295.45   15.11   23.54   8.45   83.93   55.80   -64.10
345/645/646 sweaters  101.28   448.67   8.54   9.71   15.30   343.01   13.68   57.68 
347/348 cotton trousers  271.88   1,066.86   16.86   93.01   25.70   292.40   451.75   -72.36
349/649 brassieres  446.76   516.47   41.17   53.28   45.28   15.60   29.43   -15.01
352/652 underwear  137.13   218.83   11.28   18.07   3.45   59.58   60.16   -80.91
359S/659Sa swimwear  186.03   306.87   12.52   17.22   28.45   64.96   37.52   65.24 
363 pile towels  70.81   176.07   8.29   10.45   26.48   148.64   25.99   153.44 
666ptb window blinds and shades  241.86   293.92   16.93   19.20   24.24   21.52   13.41   26.25 
443 men and boys wool suits   5.20   52.53   0.53   1.70   11.85   909.66   223.18   595.28 
447 men and boys wool trousers  10.77   27.88   1.18   1.72   1.92   158.98   45.29   11.95 
619 polyester filament  3.09   29.70   0.33   0.98   2.63   860.57   195.09   169.77 
620 other synthetic filament  11.64   42.20   0.95   1.83   0.91   262.48   92.88   -50.06
622 glass fabric  12.61   13.93   0.95   0.85   1.05   10.46   -11.10  24.05 
638/639pt man-made fiber knit shirts  235.14   433.35   23.43   48.13   17.68   84.29   105.40   -63.28
647/648pt man-made fiber trousers  287.71   424.49   22.20   38.68   17.80   47.54   74.23   -53.99
847 silk and vegetable fiber trousers  1,034.86   919.48   104.17   100.17   125.70   -11.15  -3.84  25.48 
Subtotal—restricted categories  3,856.41   6,402.00   326.26   528.56   412.82   66.01   62.01   -21.90
Total textile and clothing imports 14,558.08   22,405.22   1,198.21   1,550.25   1,813.97   53.90   29.38   17.01 
Share of restricted categories  26.49   28.57   27.23   34.10   22.76 
a Assumed to be 25% of imports in category.
b Assumed to be 20% of imports in category.
Notes: Items in categories 200 are of cotton or man-made fiber; items in categories 300 are cotton; items in categories 400 are wool; items in categories 600 are 
man-made fiber (synthetic fiber); items in categories 800 are silk or vegetable fiber.
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel, available: http://www.otexa.ita.doc.gov/, downloaded 14 March 2006.
more important is that these are high-growth sectors in US imports and 
therefore of strong commercial interest to competitive Asian suppliers. 
This point is confirmed by an examination of data for the first semester 
of 2005 (i.e., post-quota) versus the same period in 2004 (ATC quotas in 
effect). The growth rate of the items that the US restricted was, in value 
terms, 143% from the PRC (Table 1.4.8) and would certainly be nearly 200% 
in volume terms. Overall growth of imports in value terms from the world 
to the US reached 12% and would certainly have reached 20% in volume 
terms. Thus, there is confirmation that the US targeted high growth and 
growth potential categories for application of the safeguards.
Evidence suggests that the quota restrictions may well halt the 
advance of the PRC’s market share in US imports or even reverse some 
of the gains made in 2005. This is because the categories restricted are 
among those with the highest actual growth and potential for future 
growth for the PRC and other competitive Asian suppliers in the US 
market (Tables 1.4.9 and 1.4.10). 
The restriction of imports from the PRC appears to be benefiting a 
number of Asian suppliers based upon data for the first month of 2006, 
with high volume rates of growth in restricted categories for India, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and a few others, in contrast to 
contraction for the PRC and for preferential suppliers to the US market 
including CAFTA, Mexico, Sub-Saharan Africa, Jordan, and Andean 52    Asian Development Outlook 2006
1.4.8 United States imports of restricted items under the memorandum of 
understanding between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, 
by value
Value ($ million)
Jan–Jun 2004 Jan–Jun 2005 Change (%)
Nonpreferential suppliers  11,458.84   14,150.20   23.49 
Asia-Pacific DMC suppliers  9,661.80   12,539.44   29.78 
People’s Republic of China  1,769.30   4,303.97   143.26 
India  683.76   931.90   36.29 
Hong Kong, China  1,086.29   903.74   -16.80
Bangladesh  548.00   711.01   29.75 
Indonesia  735.02   874.19   18.93 
Viet Nam  834.10   766.74   -8.08
Cambodia  366.20   458.61   25.23 
Philippines  477.52   527.79   10.53 
Sri Lanka  388.23   521.47   34.32 
Pakistan  499.70   567.09   13.49 
Thailand  487.25   585.37   20.14 
Republic of Korea  788.62   617.11   -21.75
Malaysia  230.94   208.00   -9.93
Taipei,China  540.63   442.89   -18.08
Mongolia  57.52   46.63   -18.93
Turkmenistan  20.43   16.70   -18.23
Nepal  48.38   27.33   -43.51
Uzbekistan  7.16   8.61   20.26 
Fiji Islands  38.15   13.42   -64.82
Kazakhstan  6.07   0.41   -93.23
Kyrgyz Republic  3.11   1.64   -47.08
Armenia  1.37   0.09   -93.46
Maldives  41.72   4.72   -88.69
Tajikistan  2.33   -   -100.00
Excluding People’s Rep. of China  7,892.50   8,235.47   4.35 
Other nonpreferential suppliers  1,797.04   1,610.77   -10.37
Preferential suppliers  10,133.24   10,227.18   0.93 
Central American Free Trade Agreement  3,982.55   4,203.18   5.54 
Mexico  2,902.85   2,758.97   -4.96
Others  3,247.84   3,265.03   0.53 
World  22,241.93   24,877.61   11.85 
Notes: Sum of nonpreferential and preferential suppliers does not add up to world total because some 
minor suppliers are not included; numbers may not sum precisely due to rounding. 
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel, downloaded 14 March 
2006.
countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) (Table 1.4.9). India 
(2.15 points), Bangladesh (1.28 points), Indonesia (1.08 points), Cambodia 
(1.01 points), Pakistan (0.91 points), Viet Nam (0.54 points), Thailand 
(0.49 points), Philippines (0.42 points), and Sri Lanka (0.11 points) 
add a cumulative 7.99 percentage points to market share in the US 
import volume in 2006 compared with 2005. These gains come mostly 
at the expense of preferential suppliers that all together suffered a 
6.15 percentage point drop in the first month of 2006 compared with 
the same month in 2005. There were similar changes in value market 
share (Table 1.4.10) and once more the gains by the competitive Asian 
suppliers of 9.87 percentage points cumulatively are mainly at the expense 
of preferential suppliers (down 6.49 percentage points). The PRC’s loss of 
market share by volume was less than by value, reflecting the impact of 
restrictions on unit prices. Hong Kong, China also shows modest gains in 
market share in volume (0.41 percentage points) and value (1.59 percentage 
points) in 2006, reversing losses in 2005 somewhat.  Asian Development Outlook 2006    53
1.4.9 United States imports of restricted items under the memorandum of understanding between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China, by volume
Volume change over previous year (%) Market share (%)
2002 2003 2004 2005 Jan 
2006




Nonpreferential suppliers 26.0 13.3 13.0 19.6 17.7 42.96 47.45 49.61 52.20 57.60 56.62 63.08
Asia-Pacific DMC suppliers 28.9 14.8 14.9 24.1 19.8 35.92 40.60 42.97 45.94 52.59 50.78 57.62
People’s Republic of China 95.1 75.8 49.2 79.2 -2.5 2.87 4.91 7.97 11.06 18.29 16.49 15.23
India 33.4 12.9 19.9 75.2 130.6 1.45 1.70 1.77 1.98 3.20 1.82 3.97
Hong Kong, China -5.7 -6.7 1.6 0.3 22.2 4.00 3.31 2.85 2.69 2.49 2.58 2.99
Bangladesh 4.2 1.8 6.9 18.9 45.6 3.60 3.29 3.08 3.07 3.37 3.38 4.66
Indonesia 1.1 6.8 23.6 12.0 49.3 2.59 2.30 2.26 2.60 2.69 2.60 3.68
Viet Nam 976.6 151.0 -19.6 4.1 29.1 0.13 1.21 2.80 2.09 2.01 2.42 2.96
Cambodia 23.2 8.9 12.5 52.7 117.0 0.79 0.85 0.86 0.90 1.26 0.95 1.96
Philippines 19.6 -1.0 -13.5 3.1 38.2 1.95 2.05 1.87 1.51 1.43 1.37 1.79
Sri Lanka -6.2 -6.6 9.7 28.7 13.7 1.43 1.18 1.01 1.04 1.23 1.41 1.52
Pakistan 26.9 11.4 33.9 15.9 38.8 2.05 2.28 2.34 2.92 3.12 2.89 3.80
Thailand 10.8 0.3 13.2 10.4 25.9 2.38 2.32 2.14 2.26 2.30 2.53 3.02
Republic of Korea 45.8 5.5 9.6 -9.9 -2.7 6.51 8.32 8.10 8.26 6.87 7.85 7.23
Malaysia 15.8 -0.0 12.1 13.4 69.4 0.82 0.83 0.77 0.80 0.84 0.73 1.17
Taipei,China 34.7 -12.7 0.9 -13.3 10.3 4.28 5.05 4.07 3.82 3.06 3.13 3.27
Mongolia 4.3 15.3 6.3 -24.0 -11.3 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.20 0.17
Turkmenistan 0.9 36.2 -1.2 -7.6 9.2 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.10
Nepal -19.5 9.6 -17.7 -42.4 -48.7 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.05
Uzbekistan 33.8 -1.8 -22.3 -41.1 -16.4 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.02
Fiji Islands -20.6 4.8 4.3 -78.8 -88.0 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.01
Kazakhstan 83.7 74.1 -10.2 -83.1 259.1 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01
Kyrgyz Republic 251.9 245.5 -2.6 -50.2 -23.5 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Armenia -42.1 -38.8 65.4 -83.0 3,082.7 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Maldives 47.7 13.1 -3.8 -93.7 -100.0 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.01 0.12 0.00
Tajikistan - 6,102.9 -33.5 -100.0 - 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Excluding People’s Rep. of China 23.2 6.3 7.1 6.6 30.6 33.05 35.68 35.00 34.88 34.29 34.29 42.39
Other nonpreferential suppliers 11.1 5.0 1.2 -13.0 -1.2 7.04 6.85 6.64 6.26 5.02 5.84 5.46
Preferential suppliers 4.6 3.8 3.6 -2.4 -10.2 53.44 48.99 46.88 45.22 40.72 41.12 34.97
Central American Free Trade 
Agreement
7.4 5.6 5.8 3.3 -11.1 19.58 18.44 17.96 17.69 16.85 14.69 12.37
Mexico 0.1 -5.3 0.4 -9.1 -8.9 15.21 13.35 11.67 10.90 9.14 8.95 7.72
Others 5.2 8.8 3.5 -4.0 -10.1 18.64 17.20 17.26 16.62 14.73 17.48 14.88
World 14.1 8.4 7.4 8.4 5.6 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
DMC = developing member country of the Asian Development Bank.
Notes: Sum of nonpreferential and preferential suppliers does not add up to world total because some minor suppliers are not included; numbers may not sum 
precisely due to rounding.
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel, downloaded 14 March 2006.
Agenda for future trade reform
Competitive Asian suppliers of intermediate textile products and clothing 
have to continue unilateral reform efforts in reducing “behind the border” 
trade barriers and trade frictions in order to compete successfully in large 
markets that are offering competitors from outside Asia preferential tariff 
access. They also have scope to better integrate the value chain in the 
region through efforts to reduce border barriers to trade in intermediate 
textile products and clothing accessories. High most-favored nation 
tariffs on imports remain in many of the larger countries in textiles 
and clothing tariff lines, particularly those in South Asia and Southeast 
Asia, as well as the PRC. Asian policy makers could help this process by 
making these tariffs lower and more uniform (and setting bound tariff 
rates closer to applied rates). 
This rationalization of the tariff structure for textiles and clothing     Asian Development Outlook 2006
1.4.10 United States imports of restricted items under the memorandum of understanding between the United States and 
the People’s Republic of China, by value
Value change over previous year (%) Market share (%)
2002 2003 2004 2005 Jan 
2006




Nonpreferential suppliers 7.6 11.0 8.1 16.2 15.8 47.51 49.00 50.84 52.02 57.25 57.42 64.50
Asia-Pacific DMC suppliers 7.7 11.4 9.2 21.3 18.6 39.45 40.73 42.44 43.89 50.41 49.37 56.80
People’s Republic of China 21.5 31.6 32.3 66.0 -21.9 4.54 5.29 6.51 8.15 12.82 13.60 10.31
India 11.1 6.9 20.5 34.5 78.5 2.42 2.58 2.58 2.95 3.75 2.89 5.01
Hong Kong, China 3.1 -5.0 7.0 16.4 33.4 5.86 5.79 5.15 5.21 5.75 5.41 7.00
Bangladesh -4.1 -2.7 13.1 27.4 60.0 2.91 2.68 2.44 2.61 3.15 2.84 4.41
Indonesia -5.8 9.1 13.1 23.6 44.7 3.29 2.97 3.03 3.24 3.79 3.42 4.80
Viet Nam 1,554.5 175.7 -11.0 7.5 43.2 0.09 1.48 3.82 3.22 3.27 3.24 4.50
Cambodia 19.9 16.0 7.9 36.8 88.5 1.33 1.53 1.66 1.70 2.20 1.63 2.97
Philippines 9.7 3.4 -7.3 16.6 36.1 2.40 2.52 2.44 2.14 2.36 2.15 2.84
Sri Lanka -8.1 -3.3 14.8 24.1 12.9 2.10 1.85 1.67 1.82 2.13 2.43 2.67
Pakistan -4.0 16.5 16.7 13.2 59.6 2.08 1.92 2.09 2.31 2.48 1.75 2.71
Thailand 9.8 -1.6 8.6 12.0 14.8 2.34 2.46 2.26 2.33 2.47 2.76 3.07
Republic of Korea 4.5 -9.6 2.0 -20.9 -12.4 4.35 4.36 3.68 3.56 2.66 3.32 2.82
Malaysia -5.3 -2.3 4.6 3.4 42.5 1.26 1.14 1.04 1.03 1.01 0.77 1.07
Taipei,China -3.5 -0.8 -4.0 -17.4 -10.2 3.43 3.17 2.94 2.67 2.09 2.48 2.16
Mongolia 15.9 19.9 5.7 -22.1 -9.9 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.23 0.28 0.25
Turkmenistan 11.5 36.7 -3.7 -21.2 50.8 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.09
Nepal -23.9 29.6 -29.0 -42.3 -50.0 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.08 0.13 0.06
Uzbekistan 37.2 55.6 -44.3 22.6 63.1 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Fiji Islands -19.6 15.2 3.6 -79.5 -85.5 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.01
Kazakhstan 2.4 449.8 -30.7 -71.8 841.9 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
Kyrgyz Republic 107.9 241.6 -33.2 -45.3 25.0 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Armenia -32.8 -41.0 55.1 -94.1 1,029.6 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maldives 19.7 -9.1 -10.7 -94.2 -100.0 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.01 0.09 0.00
Tajikistan - 7,898.0 -48.1 -100.0 - 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Excluding People’s Rep. of China 5.9 8.4 5.1 11.1 33.9 34.91 35.44 35.93 35.74 37.59 35.77 46.50
Other nonpreferential suppliers 6.8 8.8 2.2 -11.1 -1.3 8.07 8.26 8.40 8.13 6.84 8.04 7.70
Preferential suppliers 1.8 2.7 5.1 -4.9 -13.6 48.73 47.55 45.68 45.45 40.93 40.09 33.60
Central American Free Trade 
Agreement
5.4 1.5 5.5 -2.7 -11.6 18.78 18.97 18.01 17.98 16.57 14.18 12.16
Mexico -3.6 -6.5 -2.4 -8.4 -12.7 17.06 15.76 13.79 12.74 11.06 10.20 8.64
Others 3.8 15.9 12.0 -4.6 -16.0 12.88 12.81 13.89 14.72 13.30 15.72 12.81
World 4.3 6.9 5.6 5.6 3.1 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: Sum of nonpreferential and preferential suppliers does not add up to world total because some minor suppliers are not included; numbers may not sum 
precisely due to rounding.
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel, downloaded 14 March 2006.
would stimulate intraregional trade and efficient vertical specialization, 
as has already happened in electronics and office machinery, and it 
could be safely done on a nondiscriminatory basis. Protection could be 
retained on less important textile made-up products. The tariff reforms 
could be carried out on a concerted unilateral basis (e.g., voluntarily) and 
this would assist development of the intermediate textiles and clothing 
value chain. Asian suppliers should also seek to improve the terms 
of their market access to EU, Japan, and US by supporting the Doha 
Round, which offers the potential to lower peak tariffs in the industrial 
countries on a most-favored nation basis. The “Swiss formula” adopted 
at the Ministerial Meeting of WTO in Hong Kong, China in December 
2005 under the nonagricultural market access negotiation is designed to 
accomplish this outcome (see The Doha Development Agenda in Part 1). In 
addition, acting to negotiate improved discipline over antidumping and 
other contingent forms of protection, such as safeguard measures under Asian Development Outlook 2006    
the Trade Rules component of the Doha Round, would help preempt the 
use of these instruments to take away hard-won gains in Asian suppliers’ 
market shares in world markets for textiles and clothing.
Rules of origin are used to determine which products will or will 
not receive preferential treatment under the many new bilateral trade 
agreements that Asian countries are negotiating. Negotiators should 
strive to adopt simple and consistent rules of origin in order to avoid 
undermining the development of efficient production-sharing networks. 
This will be crucial to maintaining the long-run competitiveness of Asian 
suppliers in the world market for textiles and clothing. As incomes rise 
and consumption-driven growth prospects increase within developing 
Asia, simple and consistent rules of origin will facilitate growth in this 
lucrative segment of intraregional trade.
Endnotes
1  Quantitative limits on Asian exports were first imposed on Japan by the United States in 
1957. The United Kingdom followed with restrictions on Hong Kong (1958), and India 
and Pakistan shortly thereafter (1959). A number of Western European countries insisted 
upon safeguard clauses prior to accepting Japan’s application for membership in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1960. See Hayashi (2005). Hayashi presents a detailed 
timeline, adapted from Spinanger (2000), of the regimes governing world trade in textiles 
and clothing since these restrictions were first imposed.
2  Table 1 in this source gives the precise formula used to calculate the growth of quotas and 
for the four phases of integration of tariff lines.
3  In the second quarter of 2005, the EU and US began to implement special safeguards on 
merged categories of clothing imports (that is, categories such as cotton and wool sweaters 
that include more that one type of fiber) from the PRC. These resulted in comprehensive 
trade agreements with the PRC that set out quantitative limits on imports in 10 broad 
categories in the EU and 21 categories in the US over the period 2006–2008 (see below for 
discussion and more details on the restrictions). Texts of the agreements are available online 
at http://www.otexa.ita.doc.gov and can also be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/index_
en.htm or www.emergingtextiles.com.
4  The “nonmarket” designation means that “dumping margins” used to calculate penalty 
tariffs can be extremely large, easily pricing PRC products out of the market of the countries 
that impose such measures.
5  Antidumping measures are imposed with more frequency on the PRC than on any 
other WTO member state (see WTO homepage, at www.wto.org). Most recently, the EU 
has imposed antidumping duties on leather shoes exported by the PRC and Viet Nam, 
and is also conducting an investigation into polyester fibers from the PRC (see www.
emergingtextiles.com for more details).
6  These estimates are for 2000, but USITC also shows that investment (cumulative purchases 
of machinery for spinning and weaving) has also been larger in Asia over 1999–2001 than 
in any other region (USITC 2004).
7  The Formosa Chemical & Fiber Corporation is an affiliate of Formosa Plastics (the parent) 
and initially invested in a textile factory with 200,000 spindles in 2001 in an industrial park 
outside of Ho Chi Minh City and, in anticipation of Viet Nam’s WTO accession, it and 
other textile producers are raising production capacity there in polyester spinning, yarn, 
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Asian challenges and prospects after the  
Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China
The Doha Development Agenda is the first “round” of multilateral trade negotiations under the World 
Trade Organization and is also the first time that multilateral trade talks have explicitly sought to focus on 
the interests of developing countries. Developing Asia therefore has much at stake in the talks and has 
a strong interest in a positive and ambitious outcome. The key areas of market access negotiations are 
in industrial products, agriculture, and services. Each area raises distinct issues and nuances for various 
groups of developed and developing countries. In addition, the Doha Agenda includes the rules governing 
contingent forms of protection and regional trade agreements. Finally, “aid for trade” and trade facilitation 
are part of the agenda. Asia has a vital interest in multilateral liberalization prospering in the Doha talks.
Introduction
The Doha Development Agenda constitutes the ninth trade “round” 
since the founding of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1947, and the first under the aegis of the GATT successor, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (Box 1.5.1). It is also the first set of 
multilateral negotiations that are intended to focus on issues of interest to 
developing countries. 
There is a great deal at stake for Asia at Doha. First, given the 
outward-oriented policy strategy that essentially all Asian countries now 
embrace, the region relies increasingly on a vibrant, open international 
marketplace. All sectors currently being negotiated under the Doha 
Development Agenda are relevant to the economic prosperity of 
the region, including manufactures, agriculture, services, and trade 
facilitation measures. Many of these areas have hitherto been neglected 
or ignored completely in earlier rounds of negotiation, suggesting a 
unique opportunity for the region. Bringing down peak tariffs (known as 
“mega-tariffs” at Doha) in manufactures and pervasive obstacles to trade 
in agriculture are particularly important to Asia. Better rules governing 
the comportment of WTO member states in regulating trade will also be 
extremely useful. Developing member states have often been the target of 
contingent protection (i.e., antidumping duties, countervailing duties, and 
the like). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has recently been the most 
obvious target of such actions, but it certainly is not alone: practically all 
developing member states have been subject to antidumping duties. Better 
rules are even more important now that Asia has become extremely active 
in creating its own web of free trade areas, for improved rules could lead 
to better agreements and less policy distortions.
Second, the potential negative effects of the recent surge in free trade 
1.5.1 A brief history of the 
World Trade Organization: From 
GATT rounds to Doha
The General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) was signed in 
1944, with the immediate objective 
of preventing future trade wars and 
inconsistent commercial policies 
that had plagued international 
trade in the 1930s. It was origi-
nally intended to be a temporary 
body: the International Trade 
Organization (ITO) was supposed 
to replace it as a permanent body 
with international legal status, on 
par with other Bretton Woods insti-
tutions, such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. ITO was never ratified; 
however, GATT came into effect on 
1 January 1948 as an ad hoc orga-
nization that would only have its 
existence enshrined in a permanent, 
legal form in 1994, with the cre-
ation of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO).
The raison d’être of GATT was 
to reduce international barriers Asian Development Outlook 2006    
areas, discussed at length in Part 3 of Asian Development Outlook 2006, 
will be amplified in the case of a Doha failure. This is likely for two 
reasons: (i) the more liberalized the global economy, the less the potential 
impact of discrimination inherent in free trade areas; and (ii) a failure at 
Doha could (and, most likely, will) lead to considerable disillusionment 
with the multilateral system, and starting a new set of negotiations would 
probably only be possible in the medium or long term. Regionalism and 
bilateralism will continue to be important with or without a successful 
conclusion to Doha. However, if there is no progress at the multilateral 
level, these preferential trade agreements will no doubt fill the void. This 
scenario could create spheres of influence and trade blocs that could 
easily work to the region’s detriment. 
Third, since a country will generally gain more from its own 
liberalization, a positive outcome at Doha would facilitate domestic 
reform and restructuring, as well as open foreign markets and create 
a more level trade “playing field.” Negotiators consider offering tariff 
reductions as a bargaining chip that is only to be given in exchange for 
something in return. It is, therefore, ironic that almost all simulations 
of trade liberalization in a global context show the more protected 
economies gaining much more than the more open ones. Hence, a 
successful Doha Round would show greatest gains in agriculture for the 
European Union (EU) and the United States (US), whereas developing 
countries would generally gain more through their own liberalization 
of manufactures (Anderson and Martin 2006). One can expect that 
ultimately Asian countries with the highest trade barriers will tend to 
gain the most through liberalization.
A fourth and related point regards support for the national economic 
reform programs of Asian countries. The linking of a broad array 
of sectors in a concerted, international framework of liberalization 
negotiations under WTO tends to give greater political clout to those 
favoring more open trade. Hence, WTO sets in motion a political-
economy dynamic that makes liberalization easier than, say, on a 
unilateral basis. 
Finally, like GATT/WTO negotiations before it, the Doha 
Development Agenda will be critical in setting the stage for deeper 
liberalization in future rounds. 
However, Doha negotiations have not been smooth sailing. Indeed, 
the waters have been more frequently choppy than smooth. In large part, 
this is a reflection of the complicated nature of the WTO talks, at which a 
wide variety of sensitive issues have been put on the table, including such 
areas as agricultural export subsidies; domestic support for agriculture; 
tariff reductions; and harmonization in labor-intensive manufactured 
goods, trade in services, antidumping duties, and rules governing regional 
trading agreements. 
Indeed, the oft-cited difficulties of Doha are in part a reflection of 
previous successes in multilateral negotiations: earlier GATT rounds 
were able to reduce considerably tariffs on nonsensitive manufactured 
goods, leaving the most difficult items to be tackled. Moreover, the 
nonuniformity of cuts in tariffs and nontariff barriers resulting from 
compromises in earlier GATT rounds has been problematic because they 
can create their own distortions.
1 Further, the exigencies of globalization 
to trade on a nondiscriminatory 
(or “most-favored nation”) basis. 
The modality to do this would be 
through concerted, multilateral 
negotiations called “rounds.” Since 
the creation of GATT, there have 
been eight rounds, i.e., Geneva, 
Switzerland, 1947–48; Annecy, 
France, 1949; Torquay, United 
Kingdom, 1950–51; Geneva, 1956; 
the Dillon Round, 1960–62; the 
Kennedy Round, 1963–67; the 
Tokyo Round, 1973–79; and the 
Uruguay Round, 1986–93. The 
ongoing WTO negotiations have 
been dubbed the Doha Devel-
opment Agenda, with the intention 
of underscoring the importance of 
developing countries in this series 
of talks. 
Earlier GATT rounds were suc-
cessful in reducing tariffs on manu-
factured goods. The Uruguay Round 
began to address more complicated 
issues, from quantitative restrictions 
in sensitive areas like agriculture and 
textiles and clothing to trade-related 
areas such as investment measures 
and intellectual property protection. 
The Doha Development Agenda was 
initiated to go further down the road 
of “deep” integration. The process 
has been difficult, given the political 
sensitivity of many of the key areas 
being addressed. In fact, the 2003 
Ministerial Meeting in Cancun 
ended without any agreement.
The Ministerial Meeting in 
December 2005 held in Hong Kong, 
China was successful in keeping 
the Doha negotiations alive. WTO 
members agreed to undertake lib-
eralization negotiations generally 
under four pillars: Non-Agricultural 
Market Access; Agriculture; Services; 
and Rules (such as those pertaining 
to administrative actions, e.g., anti-
dumping and countervailing duties, 
and regional trade agreements). This 
meeting reemphasized the primacy 
of the “development dimension” to 
the talks. The leaders have set April 
2006 as the deadline for the Doha 
package. 60    Asian Development Outlook 2006
require far more extensive liberalization packages than in the 
past. 
No doubt another complicating factor concerns the 
necessary emphasis on developing countries, which are 
extremely diverse and often have different priorities and 
interests. The least-developed countries (LDCs), in particular, 
face a complicated situation. The LDCs require open 
international markets in order to boost growth and reduce 
poverty—and, so, a successful Doha Development Round 
would help achieve this. However, as they benefit from 
preferential access to developed-country markets for the lion’s 
share of their exports, a good Doha deal will inevitably have 
the effect of reducing this advantage (“preference erosion”), 
a process that is being exacerbated by the trend toward 
regionalism. Doha is seeking a way to compensate them for 
this (under the “aid for trade” rubric). 
In any event, the going has been tough, and at some 
points, it seemed as if the talks would fail. The successor 
to the Uruguay Round was originally intended to be 
launched in Seattle in December 1999, rather than in Doha 
in November 2001. The Seattle debacle is well known. The 
Cancun Ministerial Meeting in September 2003 ended in 
failure as well, and the negotiations were saved only in July 
2004 when a framework agreement for negotiations (the 
“July Package”) was finalized. Hence, while many believe that 
the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China in December 
2005 could have gone much further in terms of ambition and 
progress in defining modalities of liberalization, others were 
relieved that the talks are at last moving forward. 
Asia can serve as a key protagonist at Doha. Given 
the less than stellar progress in negotiations, leadership in 
fostering a proactive approach in all areas under discussion 
is essential. As one of the most open regions in the world 
whose outward-oriented development strategy has been 
highly successful, Asia can contribute significantly in this 
regard. Moreover, active participation of Asian countries will 
ensure that the sectors and rules deemed most important to 
the region will be included in the final package. In addition, 
Asia is able to overcome the (usually counterproductive) 
division between “north” and “south.” Most countries in Asia 
subscribe to the same types of outward-oriented policies, and 
while the region does have divergent interests, differences are 
not generally drawn along north-south lines. 
In short, Asia has a strong interest in a positive outcome 
at Doha. The goal of this section of Asian Development 
Outlook 2006 is both to summarize the ongoing Doha 
negotiations, which should be completed in 2007 at the 
latest, and to consider the negotiations’ implications for the 
developing member countries of the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). First, the evolution of the Doha negotiations 
is considered, followed by a review of the liberalization 












WTO members, as of December 2005
Myanmar 1995 54.80 1,417.0 106.8
Nepal 2004 25.30 1,471.2 247.5
Cambodia 2004 13.80 2,116.0 371.2
Bangladesh 1995 137.00 1,997.9 401.2
Kyrgyz Republic 1998 5.14 2,061.0 455.5
Solomon Islands 1996 0.48 1,922.5 583.6
Papua New Guinea  1996 5.66 2,414.2 585.5
Mongolia  1997 2.55 2,045.5 671.3
India 1995 1,107.00 3,315.7 686.6
Pakistan 1995 153.96 2,549.3 777.3
Armenia 2003 3.22 4,048.1 1,077.6
Sri Lanka  1995 19.68 4,144.7 1,110.8
Philippines  1995 85.24 4,770.2 1,111.2
Indonesia  1995 221.26 3,939.5 1,232.5
PRC 2001 1,310.00 6,193.4 1,461.6
Maldives 1995 0.30 7,639.5 2,465.9
Thailand  1995 65.30 8,542.4 2,562.8
Fiji Islands 1996 0.83 6,282.1 3,206.5
Malaysia 1995 26.70 11,159.6 5,110.4
Taipei,China 2002 22.65 27,512.8 14,447.0
Korea 1995 48.29 22,665.7 16,492.9
Hong Kong, China 1995 6.94 32,292.2 24,714.9
Singapore 1995 4.35 28,228.0 26,252.7
Observers
Tajikistan 6.77 1,373.3 368.6
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 5.61 2,049.0 456.5
Uzbekistan 26.00 1,834.4 419.3
Viet Nam  83.10 2,782.2 567.5
Bhutan 0.77 3,329.8 801.9
Azerbaijan 8.44 4,500.3 1,434.9
Vanuatu  0.21 3,415.4 1,487.1
Samoa 0.19 6,389.9 1,820.9
Tonga  0.10 7,689.9 2,141.7
Kazakhstan 15.17 8,252.4 3,592.3
Afghanistan 24.70 - -
Non-WTO Members
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of 0.83 - 371.6
Kiribati 0.10 2,590.9 686.7
Turkmenistan  6.59 7,854.0 3,516.3
Marshall Islands, Rep. of 0.06 - -
Micronesia, Fed. States of 0.11 - -
Palau  0.02 - -
Tuvalu 0.01 - -
Cook Islands 0.02 - -
Nauru - - -
Notes:
GDPpc1 = GDP per capita at purchasing power parity;  GDPpc2 = GDP per 
capita at current exchange rates.
Sources: World Trade Organization, available: http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm; International Monetary 
Fund, available: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2005/02/data/
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strategies currently being discussed. The subsequent section offers some 
estimates of the economic effect of Doha on the region’s economies. 
Finally, prospects for the global system after Doha are considered. 
Key issues in the Doha Development Agenda
The majority of ADB developing member countries are WTO members. 
Of the rest, a little over half have applied to join and are at various phases 
in the accession process; Viet Nam should join in 2006. Table 1.5.1 presents 
ADB developing member countries by increasing order of per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP)
2 and offers details regarding when (or if) 
they joined WTO. These countries are quite dispersed among the many 
existing coalitions, a reflection of the diversity in trade regimes in the 
region (Table 1.5.2). Columns 1 to 5 of Table 1.5.2 present the coalitions that 
are centered on developing countries’ role in WTO. These countries tend 
to seek exemptions from various WTO disciplines and commitments for 
their members, e.g., the “Least-Developed Countries” (LDC) group, the 
“Small and Vulnerable Economies” (SVEs) coalition, and the “Like-Minded 
Group” (LMG). Columns 6 to 9 focus on coalitions ranked by their position 
on agricultural liberalization, from a group that opposes liberalization 
(G10) to one that promotes open global markets (the Cairns Group).
3 
There follows a brief survey of the key issues articulated at the 
Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China, namely Non-Agricultural 
Market Access (NAMA), Agriculture, Services, and Rules. Select aspects 
of the Doha Development Agenda of particular interest to developing 
Asia, i.e., aid for trade and trade facilitation, are stressed. 
Non-Agricultural Market Access 
As noted above, trade in manufactures has been the traditional area 
of focus at previous multilateral rounds, with considerable success: 
developed-country tariffs tend to be quite low on average in this area. 
However, tariff levels in developing countries continue to be quite high 
(though they also have come down considerably over the past 10 years); 
hence, there is considerable asymmetry in tariff levels between countries, 
as well as across sectors within countries. 
An important facilitating format established at the Ministerial 
Meeting in Hong Kong, China was the agreement to use the 
“Swiss formula” (Box 1.5.2) as the main vehicle of liberalization and 
harmonization under NAMA. The beauty of the Swiss formula lies in its 
simplicity: negotiators need only to agree on one element of the formula 
(the reduction factor); the rest of the process is automatic and completely 
transparent. And there is no need to have a common reduction factor 
for all economies; several reduction factors could be used, with such 
indicators as per capita GDP determining which reduction factor could 
be applied to which country group. It allows the process to eschew the 
definition of what is a “developing economy” and to apply “special and 
differential treatment” (SDT), a concept that was not only accepted but 
emphasized at the Hong Kong, China meeting. The Swiss formula’s 
transparency and simplicity also empower even the least-developed 
member states to participate actively in the negotiations. 
From an economic point of view, the Swiss formula cuts higher tariffs 
1.5.2 The “Swiss formula” and 
Doha
The process of reducing tariff discrep-
ancies between countries, as well as 
within countries, is known as tariff 
harmonization. As the main goal of 
Non-Agricultural Market Access is to 
reduce and harmonize tariffs between 
countries, the Ministerial Meeting 
in Hong Kong, China approved the 
adoption of the “Swiss formula,” which 
was first introduced by Switzerland and 
subsequently adopted during the Tokyo 
Round (1973–79). Such harmonization 
is effective not only in reducing global 
tariffs and making them more even 
across the board but also in avoiding 
unintended distortions stemming from 
divergent tariff levels within coun-
tries (the “effective rate of protection” 
problem). 
The simple Swiss formula is 
expressed as T = [rt/(r+t)] where 
t refers to initial tariff rates, T the 
post-negotiation tariff rates, and r 
the reduction factor (there is also 
a “weighted” version of the Swiss 
formula that combines each country’s 
tariff average with the reduction factor, 
but the Ministerial Meeting in Hong 
Kong, China did not specify which 
type should be used). 
An example might illustrate how 
the Swiss formula would both har-
monize and reduce tariffs. Suppose 
there are two countries, A and B, 
who apply tariffs on automobiles of 
150% and 10%, respectively. Further, 
suppose that the reduction factor (r) 
is 25 (“Swiss 25”) and the period of 
adjustment would be over 6 years. 
At the end of the tariff reduction 
period, country A would have a 21.4% 
(= 150x25/150+25) tariff on automo-
biles, whereas country B would have 
a 7.1% (= 10x25/10+25) tariff. Hence, 
while there would continue to be a 
discrepancy, the country A tariff would 
fall to only three times that of country 
B, whereas before liberalization the 
corresponding difference was 15 times. 
Moreover, tariffs have fallen across the 
board.
The key question, of course, relates 
to what the reduction factor should be. 
Doha Development Agenda negotiators 
are currently working out possible 
options. 62    Asian Development Outlook 2006
1.5.2 Membership of ADB member countries in WTO coalitions and other country groupings
G77 LDC G90 SVEs LMG G10 G33 G20 Cairns ACP CIS
WTO Members, as of December 2005
Nepal 1 1 1
Cambodia 1 1 1
Bangladesh 1 1 1
Kyrgyz Republic 1
Solomon Islands 1 1 1 1 1
Mongolia  1 1 1
Pakistan 1 1 1 1
India 1 1 1 1
Papua New Guinea  1 1 1
Sri Lanka  1 1 1
Philippines  1 1 1 1
Armenia 1
Indonesia  1 1 1 1 1
PRC 1 1 1
Maldives 1 1 1
Thailand  1 1 1
Fiji Islands 1 1 1 1 1





Myanmar 1 1 1
Observers
Tajikistan 1
Lao PDR 1 1
Uzbekistan 1
Viet Nam  1
Bhutan 1 1
Azerbaijan 1
Vanuatu  1 1 1
Samoa 1 1 1




Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of 1 1
Turkmenistan  1
Kiribati 1 1
Marshall Islands, Rep. of  1 1
Micronesia, Fed. States of 1 1
Palau  1 1
Tuvalu   1                 1  
Cook Islands 1
Nauru 1
ACP = African, Caribbean and Pacific countries; Cairns = a group of agricultural exporting nations lobbying for 
agricultural trade liberalization; CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States; LDC = least-developed countries 
(as defined by the United Nations); G10 = a coalition of countries lobbying for agriculture to be treated as 
diverse and special because of nontrade concerns; G20 = a coalition of countries pressing for ambitious 
reforms of agriculture in developed countries with some flexibility for developing countries; G33 = a group of 
countries advocating that developing countries be granted flexibility to self-designate a number of “special 
products” on which they would not have to make any tariff reduction or tariff-rate quota commitments; 
G77 = a coalition of developing countries G90 = coalition of African, ACP, and least-developed countries; LMG 
= Like-Minded Group (a loose coalition of WTO members with similar concerns about the WTO agenda); SVEs 
= small vulnerable economies. 
Source: World Trade Organization, available: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/brief_
e/brief25_e.htm.Asian Development Outlook 2006    63
by more than the smaller tariffs. By doing so, it enhances economic 
benefits from trade liberalization in two ways: it delivers higher welfare 
gains than in the case of, say, a straight-line approach,
4 and it may 
improve tariff revenues.
5 Moreover, from a political point of view, the 
Swiss formula tends to reduce domestic bickering regarding post-
liberalization tariffs between domestic vested interests because it does not 
change the ranking of the domestic protection by industry, though it does 
reduce differentials. 
The tariff structures of 18 countries actively involved in the Doha 
negotiations are summarized in Table 1.5.3. As these countries together 
account for over three fourths of world GDP, a deal between them has 
the potential to trigger a successful outcome of the Doha Development 
Agenda. Table 1.5.3 is based on the detailed tariff rates available at the 
Harmonized System six-digit level (HS6) of disaggregation, usually 
including some 4,000 products. It differentiates “bound” tariff rates,
6 
above which a country cannot raise its tariffs, from “applied” tariff rates, 
i.e., those that were in effect as of 2001. Negotiators focus on bound 
tariffs; to the extent that the bound tariffs exceed the applied tariffs, 
there is said to be “water” in the tariffs. Water in the tariffs is spread 
widely across WTO member states. This is problematic; if a formula has a 
country reduce its (bound) tariff to a level that is above the actual applied 
tariff, it will have no effect on trade. 
Table 1.5.3 shows that the developed countries have little to offer in 
the NAMA negotiations, as their tariff structures are characterized by 
low bound and applied tariffs, with the exception of “mega-tariffs,” i.e., 
products with tariffs of 20% or higher. The developed countries also tend 
to have far less water in their tariffs. Hence, it is clear that the developed-
country negotiators are keen to promote liberalization in NAMA (as 
“demandeurs,” in WTO-speak) and certain developing countries’ 
negotiators are less anxious to do so (as “demandées”). The compromise 
would have to be in the developed countries offering up more in 
agriculture, services, and certain aspects of “rules” (discussed below).
As previously noted, the compromise is an ironic one. Developing 
Asian countries resisting NAMA cuts have the most to gain from 
an ambitious Swiss formula, as liberalization would lead to greater 
welfare gains due to their higher levels of protection. Such a “sacrifice” 
is the economic equivalent of “crocodile tears.” Still, negotiators view 
“concessions” as negotiating chips, which they hope will be successful 
in eliciting “sacrifices” from developed countries under agriculture. 
Successful negotiations lead to a “prisoner’s delight” scenario in which all 
countries gain, though not due to the intentions of the negotiators (who 
tend to focus on the interests of producers alone). 
In the 2004 July Package, negotiators agreed on “flexibility” 
provisions, with the intent to take into account the “special needs and 
interests of developing countries.” A first provision refers to longer 
implementation periods; this approach is traditional in GATT/WTO 
negotiations and so is not particularly controversial. The two other 
provisions are much more complicated, that is: (i) the possibility of 
excluding a certain percentage of total import value from the formula 
cuts; and (ii) the possibility of excluding a certain percentage of tariff 
lines from the formula cuts. Critics stress that these two flexibility 6    Asian Development Outlook 2006




































Japan 4,327 1.6 2.3 0.8 16 17.1 23.8 6.7 25.0 28.5 13.3 0
US 4,428 2.6 3.4 0.8 47 20.7 26.0 5.3 33.1 38.6 21.3 0
EU 4,441 3.9 4.0 0.0 17 23.1 24.1 1.0 42.8 57.5 14.7 1
Canada 4,427 3.3 5.3 2.0 25 14.9 21.3 6.5 20.1 25.0 25.0 0
Australia 3,911 3.5 11.0 7.4 506 13.7 34.7 21.0 25.0 55.0 45.0 101
New Zealand 4,095 3.1 11.1 8.0 1,208 8.2 26.5 18.3 40.0 45.0 40.0 0
Developing economies
PRC 4,330 9.1 9.2 0.1 286 24.4 24.6 0.2 50 50 5.9 3
Korea 4,347 6.7 10.2 3.5 336 13.2 30.4 17.3 30.0 36.8 28.8 0
Singapore 4,306 0.0 4.1 4.1 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0 10.0 10.0 2
Taipei,China 4,266 4.5 4.7 0.2 50 25.4 27.4 1.9 40.0 60.0 22.5 0
South Africa 4,247 8.3 11.0 2.8 1,082 24.7 29.1 4.4 60.0 60.0 32.1 72
Malaysia 4,247 8.6 11.2 2.6 1,467 21.4 25.9 4.5 215.6 300.0 100.2 18
Philippines 4,053 9.2 16.7 7.4 1,877 13.9 26.5 12.6 40.0 50.0 47.0 127
Thailand 3,522 13.4 20.2 6.8 2,247 17.1 27.0 9.9 80.0 80.0 50.0 24
Brazil 4,233 15.1 29.4 14.3 3,768 16.1 31.4 15.3 35.0 85.0 72.5 1
Mexico 4,374 17.2 34.8 17.6 4,316 17.4 35.1 17.8 50.0 50.0 47.0 76
Indonesia 4,229 8.3 35.0 26.6 3,861 8.7 37.6 28.9 80.0 125.0 125.0 21
India 3,736 33.9 37.0 3.1 3,504 35.9 39.2 3.2 52.0 150.0 108.0 715
Least-developed countries
Bangladesh 4,437 21.7 22.7 1.0 2,391 31.6 33.4 1.9 37.5 200.0 200.0 62
a Defined as tariff rates higher than 50%; n.a. = not applicable. HS6 = Harmonized System six-digit level.
Note: Country classification is based on the Integrated Tariff Analysis System.
Source: Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2004, An Integrated Tariff Analysis System: Software and Database, Productivity Commission Staff Working 
Paper, available: http://www.pc.gov.au/research/swp/itas/itas.pdf. 
provisions could undermine the negotiating, economic, and political 
advantages of the Swiss formula.
7 It certainly would not be to the 
advantage of developing Asian countries.
Without a successful conclusion to NAMA talks, the Doha 
negotiations will not progress. Also, the ultimate substance of NAMA 
will be critical to the effectiveness of Doha and in setting the stage 
for future WTO negotiations. While NAMA needs to be ambitious in 
cutting tariffs, it is essential that it be symmetric in its applications. It 
could absolve the system of many of its past sins by creating a far more 
uniform tariff structure within and between countries. The structural 
adjustment that will result from such a process will make future WTO 
rounds that much easier. The Swiss formula approach offers an excellent 
opportunity to do this. However, a “flexible” compromise in which sectors 
are excluded could significantly reduce the potential gains from Doha, 
postpone once again liberalization in key sectors, and set another bad 
precedent for future rounds. 
Agriculture
Agriculture has traditionally been one of the most difficult sectors 
to liberalize, for reasons familiar to both developed and developing 
countries. In the main, this is due to various political and political-
economy-related issues. Politicians will often resist liberalization on Asian Development Outlook 2006    6
the basis, among other things, of “food security,” “national security,” 
cultural preservation, the need to maintain a beautiful countryside (the 
“multifunctionality” of agriculture), and health-related issues. While 
some of these arguments may be legitimate in theory, in practice they 
tend not to be. Instead, they are often merely finely wrapped excuses 
hiding old-fashioned protectionism. 
Farm lobbies are extremely strong in most developed countries, 
especially the EU, US, and Japan. It is an easy application of the political 
economy of protectionism (see, for example, Baldwin 1982); farmers tend 
to be geographically concentrated, have a well-defined producer interest, 
and can use politically popular slogans to mask the higher prices, fiscal 
cost, and other distortions created by agricultural protectionism. Less 
than 5% of the labor force is employed in agriculture in developed 
countries. Yet protection of this sector in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) costs over $300 billion a year 
(a multiple of the value of development assistance, for example) and has 
often caused modest results in trade negotiations of all kinds. Disputes 
pertaining to trade in agriculture almost scuttled the Uruguay Round; 
it was in part responsible for the failure at Cancun in 2003, and experts 
who are skeptical about the future of Doha generally point to the 
powerful protectionist forces in this area. 
The Uruguay Round was not particularly successful in liberalizing 
farm trade. Today, the level of agricultural protection in the OECD 
countries is still close to its level in 1986–1988, the reference years used by 
the Uruguay Round negotiators. Nevertheless, the Uruguay Round was 
instrumental in introducing the minimal level of transparency necessary 
to prepare for profound future changes in OECD agricultural markets.
8 
In particular, it helped to place farm liberalization at the forefront of the 
Doha negotiations and reinforced the steady decline of OECD public 
support for a highly subsidized farm sector. 
Moreover, the emergence of developing countries as key negotiators 
at Doha has also helped place agriculture at the top of the agenda. Net 
exporters of farm products with a long-term comparative advantage in 
agriculture, such as Brazil or Thailand, have been effective in applying 
and organizing pressure at Doha for agricultural liberalization. And many 
other developing countries have realized that they are at the stage where 
farm exports are essential to their development because their farm sector 
is large and labor intensive. Agriculture accounts for 40% of GDP, 35% of 
exports, and 50–70% of total employment in LDCs (12%, 15%, and 15–40%, 
respectively, in the other developing countries). Three quarters of the 
world’s poorest people live in rural areas, with the proportion in LDCs as 
high as 90%. This being the Doha Development Agenda, agriculture must 
be part of a final package. 
Farm negotiations in the Doha Round are taking place under three 
pillars: (i) rules on export subsidies; (ii) rules on domestic support; and 
(iii) tariff cuts. This structure is a source of difficulty in negotiation 
because the use of these instruments is asymmetrical. Most OECD 
countries use all three instruments, while developing countries protect 
their farm sector only behind tariffs. Negotiating on the combined 
effects of these instruments would be ideal, but is not technically 
possible. 66    Asian Development Outlook 2006
Export subsidy elimination
The Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China confirmed the need 
to eliminate farm export subsidies by 2013 (2006 for cotton export 
subsidies). This decision has received considerable publicity, despite the 
fact that export subsidies only represent roughly 5–6% of total farm 
subsidies, and that it simply binds the reduction of export subsidies 
unilaterally undertaken by the EU since the late 1990s.
9 Nevertheless, 
economic calculations, e.g., Anderson and Martin (2006), have shown 
that eliminating export subsidies without cutting tariffs and domestic 
support will generate noticeable welfare losses in many of the developing 
countries that are net importers of subsidized farm products. These 
calculations have also consistently shown that the only way to (more 
than) counterbalance this negative impact is to reduce domestic support 
and tariff rates in order to boost world production.
In the export subsidies domain, the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration may prepare for future WTO negotiations by expanding the 
definition of export subsidies to include the export subsidy elements of 
export credits, food aid, and state trading enterprises. These instruments 
are currently of marginal importance (Hoekman and Messerlin 2006); 
nevertheless, such disciplines are significant in inhibiting their intensive 
use in the future, perhaps to fill the void left by the elimination of 
existing export subsidies. 
Domestic support
Domestic support is an area where the OECD countries have de facto 
benefited from a “reverse” special and differential treatment (SDT) under 
the Uruguay Round. Whereas there is an outright legal prohibition 
against trade-distorting subsidies in manufacturing (and countries 
importing subsidized goods are allowed to impose countervailing duties), 
in agriculture domestic support is only disciplined by rules against highly 
distorting subsidies and practices. These tend to be extremely expensive, 
which explains to some extent why only developed countries tend to use 
them. The US and EU together represented over three fourths of global 
farm domestic support in the early 2000s (Anderson et al. 2006a). 
Table 1.5.4 presents the reform proposals put forward by the EU, G20, 
and US at the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China, focusing on 
the two largest subsidizers, the EU and US. It shows that the proposed 
subsidy cuts (applied to Uruguay Round commitments) may look huge 
in percentage terms, but in effect they reflect a good deal of “water” 
in the subsidies. For instance, the EU has made a proposal, which is a 
mere binding at WTO of its already-completed reforms of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) undertaken since 2000 (Kutas 2006). 
The EU approach in particular has been very much criticized for 
several reasons. First, there is a long WTO tradition (that the EU has 
always supported) that unilateral liberalization should not be credited as 
WTO concessions. Second, the EU proposal in farm tariff cuts is viewed 
as weak (see below) whereas its requests for tariff cuts in NAMA are 
substantial (see above). Last, but not least, the 2003 CAP reform did not 
really liberalize the EU farm sector. All other things being constant, the 
overall level of EU protection has decreased marginally from 57% to 56% 
after the 2003 reform (OECD 2004). Asian Development Outlook 2006    6
1.5.4 Farm domestic support in the United States and European Union
Unit US EU
The Amber Box (the most trade-distorting subsidies)    
Uruguay Round commitments $ billion 19 89
Effective amounts in 2004 $ billion 13 42
Estimated amounts in 2006–2010 (EU CAP) $ billion — 26
Doha proposals
EU proposal % cut 60 70
US proposal % cut 60 83
G20 proposal % cut 70 80
EU proposal $ billion 8 27
US proposal $ billion 8 15
G20 proposal $ billion 6 18
Overall trade-distorting support (sum of AMS, de minimis and Blue Box)
Uruguay Round commitments $ billion 55 149
Effective amounts in 2004 $ billion 23 74
Estimated amounts in 2006–2010 (EU CAP) $ billion — 40
Doha proposals in terms of subsidy cuts
EU proposal % cut 60 70
US proposal % cut 53 75
G20 proposal % cut 75 80
EU proposal $ billion 22 45
US proposal $ billion 26 37
G20 proposal $ billion 14 30
— = not available; CAP = Common Agricultural Policy.
Notes:
Amber box—contains a list of subsidies that WTO members have agreed to reduce under the WTO 
agriculture negotiations. 
Blue box—a category of domestic subsidies specific to the Agreement on Agriculture permitted only 
because thay are believed to distort trade less than amber box subsidies. 
AMS—Aggregate Measure of Support. An index that measures the monetary value of the extent of 
government support to a sector. 
De minimis—minimum threshold below which spending on domestic support does not need to be 
included in AMS classification. 
Sources: EU, US, and G20 proposals at the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China; Penn 2005; Jales 
and Nassar 2006; Kutas 2006.
Tariff cuts and the “Big Bargain”
Tariff cuts are crucial to agricultural liberalization because they are the 
best way to reduce and control subsidies, as lower tariffs make existing 
subsidies more visibly expensive.
10 Unfortunately, the ongoing Doha 
negotiations on farm tariff cuts face a much more complicated format 
than did the NAMA negotiations, with the risk they will reduce the level 
of ambition in farm liberalization, already fragile because of the political 
importance of the farm sector to almost every WTO member.
First, complicated modalities in farm negotiations flow from the fact 
that the proposals on tariff cuts for the Ministerial Meeting in Hong 
Kong, China have adopted a tiered format, with four ranges of tariffs, 
each range being subjected to a different percentage cut, as shown in 
Table 1.5.5. These proposals differ with respect to the figures defining 
the various ranges and percentage cuts. As a result, negotiators need to 
strike deals on the three thresholds defining the four tariff ranges, on 
the four percentage cuts for each range, and on the use and definition 
of a tariff cap. If there are different cuts for developed and developing 
countries (an almost certain situation), negotiators have to agree on 16 
figures at least, which is no mean feat. The fact that “specific tariffs” 
(i.e., a tariff based on a fixed value and/or quantity, rather than a 6    Asian Development Outlook 2006
percentage-based “ad valorem” tariff, which are almost always applied 
in manufactures) exist on agricultural products complicates matters, as 
they would likely need to be converted to an ad valorem equivalent in 
order to be liberalized. This presents a problem in that the conversion 
can lead to greater protection.
11 
Such a difficult format for negotiators could prove counterproductive. 
Thus, there is a strong incentive to look for more simplified parameters 
for negotiations, keeping in mind that the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration (paragraph 24) says: “[..] we instruct our negotiators to ensure 
that there is a comparably high level of ambition in market access for 
Agriculture and NAMA.” Importing the Swiss formula from NAMA to 
the farm negotiations seems a first condition to ensure a comparably 
high level of ambition by using the same instrument for tariff cuts in 
farm and NAMA negotiations. There is no extra cost for such a move; 
the Swiss formula requires that specific tariffs be transformed into ad 
valorem tariffs, but this exercise will be necessary anyway for the tiered 
proposals articulated at the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China. A 
Swiss formula approach would have the same advantages of transparency 
and symmetry as in the case of NAMA, to much greater effect given 
the greater divergence in tariff rates within and between countries in 
agriculture. It would also be instrumental in setting the stage for effective 
future WTO rounds and would reduce the “exceptionalist” mentality 
regarding agriculture that has always accompanied WTO negotiations. 
Finally, the Swiss formula opens the possibility of a clearer linkage 
between the NAMA and farm negotiations; that is, it opens the door to a 
transparent “Big Bargain” with trade in goods. 
In sum, Doha negotiations particularly in the areas of domestic 
support and tariff cuts continue to be controversial, and the outcome is 
unclear. However, past experience has shown that developing countries 
in particular are placing a high priority on this area. An underestimation 
of the seriousness of developing countries in this regard was in evidence 
at the Cancun Ministerial Meeting, at which a compromise agreement 
Table 1.5.5 Tabled proposals on farm tariff cuts, 2005
EU proposal G20 proposal US proposal
Definition of the 
tiers (%)
Tariff cut (%) Definition (%) Tariff cut (%) Definition (%) Tariff cut (%)
Tariff cuts to be imposed on developed countries         
Highest tier >90 60 >75 75 >60 85–90
Medium high 60–90 50 50–75 65 40–60 75–85
Medium low 30–60 45 20–50 55 20–40 65–75
Lowest tier 0–30 35 0–20 45 0–20 55–65
Tariff cuts to be imposed on developing countries
Highest band >130 40 >130 40 >60 a
Medium high 80–130 35 80–130 35 40–60 a
Medium low 30–80 30 30–80 30 20–40 a
Lowest band 0–30 25 <30 25 0–20 a
Other elements of tariff rates
Cap tariff (developed countries) n.a.  100 n.a.  100 n.a.  75
Cap tariff (developing countries) n.a.  150 n.a.  150 n.a.  100
n.a. = not applicable.
a Reference to “slightly lesser reductions” without more precision.
Source: The EU, G20, and US proposals at the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China.Asian Development Outlook 2006    6
between the EU and US in agriculture was rejected by developing 
countries (under the leadership of the G20). This should not happen 
again. These three areas of agriculture will also have to be an important 
part of a final Doha package. 
Still, agriculture is complicated and faces strong resistance at the local 
level in developed and developing countries. As farm interests in the 
EU, for example, attempted to keep any commitments at the Ministerial 
Meeting in Hong Kong, China as modest as possible, Korean farmers 
also actively sought to influence their country’s position. However, WTO 
has matured such that it needs to tackle trade in agriculture seriously, 
unlike in the past. Doha presents an opportunity to do this, that is, to 
treat agricultural trade more like trade in manufactures, in which trade-
distorting subsidies are eliminated and tariffs are lowered and made more 
uniform. The adoption of the Swiss formula to agricultural tariffs would 
help to achieve this. 
Trade in services
Globally, services represent more than 50% of the GDP of any country, 
and more than 70% of many developed economies. International trade 
in services is becoming commensurately important; in 2003, it came to 
$1.8 trillion, about one quarter the value of merchandise trade (WTO, 
International Trade Statistics, 2004, Table 1). Although data on barriers 
to trade in services are notoriously rare and often incomplete, in-depth 
studies on specific services sectors suggest that protection in this sector 
is much higher than is the case for trade in goods, suggesting that trade 
liberalization in services has significant potential for all WTO member 
states.
While services are not included in the Doha liberalization scenario 
reviewed below using ADB’s General Equilibrium Model of Asian Trade 
(GEMAT), Francois et al. (2003) do estimate the potential gains from 
various scenarios of liberalization in services trade. Assuming a 50% 
reduction in their estimated barriers to trade in services and increasing 
returns to scale, they calculate a $68 billion global gain, double that of 
a similar reduction in protection in manufactures and about one fourth 
more than in agricultural liberalization. Developing countries almost 
gain as much as the OECD countries, with the PRC and India accounting 
for over three fourths of this share. Clearly, the potential economic gains 
from services liberalization are high. 
Nevertheless, negotiations under services have hitherto produced very 
little at Doha. As of July 2005, less than half of WTO’s member countries 
had tabled proposals of any kind. Moreover, the content of these offers 
seems thin, especially in Mode 3 (commercial presence, see Box 1.5.3), 
which is of special interest to the industrial economies, and in Mode 4 
(that is, trade in labor services), which is of special interest to some 
developing countries (for example, in Asia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, 
Philippines, and Sri Lanka).
A first reason for this deadlock is the negotiating process per se, 
which is complicated in part due to measurement problems. In trade in 
goods, negotiators balance the concessions granted to trading partners 
via tariff cuts at home with those they receive in return, a straightforward 
calculation. In services, it would make little sense to balance, say, the 0    Asian Development Outlook 2006
The complicated and diverse nature of trade in services 
explains why liberalization in this sector can be far more 
difficult than trade in goods. Services can be high tech or 
low tech; inputs and/or final products; publicly provided or 
privately provided; and closely related to other areas, such 
as foreign direct investment (FDI) and immigration. Trade 
in goods internationally tends to be almost always privately 
provided, with strong GATT/WTO controls on state 
intervention, including the technical prohibition against 
state subsidies and constraints in the form of state-owned 
enterprises having to abide by market principles (GATT 
Article XVII). Many services areas, however, still include 
government involvement, and state prerogatives in certain 
areas are recognized by the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS). Moreover, trade in goods tends to be 
separate from FDI, though clearly there exist indirect links 
between trade and FDI. In the area of services, however, 
trade can be intricately linked to FDI; in some subsectors, 
trade in services is impossible without FDI. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development defines four “modes” of trade in services: 
(1) cross-border supply, in which a company exports 
the service from its home country, e.g., by fax or email; 
(2) consumption abroad, in which the user of the service 
consumes it outside his/her home country, e.g., tourism; 
(3) commercial presence, in which a company directly 
supplies the service to foreign customers (this involves 
establishment of an affiliate abroad and constitutes over 
three fourths of all trade in services); and (4) presence of 
natural persons, in which the service-exporting country 
sends personnel abroad to supply services.
In the Doha Development Agenda, key areas of 
contention in trade in services relate to Mode 3 and Mode 
4, which is no doubt why little has been offered. Mode 
3 is a high priority for developed countries; in fact, after 
the “Singapore issues” were taken off the agenda after the 
2003 Cancun Ministerial Meeting, Mode 3 is the main 
area in which facilitating FDI policies are being discussed. 
Liberalization in Mode 4 is an important priority for 
labor-exporting developing Asian countries, which are 
especially concerned about working visa policies and other 
immigration-related procedures in developed countries.
number of licenses granted to foreign insurance companies with the 
number of visas obtained for domestic nurses willing to work outside the 
country. Moreover, until the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China, 
negotiations were exclusively based on bilateral offers and requests, a 
cumbersome procedure that complicates the negotiations. So does the 
fact that substantial services liberalization can require behind-the-border 
changes (e.g., changing a law or bureaucratic regulations). 
To simplify things, services negotiations under WTO in the past have 
focused on national treatment, that is, on the elimination of measures 
that discriminate against foreign service providers. Such an approach 
allows regulatory flexibility, but this comes at a price: there is no “forced” 
regulatory efficiency. The failure of countries to adopt “best practices” 
in this regard has been estimated to be high (OECD 2005, Estevão 
2005). In order to allow for deeper integration in the services context, 
the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China decided that countries 
could pursue services negotiations on a “plurilateral,” rather than the 
usual bilateral, basis. That is, more than two countries can negotiate 
a liberalization package in a certain sector, a result which would be 
extended on a most-favored-nation basis.
12 
Although there could be some breakthroughs in the less controversial 
areas, the paucity of proposals on services thus far does not bode well for 
a breakthrough in this area. Nevertheless, it is an increasingly important 
sector with great potential. A successful conclusion to the Doha 
negotiations would also likely produce a strong commitment to focus on 
services in future rounds of multilateral negotiations. 
Rules 
The Doha discussions on “rules” focus on several issues; for developing 
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Asia (and other developing regions) it is argued that the most important 
areas relate to contingent protection (antidumping and countervailing 
duties) and regional trading agreements. (Aid for trade, including trade 
facilitation, is handled in the next subsection.)
During the last decade, WTO has been unable to monitor effectively 
the use of nontariff barriers (NTBs). The success of the Uruguay Round to 
eradicate “gray measures” (such as quotas and voluntary export restraints) 
has been somewhat diminished by the increased use of contingent 
protection, especially antidumping measures. Hitherto there has been no 
major systematic effort by WTO to delineate and quantify major NTBs 
imposed by WTO member states. Table 1.5.6 provides an illustration of 
the use of antidumping duties and other NTBs gleaned from recent trade 
policy reviews
13 of selected WTO members. It suggests that the NTB 
problem continues to be important.
Doha discussions on reforms addressing antidumping and 
countervailing duty procedures have not yet reached the negotiating 
stage, but such topics tend to be handled in the final negotiating phase. 
Contingent protection could represent a growing threat to open 
trade. While, technically, antidumping measures and countervailing 
duties are justifiable in certain cases, in practice they have been used as 
a protectionist tool, all the more problematic because applications are 

























Japan 2004 Low Yes 0 0 Low Low Low Low Low
US 2003 — Yes 85 23 High High High High Low
EU 2004 High Yes 156 18 High High High Average Low
Canada 2003 — No 43 10 High Low High High High
Australia 2002 Low No 19 5 High High High Average —
New Zealand 2003 Low Yes 0 0 High Low Low Low High
Developing economies
Korea 2004 Low Yes 21 0 Low High Average Low High
South Africa 1998 High No 35 0 Low Low High High Low
Malaysia 2005 Low No 12 0 High Low Low Low Low
Singapore 2004 Low No 0 0 Low High Low Low High
Philippines 2005 High Yes 5 0 Low Low Low Low Low
Thailand 2003 Low No 26 0 Low Low Low Low Low
Brazil 2004 High Yes 48 6 High High Low Average High
Mexico 2002 Low No 90 1 High Low Low Low Low
Indonesia 2003 Low No 7 0 Low Average Low Average Low
India 2002 High Yes 131 0 Low Low Low Low High
Least-developed countries
Bangladesh 2000 High No 0 0 Low Low Low Average Low
Notes:
Country classification is based on the Integrated Tariff Analysis System.
— = no pages devoted to the particular NTB; Low = below average number of pages devoted to the particular NTB; High = above average number of pages devoted 
to the particular NTB; Average = equal to the average number of pages devoted to the particular NTB; Yes/No = has/has not applied safeguard measures.
For Singapore and Malaysia, state-owned enterprises refer to government-linked companies; for the columns referring to antidumping and countervailing measures, 
the figures refer to the number of measures in force.
Source: Trade Policy Reviews (various issues), available: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm.2    Asian Development Outlook 2006
firm- or country-specific. Enforcement of rules governing contingent 
protection has also been relatively lax. Hence, discussions regarding the 
need to make contingent protection more transparent and symmetric 
between countries will likely become a significant issue at Doha, though 
it is not clear exactly what will be put forward. Still, the regulatory nature 
of this area, as well as the increasing use of contingent protection even 
by developing countries, will render progress difficult. Little progress is 
expected in this regard outside clarification of rules, as was basically the 
case during the Uruguay Round. 
As is noted at length in Part 3, the trend toward the creation of 
preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade areas or customs unions) 
has become increasingly important in driving international commercial 
policy over the past 10 years. By their very nature, these agreements 
discriminate in favor of partner countries, to the disadvantage of 
nonpartners. This is a violation of the heart and spirit of the GATT/
WTO, i.e., most-favored-nation treatment, enshrined in Article I. 
However, Article XXIV allows for preferential trade agreements, 
provided that they meet certain general criteria. In GATT’s early years, 
preferential trade agreements were relatively few in number. As of March 
2006, however, almost 200 such agreements had been reported to WTO, 
double that of just a decade earlier. Many more are in the works; the vast 
majority of developing Asian countries are party to such agreements. 
Recognizing that this trend poses an important challenge to 
nondiscrimination, WTO members have been discussing the need 
to revamp the organization’s policies toward regionalism. The 1994 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT was an 
attempt to enhance the compatibility of regionalism with multilateralism 
at a time when the trend was beginning to grow, but it did little to 
clarify the issues. Under the Doha Development Agenda, further 
revisions of interpretations of Article XXIV were to be part of its “single 
undertaking.” But little was accomplished at the Ministerial Meeting in 
Hong Kong, China in this regard, except a commitment to improve the 
transparency of free trade areas and encouragement to negotiators to 
arrive at “appropriate outcomes” by the end of 2006. 
Because the global trend toward bilateralism and regionalism is new 
and just about all WTO member countries are involved, it is unlikely 
that substantial progress will be made in this area at Doha, outside 
of some minor points on definitions and transparency. However, the 
problems that are being created by this trend—such as inevitable trade 
and investment diversion, “noodle bowl ” (or “spaghetti bowl”) issues, 
and the clear threat to the multilateral system—will become evident 
in time, and the threat to the multilateral system will be taken more 
seriously. This will no doubt be a key area of discussion in subsequent 
rounds, if not sooner. 
Special and differential treatment and aid for trade
The 6 years between the ministerial meetings held in Seattle and 
Hong Kong, China witnessed an intense debate on whether and 
how developing countries should be granted special and differential 
treatment (SDT). Importantly, at the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, 
China developed countries agreed to end tariffs and quotas on 97% of Asian Development Outlook 2006    3
the tariff lines exported by the LDCs by 2008. This was hailed as an 
important success. However, it has been criticized as not being extensive 
enough.
14 
To begin, it should be noted that the pursuit of SDT has often been 
counterproductive for developing countries. As noted above, countries 
tend to gain most from their own liberalization, and the quest for 
exclusions, drawn-out timetables for the implementation of reform, and 
lack of active participation in global trade talks (meaning that protection 
remains relatively high in LDCs) have postponed or even stifled 
liberalization. The possibility of a “round for free” was discussed earlier 
in the Doha talks, ostensibly suggesting that LDCs should be exempt 
from everything at Doha. This approach, though well meaning, would 
have been highly detrimental to LDC development, as it would have 
precluded the need for domestic reform and restructuring. Moreover, 
active participation ensures that the issues they really care about will 
be addressed. Some aspects of SDT can be useful, but in no way should 
it serve to exclude LDCs and developing countries more generally from 
being true partners in the global trading system.
Since the 1970s, SDT has been mostly delivered through preferential 
(low or zero) tariffs granted to a limited number of developing countries 
defined on an ad hoc basis by developed countries (on an individual 
basis). However, the value of SDT preferences has been falling over 
time. For example, beneficiaries are currently suffering from “preference 
erosion” and associated adjustment costs. During the last decade, 
the differences between the most-favored-nation tariff rates and the 
preferential tariff rates have been reduced by a long series of trade 
agreements, under the GATT/WTO and in regional trade agreements. 
“Aid for trade” has become a buzzword in the Doha negotiations, and 
as a result, deserves to be defined with some precision. The preference 
erosion issue, for example, is often included under the aid for trade 
heading. What follows limits aid for trade to issues increasingly related to 
governance in general (and not necessarily to trade directly).
First, aid for trade can be linked to “trade facilitation,” that is, to the 
activities undertaken by customs and logistics procedures, e.g., improving 
the movement, release, and clearance of goods, including goods in transit. 
The Doha Development Agenda has a program of negotiations on trade 
facilitation intended to buttress developing-country capacity to implement 
trade liberalization and structural change in general. A particularly 
important aspect of this program relates to transit conditions (for 
example, fees, delays, and transparency), which is of prime importance to 
landlocked countries.
Second, as the above definition of trade facilitation is quite narrow 
(it covers only public governance at the borders), this approach could 
potentially be extended to all activities involved in the international 
movement of goods and services, such as building the corresponding 
infrastructure (ports, roads, and other transport facilities), or operating 
trade-related services (mail and parcels, telecoms, specialized legal and 
insurance services, storage, and the like). This “trade facilitation plus” 
concept is very close to services negotiations since de facto it relies on a 
cluster of services on which developing countries need to focus in order 
to reap effectively gains from trade liberalization.     Asian Development Outlook 2006
Gauging the gains of Doha trade liberalization 
for the region 
Viewed from a historical perspective, global free trade would appear an 
idealistic goal. As noted above, negotiations in the Doha Development 
Agenda have focused on a more modest agenda. To conjecture about 
the outcome in Doha, this section examines the economic impact in the 
context of a model that brings Asia into sharper relief. This exercise is 
conducted using an Asia- and trade-focused general equilibrium model 
(GEMAT), described more fully in Part 3.
Since the parameters (and, indeed, likelihood) of an agreement 
at Doha remains uncertain, the simulations adopt the ambitious 
assumptions about Doha outcomes that have been made by Anderson 
et al. (2006b) (Box 1.5.4). While a successful Doha package could spur 
further multilateral liberalization initiatives, these are not considered 
here. 
Under the “Deep Doha” scenario, world income rises by $155.2 billion 
in 2025, measured in 2001 prices (Table 1.5.7). However, liberalization 
benefits developing Asia disproportionately. Around 70% of the estimated 
gains from Deep Doha accrue to Asia (including Japan). Box 1.5.5 
compares ADB current estimates with those of earlier World Bank 
studies. Caveats about these exercises and their estimates are set out in 
Part 3. Importantly, as is further discussed in Part 3, the absolute values 
of these estimates tend to have a strong downward bias, and, of course, 
are a function of the assumptions and parameters underlying the model. 
Hence, the absolute values are arguably less important than the rank 
ordering of the results and the relative magnitudes. 
As Table 1.5.7 shows, the estimated gains from Doha are not evenly 
distributed either globally or within Asia. The disproportionately large 
gains accruing to Asia follow from Asia’s openness and larger initial 
trade shares, as well as the assumption of a significant reduction in Asian 
import protection, especially in agriculture. Japan and Korea, which are 
large economies in absolute size, capture the bulk of the gains. Relative to 
income, Korea and Thailand gain most. Korea benefits significantly from 
a sharp reduction in its own agricultural tariffs as well as from growing 
export opportunities in the PRC. Thailand benefits as its agricultural 
exports are boosted by reduced distortions in the global agricultural 
trading system. 
Although Deep Doha is a positive sum game, there are prospective 
losers as well as winners. In Asia, Bangladesh and Viet Nam would 
appear to face the prospect of income losses. And Deep Doha would 
appear to offer no benefits to the Philippines and few to the PRC. As 
the possibility of prospective losses may impede or slow multilateral 
liberalization initiatives, it is important to look behind these results. 
An important aspect of the Doha negotiations, reflected in this 
scenario, is that negotiations are about reductions in members’ legally 
bound tariffs, not the actual tariffs that they apply. Therefore, where there 
is water in the tariffs, nominal reductions in bound tariffs may mean little 
or no reduction in actual levels. In the Deep Doha scenario assumptions 
presented here, this is the case for both Bangladesh and the Philippines. 
An important result from standard economic theory is that liberalization 
1.5.7 Welfare gains from Deep Doha 








China, People’s Rep. of  11.57 0.21
Korea 36.76 3.49







Viet Nam -0.79 -0.58
Bangladesh -0.03 -0.02
India 12.50 0.67
Sri Lanka 0.24 0.54
Developing Asia 88.81 0.76
Asia including Japan 110.07 0.61
United States 8.13 0.04




Latin America 2.15 0.05
Rest of the world -1.13 -0.02
World Total 155.20 0.24
Note: Europe 19 comprises 15 countries of the 
EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and 
Switzerland.
Source: Staff estimates.Asian Development Outlook 2006    
Deep Doha. This is essentially scenario 5 in Anderson et al. 
(2006).1 It assumes significant agreement in Doha by 2006 in 
a number of areas: nonagricultural tariff bindings are cut by 
50%, and agricultural tariffs are cut using a tiered formula. The 
marginal cut is set at 45% for agricultural tariffs below 15%, 
70% for tariffs within the 15–90% bracket, and 75% for tariffs 
above 90%.2 Agricultural export subsidies are eliminated for 
all countries. Domestic support for agriculture is also cut for 
the United States (by 28%), the European Union (by 16%), and 
Australia and New Zealand (by 10%). Special and differential 
treatment (SDT) is not applied and developing countries are 
assumed to liberalize to the same degree as developed coun-
tries. All these trade reforms are phased in over the 5-year 
period of 2007–2011. Possible reforms in services sector and 
trade facilitation are not incorporated in this scenario. 
Doha-SDT. This scenario examines the consequences of 
including SDT. Specifically, there are four agricultural tariff 
brackets for developing countries, with inflexion points placed 
at tariff levels of 20%, 60%, and 120%. Their marginal rates 
of reduction are 35%, 40%, 50%, and 60% within each of 
the four bands. On NAMA, the cut in nonagricultural tariff 
bindings for developing countries is 33%. Least-developed 
countries are not required to undertake any reduction com-
mitment. On the other hand, the required reductions in both 
agriculture and nonagriculture sectors for developed coun-
tries are the same as that in the Deep Doha scenario. The 
assumption regarding cuts in domestic support and export 
subsidies are also the same as those in Deep Doha.
Doha-SDT excluding sensitive agricultural products. 
Building on Doha-SDT, this “Doha Light” scenario further 
assumes a less ambitious agricultural agenda that excludes 
sensitive farm products. The developed countries are 
assumed to treat 2% of their HS6 agricultural tariff lines as 
sensitive and subject to just a 15% tariff cut. For developing 
countries, the corresponding figure is 4%.
1 See Anderson et al. (2006b) for the details of the design of this Doha 
scenario. The Doha scenario used here corresponds to their “Doha-All” 
scenario.
2 Since the cut is applied on bound tariffs, the cuts in applied rate may 
be small for some developing countries due to binding overhang.
gains depend largely on the boosts to efficiency and productivity that 
occur when countries liberalize their own trade (Figure 1.5.1), not from 
tariff reductions by their trade partners. By volunteering cuts in bound 
tariff rates that would lower applied tariffs, countries such as Bangladesh 
and the Philippines would also benefit. The negotiating approaches of 
WTO obfuscate this fundamental point.
Of course, even if countries do reduce their own tariffs, multilateral 
liberalization may not lead to gains in all cases. If liberalization means 
that a country loses preferential access to important markets, or export 
subsidies are removed on goods that have a large weight in the import 
basket, or subsidized entry into other markets is halted (as, for example, 
in the case of the Fiji Islands’ sugar exports to the EU), countries may 
face the prospect of significant losses. The model suggests that the erosion 
of preferential access for clothing and textiles to the EU, with the EU 
lowering its most-favored-nation tariffs, could dampen Bangladesh’s 
exports, resulting in losses in income and terms of trade. Bangladesh 
also loses from terms-of-trade effects driven by higher agricultural prices 
(including cotton). Also, given that the PRC already has substantially 
reduced its tariffs on merchandise trade, a deterioration of its terms 
of trade may be needed to sustain fast export growth. The case of Viet 
Nam, which is not yet a member of WTO, illustrates another point. In 
the Doha scenario, levels of protection in nonmember countries are 
assumed unchanged. Consequently, as WTO member countries liberalize, 
nonmember countries such as Viet Nam suffer from a diversion of 
their trade to other locations where costs are now lower. If Viet Nam 
successfully concludes negotiations to enter WTO, it too would benefit 
from Doha, raising estimated impacts. 
Under the scenario of Doha-SDT (Table 1.5.8), the global gain in 2025 
shrinks by around 30% in comparison with the Deep Doha scenario, to 
1.5.1 Tariff reductions and income gains

































Gains in real income, 2025
% of GDP
Sources: GTAP database 6.05; CEPII scenarios; staff 
estimates.
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$110.6 billion. But for developing countries,
15 the gain would 
be only $56.4 billion, only 63% of that in the Deep Doha 
scenario. If higher-income Asian countries (Hong Kong, 
China; Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China) are excluded, 
the gain of developing countries is only $19.3 billion, or less 
than half of that in the Deep Doha scenario (Figure 1.5.2). 
This exercise suggests that no regions (as defined) would 
be better off from the introduction of SDT, even for LDCs 
like Bangladesh. This result squares with the theoretical 
proposition that developing countries need to cut their 
own trade protection to reap the benefits of multilateral 
trade liberalization. SDT does not serve the interests of 
developing countries. 
If the Doha-SDT scenario is further weakened by 
assuming that the sensitive agricultural products are 
subject to lower tariff cuts, global gains in 2025 would 
be reduced to $68.4 billion, reflecting the importance of 
agricultural liberalization in the Doha trade liberalization 
agenda. In Asia, the exception of sensitive agricultural 
products are important for Japan, Korea, Thailand, and, 
to a lesser extent, Viet Nam, given their high interests in 
agricultural trade liberalization. However, for other Asian 
economies, the exception of sensitive agricultural products 
only have marginal impacts on their welfare gains from 
Doha.
Beyond Doha
The outcome at Doha is uncertain. It is hard to predict at 
this point whether there will be a successful package that 
emerges in time for the April 2006 deadline, whether the 
deadline will be extended and subsequently completed, or whether the 
negotiations will fail. Moreover, it is unclear what the package will look 
like. Will it be a comprehensive set of liberalization initiatives or “Doha 
Light”? 
In terms of economics, Doha Light could potentially be worse than a 
failure at Doha. For example, a “flexible” package under NAMA in which 
many sensitive products are excluded, minimal “value added” in terms 
of progress in agriculture, and mere rhetoric in services and “rules,” 
with some compensation under “aid for trade,” is not an inconceivable 
outcome. However, it would be regrettable. First, nonuniform tariff cuts 
could lead to distortions in the value-added chain that could potentially 
negate any gains from liberalization. Mere patchwork in agriculture 
would repeat the mistakes of previous GATT/WTO rounds, since it 
would thwart necessary structural reform in developed and developing 
countries, and would leave much for future rounds (discussed below). 
And lack of progress in reforming contingent protection rules would 
leave fully loaded an important (and increasingly dangerous) protectionist 
weapon. 
From a political perspective, Doha Light might be considered 
preferable to no agreement at all, as it would at least be a “success” 
1.5.8 Welfare gains from two less ambitious Doha scenarios 
(change compared to baseline in 2025, real income)
Doha-SDT Doha-SDT excluding 
sensitive farm 
products
($ billion) (% of 
GDP)
($ billion) (% of 
GDP)
Japan 18.57 0.29 7.86 0.12
China, People’s Rep. of 10.11 0.18 9.00 0.16
Korea 26.93 2.55 10.69 1.01
Hong Kong, China 3.52 0.85 3.42 0.83
Taipei,China 4.00 0.59 3.89 0.58
Indonesia 2.08 0.40 2.10 0.40
Malaysia 1.67 0.57 1.47 0.50
Philippines 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.05
Singapore 2.57 1.24 2.53 1.22
Thailand 5.87 1.49 3.71 0.94
Viet Nam -0.71 -0.52 -0.48 -0.35
Bangladesh -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06
India 6.32 0.34 6.25 0.33
Sri Lanka 0.13 0.29 0.06 0.14
Developing Asia 62.52 0.54 42.67 0.37
Asia including Japan 81.09 0.45 50.53 0.28
United States 6.81 0.03 6.82 0.03
Europe 19 26.09 0.19 19.61 0.15
Australia and New 
Zealand
2.74 0.31 1.69 0.19
Latin America -0.45 -0.01 -1.14 -0.03
Rest of the world -5.72 -0.08 -8.88 -0.12
World Total 110.56 0.17 68.64 0.11
SDT = special and differential treatment.
Note: Europe 19 comprises 15 countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway, and Switzerland.
Source: Staff estimates.
1.5.2 Gains from Doha scenarios:  
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and could keep momentum going for the next round, an important 
consideration given the rise in regionalism. However, this is purported 
to be a development round; lack of progress in comparative-advantage 
areas for developing countries would reinforce the impression in some 
circles that the international trading system is rigged against the poor. 
Enthusiasm for global trade could wane, and the regionalism trend could 
actually be reinforced.
But a comprehensive Doha package would likely do wonders for 
the global trading system. What such a package would look like is 
Care needs to be taken in comparing different estimates of 
the potential benefits of the Doha Development Agenda. 
Over the years, the World Bank has revised its estimates 
of Doha benefits significantly downward. The estimate 
here is also lower than earlier World Bank estimates (2001 
and 2004). An important reason for this is that use of 
the GTAP V6 (Global Trade Analysis Project) database 
implies a reduction in baseline trade protection compared 
to the earlier GTAP datasets used in the initial World 
Bank studies. The benefits of the cessation of quotas on 
textiles and clothing and the entry of the People’s Republic 
of China into the World Trade Organization are now 
embedded in the baseline, so Doha assumptions now 
remove fewer distortions (van der Mensbrugghe 2006). 
But there are also technical differences between the 
estimate of the General Equilibrium Model of Asian Trade 
(GEMAT) and more recent World Bank estimates. These 
differences illustrate the sensitivity of model estimates to 
differences in technological and behavioral specifications, 
and parametric assumptions. In particular, estimated 
benefits are sensitive to assumptions about trade price 
elasticities (Armington elasticities), returns to scale and 
product variety, and to sector and geographic aggregation. 
The most recent World Bank estimates are based on 
trade price elasticities that are about one third higher than 
those used here. The elasticities in GEMAT are closer to 
the traditional GTAP values, which have been estimated 
econometrically (Hertel et al. 2003). This difference in 
parameter assumptions tends to boost the World Bank’s 
estimates of trade benefits. 
On the other side of the coin, GEMAT’s assumption 
of increasing returns and imperfect competition generates 
larger benefits than those derived in a perfect competition 
model with constant returns technology, such as that used 
by the World Bank. Aggregation also matters. Higher 
commodity and geographic aggregation in GEMAT cuts 
estimated benefits. For essentially an identical scenario, 
GEMAT’s construction trims about 15% of the global 
benefits reported in recent World Bank studies.
1 
A recent study by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute shows that ambitious Doha round 
trade liberalization can induce a global real income gain 
of $104 billion in 2019, around 0.19% of world GDP in 
2019. This study was conducted using MIRAGE, a global 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model which also 
incorporates scale economy and firm-level productivity 
variety (Bchir et al. 2002). The lower estimates, in 
comparison with the GEMAT results, may be due to its 
assumption about the imperfect mobility of unskilled labor 
between agricultural and nonagricultural activities, which 
limits the gains from more efficient resource reallocation. 
Another recent study by Polaski (2006) (the “Carnegie 
model”), using a static global CGE model, estimates 
global gains of $58.6 billion, or 0.19% of 2001 world 
GDP, according to its Central Doha scenario. This gain is 
larger than the equivalent static impact in GEMAT. The 
difference may be found in scenario design and model 
specification. The Central Doha scenario in Polaski (2006) 
assumes relatively modest agricultural trade liberalization 
and more ambitious manufacturing trade liberalization, 
which would induce larger gains from manufacturing 
liberalization and smaller gains from agricultural 
liberalization. Moreover, Polaski (2006) assumes 
unemployment in the urban unskilled labor market and 
a rural-urban wage differential in developing countries. 
This further magnifies the gains of some developing 
countries from manufacturing trade liberalization, as their 
manufacturing sector expands following the increased 
export opportunities induced by trade liberalization, but 
may induce losses for developing countries from Doha 
agricultural liberalization, which diverts unskilled labor 
away from manufacturing and into agriculture. 
Simulation approaches clearly have limitations and 
until there is better information, estimates of the benefits 
of trade liberalization will necessarily be subject to 
important qualifications. However, the relative magnitude 
of the welfare impacts and the sources of gains and losses 
obtained from these modeling exercises do provide useful 
insights for policy analysis.
1 For Asian countries, the estimated income gains from GEMAT 
are generally larger than the World Bank estimates, reflecting that 
the impacts of low trade elasticities are more than offset by the 
introduction of scale and variety effects.
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outlined above: a balanced Swiss formula applied to both NAMA and 
agriculture with as few excluded sectors as possible; some progress in 
services, particularly in terms of Mode 3 and Mode 4; fairer and more 
transparent rules on contingent protection; better definitions and rules 
on transparency in regional trade agreements, as well as commitments to 
develop means to ensure that Article XXIV agreements will be consistent 
with multilateralism; and generous offers in terms of “aid for trade” and 
“trade facilitation plus.” Certainly, this scenario is far more sensitive at 
the national political level. 
Perhaps the negotiated outcome will be a combination of these two 
scenarios. Given the stakes for Asia, the region’s WTO member countries 
should be proactive in molding the negotiations in favor of the latter 
scenario. Above it is argued that the unique situation of Asia suggests that 
it has strong leadership potential. Hopefully, the political will to assume 
such a role will be forthcoming.
What will the global trading system need to tackle in future WTO 
rounds? As the Doha outcome is still unknown, prediction is doubly 
difficult. However, it is suggested that the following six areas will be 
important features of the next round: 
1. As the Swiss formula under NAMA will likely achieve a good deal 
of progress, it will be the least controversial area, at least relative to earlier 
rounds. Average tariffs are already quite low; Doha should reduce them 
further and create greater symmetry. Mega-tariffs should be a thing of 
the past. Hence, reductions in tariffs in manufactures will likely be on 
the agenda but will not be as important as in previous rounds. Could 
a complete phaseout of tariffs in developed countries be a goal? And 
perhaps 10% maximum tariffs in developing countries?
2. Regardless of the outcome of current negotiations, agriculture 
will still be important. How important will depend on progress made at 
Doha. Export subsidies will be gone, but tariffs will continue to be high 
and domestic support trade-inhibiting. The next round will seek to lower 
tariffs and put further constraints on domestic support. This sector will 
continue to be difficult; reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
will be particularly significant in defining the next round’s potential. 
3. Given the importance of the services sector and the fact that it 
will likely see modest progress at best at Doha, this will be one of the 
most important focus areas at the next round. It will require significant 
preparation, as trade in services is extremely complex. But as a priority, it 
should receive considerable attention. And its potential to stimulate trade 
appears to be even greater than that in agriculture and manufactures. 
4. Trade and investment issues, trade and competition policy, 
government procurement, and trade facilitation will also be a high 
priority on the negotiation agenda. These were known prior to Cancun 
as the “Singapore issues.” However, they proved too controversial for the 
Doha Development Agenda. Indeed, the failure at Cancun was blamed 
on them (and lack of progress in agriculture) and they were subsequently 
dropped, with the exception of trade facilitation. Look for them to be 
reincorporated, particularly since they continue to be a high priority for 
developed countries (as is evident by their incorporation in bilateral free 
trade areas with developing countries). Aid for trade, in particular trade 
facilitation, will also become a more salient feature of the global talks. Asian Development Outlook 2006    
5. Contingent protection will also receive much higher priority in 
the future. Since there is not much hope that significant progress will 
be reached in controlling (particularly) antidumping and countervailing 
duties, countries will no doubt try to use them in order to protect sectors 
facing significant structural change due to liberalization in agriculture 
and manufactures. Moreover, by the next round, the PRC’s transition 
period will be over (precluding the imposition of import quotas on its 
exports of textiles and clothing, recently applied so firmly by, especially, 
the EU and US) and new, labor-abundant, competitive economies like 
Viet Nam should be full-fledged members. The trend toward greater 
usage of contingent protection will surely continue, and its threat to 
international trade will become increasingly significant. 
6. The most important area will probably pertain to regional 
and bilateral free trade areas. As noted above and more extensively 
documented in Part 3 of Asian Development Outlook 2006, regionalism 
has been growing rapidly, with Asia becoming an active and enthusiastic 
participant. This trend will likely continue for at least another few years. 
At that time, the trade effects of these agreements will start to be felt, 
and the costs associated with the “spaghetti bowl” will be increasingly 
recognized. The need for more effective rules and best-practices will 
become increasingly evident. 
To conclude, much is at stake at Doha for Asia and the world. Much 
is riding on a successful outcome. The negotiators have their hands full, 
as the issues are complex and controversial in some quarters. But with 
the right leadership and political will, a successful conclusion to the Doha 
Development Agenda is certainly feasible.
Two final remarks on the strategies of developing Asia in Doha. First, 
there is no “round for free”; active participation is not an option but a 
necessary condition to reap the gains from multilateral negotiations. 
This is because offering to liberalize hitherto protected sectors allows not 
only for concessions in exchange but also for gains from trade. Countries 
tend to gain most from their own liberalization. Second, developing 
member countries of ADB that are not yet members of WTO need to 
focus on accession. Without WTO membership, they will never fully be 
able to take advantage of the new trade architecture that is being created. 
Even if they receive most-favored-nation status or even preferential 
treatment from key trading partners, they are still outside the system. 
And one cannot change the system from outside. Moreover, a focus on 
WTO accession means that negotiating capacities—often limited in the 
developing member countries—should not be diverted to other areas, 
for example, in negotiating bilateral and regional trade agreements. The 
opportunity cost is too high. 
Endnotes
1  For example, tariff cuts on capital goods imports have been very successful in past rounds, 
whereas textiles and clothing remain highly protected in countries that do not have a 
comparative advantage in this area. Since textiles and clothing use capital goods in the 
production process, this reduction in input costs will have the tendency to increase the 
protection of value added in the textile and clothing industry, thereby creating an incentive 0    Asian Development Outlook 2006
for additional resources to be allocated to this inefficient sector. This is known as the 
problem of the “effective rate of protection” in economics. 
2  Per capita income will be the most likely criterion used to determine whether a country 
should benefit from “special and differential treatment.” 
3  More specifically, the G10 is opposed to substantial opening in agriculture; the G33 
supports easy exceptions from liberalization, e.g., via the notions of special products or 
safeguards; the G20 focuses on the opening of the farm markets of developed countries; and 
the Cairns Group is dedicated to global opening of agricultural markets. 
4  As the welfare costs of tariffs increase disproportionately as the tariff level rises, larger 
reductions in the highest tariffs have a more than proportional positive effect on efficiency 
and welfare. 
5  In general, moderate tariffs provide larger revenues than high tariffs. This is in large part 
due to the decrease in import volume associated with high import prices generated by steep 
protection. The fiscal aspect of the tariff is particularly important for developing countries 
with a narrow domestic tax base.
6  “Bound” tariff rates for individual products are those that a WTO member has committed 
not to exceed in past GATT rounds or as part of their protocol of accession.
7  First, exclusions of sectors give an advantage to countries with better negotiators, creating 
an advantage for developed countries over many developing countries. Second, countries 
will likely exclude the sectors with the largest potential for trade creation. And third, the 
symmetry of liberalization imposed by the Swiss formula would be distorted.
8  It should be noted that Australia and New Zealand have liberal farm policies already in 
place.
9  The EU is by far the main user of this instrument; it accounts for more than 80% of all 
global export subsidies in agriculture. 
10 Subsidies are used in order to maintain a certain standard of living for farmers. If tariffs 
are cut, either the country needs to increase subsidies to maintain those standards, or allow 
for a reduction in living standards. The former policy would in part negate any gains from 
liberalization, whereas the latter would help achieve the necessary structural adjustment. In 
any event, if the decision is made to maintain standards by increasing subsidies, this is more 
“transparent” than tariff protection because it comes at a quantifiable fiscal cost. 
11 Arguably this happened in certain cases at the Uruguay Round, when import quotas had to 
undergo “tariffication”. 
12 Among other things, plurilateral negotiations facilitate negotiations by allowing a critical 
mass of like-minded countries to pursue liberalization in areas that would be difficult for 
other countries. This approach has already been used with success in the complex 1996 
WTO Information Technology Agreement.
13 Trade policy reviews involve periodic assessments of the trade policies of WTO member 
states. 
14 There are at least three major criticisms. First, it represents no additional commitment 
for the EU, as part of its Everything But Arms initiative has a 100% coverage, and a very 
marginal one for the US, which grants duty-free and quota-free access to its market for 83% 
of imports from LDCs. Second, the remaining 3% of tariff lines (roughly 300–400 lines) 
could easily cover all the crucial exports of most LDCs, which tend to have a limited range 
of exportable products. Third, the agreement covers only the LDCs, so excluding many 
poor countries that are not classified as LDCs. 
15 Developing countries here refer to Asian developing economies, Latin America, and the rest 
of the world.Asian Development Outlook 2006    1
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